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Abstract
My thesis consists of three essays on the industrial organization of pharmaceutical mar-
kets. In Chapter 1, I introduce the three essays and present the main results. In Chapter
2, I quantify how uncertainty aﬀects medical decision-making by physicians. I estimate
a dynamic model of demand where physicians may learn about the eﬀectiveness of drug
treatments from their prescription experiences. In the model, physicians may want experi-
ment new drugs for their patients to get information that is valuable for their future drug
choices. At the same time, risk aversion can make physicians reluctant to try less well-
known, but potentially superior products. Using a rich Finnish data on cholesterol drug
prescriptions, I study the roles of experimentation and learning in drug demand. I ﬁnd
that the eﬀectiveness of cholesterol drugs varies across patients which creates uncertainty
to medical decision-making. My results suggest that uncertainty and risk aversion create
substantial switching costs in drug demand. I also ﬁnd that if physicians became more
willing to experiment with their treatment choices, the process of learning would improve
and the eﬃciency of medical decision-making would increase.
In Chapter 3, I develop a framework for analyzing demand for experience goods where
agents can learn product quality both from their own experiences and from the past
behavior of their peers. I modify the standard theoretical models with social learning,
by allowing agents to make repeated choices. I focus on the medical decision-making of
physicians under uncertainty about the eﬀectiveness of drug treatment. I ask whether in-
formation on the past choices of other physicians improves the eﬃciency of drug choices.
My estimates from the Finnish market for cholesterol drugs suggest that treatment pat-
terns relying heavily on the past choices of other physicians can lead to over-prescribing.
I show that continuity of care - in the sense of a patient repeatedly consulting the same
doctor - is an eﬃcient policy to limit over-prescribing and to promote learning.
Finally, in Chapter 4, I explore how intellectual property rights change the competitive
environment and technology ﬂows between ﬁrms. Traditionally, stronger patents have
been viewed to have an essential role in promoting innovation. Economic theory predicts
that longer patents may hinder rather than stimulate innovation by increasing competi-
tion during the patent period. The theory also suggests that broad patents increase the
costs of imitation and thus decrease competition. I test the relationship between patent
strength and competition during patent protection. I consider the Finnish markets for
pharmaceuticals that provide rich variation in both patent length and breadth across
innovations. I ﬁnd that patent breadth, rather than length, prevents imitation. Patent
rights have no eﬀect on the risk of parallel trade.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1
"Life is short, and the Art long; the occasion ﬂeeting; experience fallacious, and judgment
diﬃcult."
Hippocrates
1.1 Introduction
This thesis contains three empirical industrial organization (IO) studies on markets for
pharmaceuticals. Economists have long been concerned with the question on whether
medical care markets are diﬀerent from other markets. The question goes back to a
seminal paper by Arrow (1963) who explained that the speciﬁc feature of the medical care
markets is uncertainty. In this thesis, I show that uncertainty has important implications
on the eﬃciency of health care provision.
Uncertainty is particularly present in every dimension of the clinical judgment by a physi-
cian, from doing a diagnosis, to deciding a laboratory test, interpreting the patient's
symptoms and to choosing a medical intervention. A disease involves often the complex,
abnormal conditions of physiological mechanisms that depend on various factors, such as
the patient's genotype, choices and environment. Quantiﬁable data and the physician's
personal experience help to understand the disease and to choose a medical interven-
tion. The data can be easily stored and transmitted between physicians through patient
records, whereas the personal knowledge may not be explicitly measurable. This knowl-
edge can be gathered during the course of the patient's therapy, by treating other patients
with similar diseases, discussing with colleagues, reading academic journals and receiving
information through advertisements.
To illustrate the signiﬁcance of uncertainty in medical care markets further, consider
cholesterol drugs called statins that are prescribed to millions of people globally to de-
crease the risk for cardiovascular events, such as heart attack and stroke. An extensive
medical literature has documented that the beneﬁts and side-eﬀects of statins vary be-
tween patients, for example, by their age and gender. The physician may not thus know
in advance the health eﬀects of statins for a patient. Moreover, in the early 2000s, the
use of a statin called Cerivastatin was linked to fatal kidney failures and to 385 nonfatal
cases, most of whom required hospitalization. Given that Cerivastatin was estimated to
have 700,000 users in the United States at that time, many physicians were not be able
to fully anticipate the extent of serious adverse eﬀects (Furberg and Pitt, 2001).
In this thesis, I consider the behavioral consequences of uncertainty. In economics, an
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experience good is a product or service where product characteristics are not known
in advance but may be learned through diﬀerent channels, such as consumption or the
behavior of other agents. Many situations ﬁt into this category, such a choice between
restaurants, a ﬁrm's decision on subcontractors and clinical trials where pharmaceutical
ﬁrms aim to minimize patient deaths.
Let's ﬁrst consider a single agent's decision between diﬀerent alternatives under uncer-
tainty about their quality. A theoretical workhorse is the multi-armed bandit problem
(e.g. Gittins, 1979, Bergemann and Välimäki, 2006). In the problem, a gambler is in
the front of slot machines, or "one-armed bandits". He decides which machines to play,
how many times to play each machine and in which order to play them. When a certain
machine is played, a random reward realizes from a distribution speciﬁc to that machine.
The gambler's objective is to maximize the expected sum of rewards taking into account
that her information will improve over time. In other applications, the slot machines can
be replaced by, for example, products, services or medical interventions.
In the bandit problem, the agent has a trade-oﬀ between exploitation and exploration.
In exploitation, she makes a decision that provides the highest current utility given her
information, e.g. a physician prescribes a drug which clinical eﬀectiveness for a patient
is fairly easy to predict in advance. In exploration, the agent gathers more information
about its quality by experimenting, e.g. the physician prescribes a new drug treatment
with highly uncertain clinical eﬀectiveness. If the agent is risk averse, she can be unwilling
to try new, less well-known products, which decreases the price elasticity of demand. If
she nevertheless switches between products, she undergoes direct (current) welfare losses
but may beneﬁt from new information in the future. The second chapter of this thesis
quantiﬁes the roles of exploration and experimentation in demand for cholesterol drugs.
In the third chapter, I consider how the private experience of a physician and the past
choices of other doctors aﬀect the process of learning and prescription choices. I show that
the long-term doctor-patient relationship can improve the process of learning about the
health eﬀects of drug treatment and thereby increase the eﬃciency of medical decision-
making. On the other hand, treatment patterns that rely heavily on the past choices of
other doctors may lead to over-prescribing and eventually lower health.
To explain these predictions, consider the following setup. Physicians make one-shot
decisions for the patient between two options, the drug treatment and the outside good
(non-medical treatments). The drug has either high or low quality. For example, the
drug can either improve patient health or produce serious side eﬀects. The quality of the
outside good is normalized zero, i.e. it is between high and low quality. Before making her
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decision, the physician investigates the patient and privately observes the quality signal,
or health eﬀects, of the drug and the patient's prescription history. The signal of the ﬁrst
physician indicates that the drug is of high quality, so she chooses that. The second one
also receives a high signal on the drug and, by seeing the action of the ﬁrst one, she ﬁnds
out her signal. These two positive signals make the second physician even more optimistic
that the quality of the drug is high and so she chooses it. The third physician observes
a low quality signal on the drug but the past choices of others make her to choose the
drug treatment, and so forth. If quality is in reality high, observing the past choices of
other doctors improves the process of learning. If quality is low, the past choices of other
doctors increase the physician's optimism on quality and lead to over-prescribing. If the
physician-patient relationship was long-term, the physician would sooner or later ﬁnd out
quality.1
Empirical observations from pharmaceutical markets are consistent with uncertainty and
learning. The literature has demonstrated that the markets are characterized by signiﬁ-
cant ﬁrst-mover advantages (Caves et al., 1991, Grabowski and Vernon, 1992, and Hollis,
2002) and persistence in demand that is driven by the physician's own experience and
the past choices of other doctors (e.g. Hellerstein, 1998, Nair et al., 2010, Coscelli and
Shum, 2004). When physicians are risk averse, they may continue to prescribe the brand
name drug, as they and other doctors have got used to do, instead of considering new
treatment alternatives. Correspondingly, patients who have used brand name drugs for
many years may not be willing to switch to generic products. The brand name ﬁrm may
have an incentive to exploit locked-in physicians and patients by setting a high price for
its product. Consistent with this, empirical evidence suggests that brand name ﬁrms are
often able to maintain high prices, or even raise them, in response to generic entry (e.g.
Frank and Salkever, 1992, 1997, Regan, 2008). Policy makers have widely tried to con-
trol for high drug expenses with price ceilings and guided the behavior of physicians and
patients with public insurance policies, such as reference pricing.
Uncertainty is also present in the development of new innovations. Firms may not know
well the commercial success of their new drugs but only few innovations reach even the
marketing authorization stage. It has been estimated that less than 1 % of compounds
survive from pre-clinical period to human testing and 22 % from clinical trials to the US
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval. As generic products are developed with
substantially lower costs and risks than new drugs (Grabowski, 2002), patents have been
often seen as the lifeblood of pharmaceutical innovation.
1See Chamley (2004) for the review of social learning models where agents learn by observing the past
choices of other agents.
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Pharmaceutical patents do not necessarily protect against competition for at least two rea-
sons. First, imperfect intellectual property rights allow ﬁrms to invent around a patented
innovation. In particular, rivals may imitate an innovation with an analogy process patent
by inventing a (non-trivial) manufacturing processes that are not covered by the origi-
nal patent claims. Second, competitors may import a patented innovation from another
country without the permission of the intellectual property owner (e.g. Kyle, 2011).
Policy makers in the United States have been strengthening intellectual property rights
during the past few decades so that patents have become easier to enforce in court and
may be longer (Gallini, 2002). The rationale behind the reforms is that strong patents
provide higher rents for the incumbent on innovation and stimulate R&D. Both theoretical
and empirical evidence suggests that the eﬀect of strong patent systems on innovation can
be ambiguous or even negative (Gallini, 2002, Hassan et al., 2009). An explanation is
that patent policy aﬀects competition and technology transfer between ﬁrms. A longer
patent may increase imitation (Takalo, 1998, Gallini, 1992, Kanniainen and Stenbacka,
2000) and parallel trade and thus may not much promote innovation. Broader patents
may discourage follow-on invention, such as the development of non-infringing duplicates
(Gallini, 1992). The fourth chapter takes the ﬁrst step to test whether stronger patents
aﬀect competition, i.e. imitation and parallel trade, during the patent period. I consider
the Finnish markets for pharmaceuticals that provide rich variation in both patent length
and breadth across innovations.
The focus of this thesis is on the role uncertainty in demand. The literature has developed
structural models in order to infer uncertainty from observed choices and to analyze the
welfare consequences of learning. This thesis makes no exception in that respect. In the
second section, I ﬁrst discuss the beneﬁts and drawbacks of structural modeling in general.
I then present the existing literature on traditional discrete choice demand models where
the product's quality is known by agents (e.g. physicians). After that, I discuss the
literature on demand for experience goods. At the end of the chapter, I introduce the
remainder of this thesis.
1.2 Structural demand models
The analysis of demand has a long tradition in empirical IO. Researchers have used
and developed demand models for several purposes. First, the parameters of a utility
function may be interesting. For example, a researcher may want to estimate uncertainty
associated with the health eﬀects of drugs and the risk aversion coeﬃcient of physicians
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(Crawford and Shum, 2005, Chapters 2 and 3). Second, she may be want to study the
welfare eﬀects of diﬀerent policies on demand, such as the provision of information on the
quality of the match between a patient and a drug treatment (Crawford and Shum, 2005,
Chapter 2), the length of the doctor-patient relationship (Chapter 3), mergers (Nevo,
2000), the introduction of new goods (Petrin, 2002), insurer policies (Dickstein, 2011) or
price regulation (Ericson and Starc, 2012). Third, demand analysis is often needed in
to estimate the price-cost markups of ﬁrms (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995, hereafter
BLP).
In this subsection, I present a sample of the background literature on structural demand
models. I begin by evaluating the beneﬁts and limitations of structural econometric mod-
eling in general.2 I then discuss the traditional demand models where product qualities
are observed. This discussion helps to understand the main setup of my demand analysis
in Chapters 2 and 3. The traditional demand models are not, however, suitable for evalu-
ating the welfare consequences of uncertainty and learning that are present in markets for
pharmaceuticals. The second and third chapter of this thesis contribute to the literature
on demand for experience goods that I present at the end of this section.
1.2.1 Structural models
Structural econometrics uses econometric theory to produce statements about relation-
ships between endogenous variables y and exogenous variables (x, ω) that may be observ-
able (x) or unobservable (ω) to the agents of the theoretical model or the econometrician.
The relationships can be functions y = f(x, ω,Θ) or inequalities, e.g. y ≥ f(x, ω,Θ),
where Θ is a vector of parameters. Because econometric theory does not often provide
a reasonable description of the data, statistical assumptions about the distribution of
(y,x, ω) complete theoretical assumptions. These theoretical and statistical assumptions
are used to form predictions that are ﬁtted to data. After estimating the parameters, a
structural model can be used to evaluate responses to counterfactual, or not-yet-observed,
policies.
Non-structural approaches in economics include studies on the description of data, such
as the measurement of the prevalence of diseases in patient population or using non-
parametric techniques to estimate a medical expenditure density. At the other side are
statistical models that are used to predict outcomes without using any economic theory
about underlying relationships. For example, a researcher may want to predict demand
2This section is based on Reiss and Wolak (2007).
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for drugs with an autoregressive model based on the previous demand. Both of these
approaches are widely used in economics and statistics. In the middle between the struc-
tural and the "reduced-form" models are the "quasi structural" models that are only
loosely connected to economic theory. One example is a Heckman's (1979) sample selec-
tion model. The model has been used to analyze, for example, a patient's decision to visit
a doctor and the doctor's decision to choose treatment (see e.g. Jones, 2000).
Economic theory helps to formulate relationships between variables, to understand how
they are aﬀected by changes in institutional conditions and to identify causal relationships.
Consider the following example where a researcher wants to evaluate the eﬀects of new
drugs on competition between pharmaceutical ﬁrms. Suppose that the researcher observes
the products' demand, prices and characteristics and variation in the number of ﬁrms that
are active in the market. A descriptive model that uses very little economic theory, besides
specifying endogenous and exogenous variables, could predict how the market shares of
ﬁrms change with the number of competitors. Without any other information on the
nature of competition and demand, it could be hard to justify assumptions that would
guarantee a causal relationship between the number of ﬁrms and the market shares.
With theoretical and statistical assumptions, the researcher could specify supply and
demand for pharmaceuticals. She could then estimate the price elasticity of demand and
the price-cost margins of pharmaceutical ﬁrms that are not directly observable in the
data. Finally, the researcher could evaluate how the welfare of patients and the proﬁts of
ﬁrms change if some of the ﬁrms would exit the market. The counterfactual experiment
can be performed without observing any changes in the number of ﬁrms.
The process of structural modeling involves many choices. These choices may or may
not be credible from the viewpoint of statistical inference and knowledge on institutions
and economic theory. For example, a researcher may want to impose assumptions on
how marginal costs depend on product characteristics, whether ﬁrms decide on prices
(Bertrand competition) or quantities (Cournot competition) and whether physicians are
risk-averse, myopic or forward-looking while making their treatment choices for patients.
Some of the assumptions may be tested with data. For example, the researcher may want
to test if physicians are risk-averse or wants to evaluate whether Cournot or Bertrand
competition provide a better ﬁt to the data. Still, the functional form of a utility function
is frequently taken as given even though it aﬀects statistical inference and interpretation.
A careful researcher should, when possible, experiment with diﬀerent assumptions.
A convincing structural model should also respect both economic theory and institutional
environment that generates data. To make this more concrete, suppose that price ceiling
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regulation truncates the drug price distribution in the supply-demand -analysis. Then the
consistent estimation of the eﬀect of competitors on prices requires that this truncation
is taken into account. When price ceilings are binding, demand exceeds supply. For this
reason, an assumption on the equality of demand and supply does not hold (Reiss and
Wolak, 2007).
1.2.2 Traditional demand models
This section considers the traditional demand models where product characteristics are
observed by agents (e.g. physician or consumers) but not necessarily by the econometri-
cian. To understand the beneﬁts of discrete choice models that I apply in the analysis
of demand for pharmaceuticals, I ﬁrst discuss the neoclassical extensions of homogeneous
goods demand models.
Early work in IO considered the estimation of demand in an industry where products
are perfect substitutes (see e.g. Porter, 1983). The basic idea was to specify a system of
demand equations that depend on prices, exogenous market variables and demand shocks.
In the 1980s and the 1990s, researches became interested in demand for diﬀerentiated
products (see e.g. Bresnahan, 1981 and 1987). Instead of estimating a one industry level
demand equation, separate demand equations were often estimated for each product.
This approach created problems with the number of parameters that became often very
large without any restrictions. For example, if there were 100 drugs, the number of
estimated demand equations would be 100 and each of them would contain 100 price
elasticity coeﬃcients. The number of estimated parameters would be at least 10, 000
which requires large datasets and can cause computational challenges. One solution to
avoid "the curse of dimensionality" is to make parameter restrictions, such as to assume
that all cross-price elasticities are equal.3 Parameter restrictions are, however, often ad
hoc and aﬀect price-cost markups in an undesirable manner.
A another solution is to relate the utility of an agent to a set of parameters and the
attributes of the chosen product and the agent. For example, the utility of a patient from
a drug treatment may depend on the patient's income, age and gender as well as on price,
strength, drug form (e.g. a tablet) and route of administration. Market demand can then
be aggregated from agent level choices. This approach avoids the curse of dimensionality
because the computation of price elasticities is based on a much smaller set of utility
parameters.
3See Reiss and Wolak (2007) for more extensive discussion about solutions to the curse of dimension-
ality.
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The discrete choice literature goes back to 1970s and 1980s to the work of McFadden
(1973, 1981, 1982, 1984) who developed conditional multinomial logit models. These
models have received increased attention in empirical IO since the inﬂuential papers by
Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) (e.g. Ackerberg and Rysman, 2005,
Davis, 2000, Hendel, 1999, Nevo, 2000, Petrin, 2002).
To illustrate discrete choice demand models further, consider a physician who chooses
a drug treatment for her patient i among J alternatives. For simplicity, assume that
the physician is perfect agent for the patient, i.e. she maximizes the patient's utility.4
Suppose that the number of potential patients that may need drug treatment at time, or
prescription, t is Nt. The indirect utility of the patient for drug j, j ∈ {0, ..., J}, at time
(or market) t is
Uijt = U(Zjt, ωijt,Θ), (1.1)
where Zjt is a vector of covariates for the product at time t (including the price), ωijt is a
variable that varies by patients, products and time periods and Θ is a vector of parameters.
The alternative j = 0 denotes the outside good (e.g. non-medical treatments).
The physician chooses drug j at time t that maximizes the patient's utility,
j = argmaxk∈{0,...,J}U(Zkt, ωikt,Θ). (1.2)
Following the early work, assume that heterogeneity across patients arises only in prefer-
ence shocks and marginal valuations for characteristics are constant,
Uijt = Zjtβ + ωijt, (1.3)
where ωijt is the Type 1 extreme value distributed error term. This speciﬁcation implies
very restricted substitution patterns by assuming the independence of irrelevant alter-
natives (IIA). The assumption implies that the relative odds of choosing one alternative
over another do not depend on the presence or absence of other "irrelevant" alternatives.
For example, the relative probability of choosing between two cholesterol drugs does not
change if a new cholesterol drug is added as an additional possibility. The assumption
also implies that price elasticities are completely determined by prices and market shares,
not by how diﬀerent the products are (e.g. Berry, 1994).
4This assumptions allows me to drop the physician-index from the utility function. A demand model
can easily be extended to allow for variation across both physicians and patients (see Chapter 3).
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Random coeﬃcients for the characteristics are often used to get more realistic substitution
patterns. A vector of random coeﬃcients can, for example, depend on the patient's
demographics, Di, βi = β1 + Diβ2 + Σvi, where Σ is standard deviation and vi ∼ P (v).
For example, this speciﬁcation allows for patients with diabetes to beneﬁt more from
cholesterol drugs and to respond less to changes in prices than healthy patients do. The
indirect utility function is
Uijt = Zjtβi + θjt + ijt (1.4)
= Zjtβ1 + θjt︸ ︷︷ ︸
δjt
+Zjt(Diβ2 + Σvi) + ijt︸ ︷︷ ︸
ωijt
, (1.5)
where θjt is the alternative and time speciﬁc random coeﬃcient, δjt is the mean utility
and ijt is the preference shock. In the above expression, ωijt contains heterogeneity in
marginal utilities and the preference shock across patients. An alternative is a discrete
version of random coeﬃcients where βi ∈ {β1, ..., βK} and pk = P (βi = bk|Di). For
the estimation of these type of models with the simulated maximum likelihood or Gibbs
sampling, see Train (2009).
BLP extended the random coeﬃcient multinomial logit models by allowing for unobserved
(to the econometrician) product characteristics θjt to be correlated with the observed
characteristics, such as the price. They also assumed that neither the ﬁrms nor the
econometrician observes ωijt in (5) but knows the distributions of the random coeﬃcients.
The expected demand for drug j at time t is a sum of purchasing probabilities,
qejt(δt,Θ) =
Nt∑
n=1
Eωijt(U(δjt, ωijt,Θ) ≥ maxk 6=j{U(δkt, ωikt,Θ)}) (1.6)
=
Nt∑
i=1
P (The physician chooses drug j at time t for patient i), (1.7)
where Nt is the number of potential patients.
Let δt be a vector of mean utilities, sjt(δt,Θ) = q
e
jt(δt,Θ)/Nt be predicted market shares
and Sjt be observed market shares. Because predicted market shares sjt(δt,Θ) = Sjt for
drugs depend on the mean utility vector δt, the mean utility vector can be recovered by
inverting the market shares, δt = s
−1(St,Θ), where St is a vector of observed market
shares. In the logit model (3), the inversion can be done analytically by δjt = lnsjt −
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lns0t, where s0t is the market share of the outside good (Berry, 1994). With the random
coeﬃcients, numerical methods can be used to compute the predicted market shares and
the inversion.
Several papers have generalized discrete choice demand models further. For example,
Ackerberg and Rysman (2005), Bajari and Benkard, (2001, 2005) have modiﬁed the as-
sumptions of BLP on the functional form of the utility function or the distribution of
agent heterogeneity. In Gentzkow (2007), agents may choose multiple products, that can
be either substitutes or complements, at the same time. The traditional demand models
also assume that agents know product quality θjt. The assumption is not often realis-
tic in markets for pharmaceuticals. In these markets, the eﬀectiveness and side eﬀects
of drugs can diﬀer across patients which creates uncertainty to the physician's medical
decision-making. Next, I consider demand models that take into account uncertainty in
quality.
1.2.3 Demand models with unobserved quality
This section presents the literature on discrete choice demand models for experience goods.
In the models, an agent does not know in advance the quality of available options that
may be learning by consumption or by observing the past choices of other agents. In this
thesis, I focus on demand models with Bayesian learners.5
To describe the setup of the learning models, consider again a physician's (she) prescrip-
tion choice when she is a perfect agent for her patient (he). Assume that the physician
does not know in advance how sensitive the patient is for the eﬀectiveness and side eﬀects
of available drugs. Denote the quality of the match between product j and patient i by
θij.
6 The quality has the prior distribution F (θij,Z
q
ij1) that may depend on a vector of
observables at the beginning of the drug therapy, Zqij1.
While investigating the patient, the physician observes certain health eﬀects associated
with the use of the prescribed drug. Let xijt = θij + σvijt, where σ is standard deviation
and vijt ∼ F (v), measure health eﬀects, or signals, that are realized after the patient has
taken the drug in period t. Denote a set of the state variables by Sit. The set contains
preference shocks ijt, health eﬀects xijt and characteristics Zijt that are observed by the
beginning of period t.
5For example, in macroeconomics there is the extensive literature on non-bayesian learning, see e.g.
Evans and Honkapohja (2011).
6In this thesis, I analyze the physician's learning about the patient-speciﬁc quality of drugs. For
learning about the average health eﬀects of drugs across patients, θj , see e.g. Coscelli and Shum (2004).
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The physician maximizes the patient's discounted expected utility conditional on the state
variables. The value function for drug j at time t is
Uj(Sit) = E(u(xijt)|Sit) + Zijtβ + ijt + ρE[maxk∈{0,...,J}Uk(Si(t+1)|Sit, j)], (1.8)
where ρ is the discount factor and u(xijt) is a sub-utility function for health eﬀects.
Conditional on the state variables, the ﬁrst element of the value function is the expected
per-period utility for drug j and the second one is the continuation value given that drug
j was chosen.
The physician updates her beliefs about quality based on observed health eﬀects, creating
dynamics to pharmaceutical demand. When health eﬀects are normally distributed, the
updating process is simple because the posterior distribution of θij at the beginning of
period t, f(θij|{xijt′ , t′ < t}), is also normal (see DeGroot, 1970). Over time, more health
realize and the physician's belief about quality become more precise (see e.g. Chapters 2
and 3 and Crawford and Shum, 2005).
To simplify the problem further, several papers (e.g., Coscelli and Shum, 2004, Ching,
2009, Chernew et al., 2009) have assumed agents are myopic, i.e. the discount factor
equals zero. This assumptions abstracts away incentives to experiment with new, less well-
known products. Despite of the computational challenges, many papers have estimated
a dynamic demand model, starting from Erdem and Keane (1996) (e.g. Ackerberg, 2003,
Chan et al., 2006, Crawford and Shum, 2005, Ching, 2009, Dickstein, 2011, and Kim,
2010). The second chapter ﬁts into this literature and estimates the importance of learning
through experimentation in the Finnish market for cholesterol drugs.
The structural learning literature has typically assumed that agents learn from their own
experience or observe the signals of their predecessors perfectly. In many situations,
agents may infer quality by using their own experiences and the past choices of peers.
For example, physicians want to prescribe products that other doctors have previously
prescribed (see the Section 3 of this thesis), restaurants full of customers are thought
to sell high quality food, people want to be friends with those who are popular and an
unemployment period is often believed to reveal information to the employer about the
quality of the job applicant.
The literature on structural social learning models is still very limited, with a few excep-
tions (Cipriani and Guarino, 2012, Zhang, 2010, Knight and Schiﬀ, 2010).7 Cipriani and
7To be more speciﬁc, Cipriani and Guarino (2012) investigate the herding behavior of investors, Zhang
(2010) analyzes kidney replacement decisions and Knight and Schiﬀ (2010) consider elections.
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Guarino and Knight and Schiﬀ assume that agents are myopic, whereas Zhang allows for
agents to be forward looking. The literature assumes that quality is constant across agents
who make once-in-a-lifetime decisions.8 Unlike the previous literature, I take into into ac-
count both private and social learning, by allowing for agents make repeated decisions,
and allow for heterogeneity in quality (Section 3).
1.3 A summary of chapters
This section provides a summary of chapters. The second chapter presents a dynamic
model of demand for pharmaceuticals where a physician does not know ex-ante the av-
erage health eﬀects of drug treatments for a patient. With the model, I investigate the
value of experimentation in the Finnish market for cholesterol drugs. In the third chapter,
I provide a structural model of demand for pharmaceuticals with learning from the physi-
cian's personal experience and the past choices of other doctors. With the counterfactual
experiments, I analyze how the length of the doctor-patient relationship aﬀects learning
and the eﬃciency of medical decision-making. In the ﬁnal section, I ask whether stronger
patents prevent competition during patent protection.
1.3.1 Chapter 2: Experimentation and Learning in Pharmaceu-
tical Demand: Evidence from the Cholesterol Drug Market
Uncertainty and learning can have important behavioral implications on drug treatment
choices by a physician. The physician can have incentives to experiment with new prod-
ucts to get more information about the eﬀectiveness of drugs. At the same time, uncer-
tainty and risk-aversion can make the physician reluctant to try new drug treatments for
the patient. The second chapter quantiﬁes the roles of learning and experimentation in
pharmaceutical demand. I estimate a structural model of medical decision-making under
uncertainty about the health eﬀects of drug treatments for a particular patient. After tak-
ing the drug, the physician observes two health eﬀects: the ﬁrst eﬀect aﬀects the patient's
symptoms and the second one aﬀects the probability that the drug therapy continues. If
the patient's therapy continues, this new information helps the physician to form more
precise predictions about the quality of the match between the patient and the drug. I
8In this case, a set of state variables, Sit, includes a (one) experience signal xit of agent i and the past
choices of other agents.
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focus on the Finnish market for cholesterol drugs. In this market, exit rates are high and
physicians are very unwilling to change the drug treatment of their patients.
The parameter estimates imply that much of the uncertainty regarding to health eﬀects is
resolved after the ﬁrst prescription. As physicians are estimated to be risk-averse, they are
unwilling to prescribe new treatment alternatives for their patients. My ﬁndings suggest
that if doctors became more willing to take risks in their treatment choices, the process
of learning would improve. I also show that if a physician does not learn, the patient's
welfare decreases and the quit rate from the drug therapy increases. These ﬁndings
indicate that information provision about the average health eﬀects of drug treatments
should be promoted.
1.3.2 Chapter 3: Private Experience and Observational Learning
in Pharmaceutical Demand
Uncertainty about the quality of a product is present in many markets. Agents may
apply their own experiences and the past choices of their peers to re-evaluate how well
the product matches with their preferences. Somewhat surprisingly, previous work about
the roles of private and social learning in demand has remained very limited. In the
third chapter of this thesis, I consider these issues in medical decision-making under
uncertainty about the eﬀects of drug treatment on patient health. I apply the standard
theoretical models with social learning (Chamley, 2004), by allowing for physicians to
take repeated choices. I test whether the long-term doctor-patient relationship is more
eﬃcient than providing information on the past choices of other doctors through patient
records. Policies that guarantee continuity of care are commonly used in primary care to
promote the process of learning and improve medical decision-making (e.g. Scott, 2000).
My data from the Finnish market for cholesterol drugs conﬁrms that prescriptions are
highly responsive to the length of the doctor-patient relationship. I explain this ﬁnding
by showing that the number of interactions between the physician and the patient have
important implications on pharmaceutical demand. Speciﬁcally, I ﬁnd that the long-term
treatment relationship promotes the process of learning and improves physician decision-
making. I demonstrate that treatment patterns relying on the past choices of other doctors
hinder learning and may lead to over-prescribing for a fraction of patients. This is so, since
an inexperienced physician becomes more optimistic about quality, or the average health
eﬀects, if other doctors have prescribed the drug for the patient previously. Overall, my
ﬁndings suggest that providing information on the past choices of other doctors does not
compensate for the lack of the long-term relationship.
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1.3.3 Chapter 4: Do Stronger Patents Protect Against Competi-
tion? Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry
The main goals of the patent system is to stimulate innovation and to encourage ﬁrms
to disclose their innovations. The system is often claimed to be ineﬃcient in achieving
these goals, in part because patents do not provide exclusive rights for the innovator.
Competitors are frequently inventing around patented innovations (Boldrin and Levine,
2005). In certain industries, such as software, music and pharmaceuticals, the resale of
goods between countries (so called parallel trade) may also arise without the authorization
of the owner of the intellectual property (Kyle, 2011). Over the past decades, policy
makers in the United States have been strengthening patent protection such that patents
have become longer for some innovations and easier to enforce in court (Gallini, 2002). The
rationale behind these reforms is that stronger patents increase the proﬁts of an innovator
and promote innovation. Economic theory predicts that longer patents may hinder rather
than stimulate innovation by increasing competition during the patent period. Broad
patents increase the costs of imitation and thus decrease competition. In the fourth
chapter, I test the theory on the relationship between patent strength and competition
during patent protection.9
I consider the Finnish markets for pharmaceuticals that provide rich variation in patent
length and breadth across innovations. With this variation, I analyze how the patent
rights of an incumbent innovation aﬀect the risks of imitation and parallel trade. My
results suggest that patent breadth - measured by the number of claims - discourages
imitation. I ﬁnd no evidence that patent length would increase the risk of imitation
during patent protection. The eﬀects of both patent length and breadth on the rate of
parallel trade are also insigniﬁcant. These ﬁndings suggest that policy makers should
promote broader, rather than longer, patents if they aim to decrease imitation incentives
and to guarantee higher rents for the incumbent on its R&D eﬀorts. Still, further work is
required to understand the role of patents in a cumulative innovation process.
9See Grönqvist, 2009, for the eﬀect of patent length on the private value of patents in Finland.
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Chapter 2
Experimentation and Learning in
Pharmaceutical Demand
Buyers do not necessarily observe the quality of products in advance but may learn them
through consumption. Such uncertainty creates incentives to experiment with new prod-
ucts to gain more information. At the same time, uncertainty makes risk-averse buyers
reluctant to try new, less well-known products. Still, traditional demand models ignore
uncertainty and learning. In this chapter, I estimate a dynamic model of demand for
cholesterol drugs that allows for learning through experimentation. The results suggest
the average health eﬀects of cholesterol drugs are heterogeneous across patients which cre-
ates uncertainty to medical decision-making. My analysis also identiﬁes drugs that induce
higher exit rates from the cholesterol drug therapy. I ﬁnd that uncertainty and risk aver-
sion make physicians unwilling to try new drug treatments for their patients. These results
suggest that if doctors became more willing to experiment with their treatment choices,
the process of learning would improve and the eﬃciency of medical decision-making would
increase.
Keywords: learning, structural modeling, unobserved quality, demand, physician behavior
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2.1 Introduction
In markets for experience goods, agents may learn about the unknown quality of products
through experimentation. In each period, an agent chooses a product that best matches
with her preferences by knowing that her purchase will reveal new information about its
quality. Through repeated choices, information accumulates and uncertainty diminishes.
In many of these markets, the degree of risk version may have signiﬁcant implications on
behavior. One particularly interesting example is medical decision-making by physicians
about risky treatment alternatives for their patients. When the health eﬀects of drugs are
uncertain, risk-aversion can signiﬁcantly increase the costs of uncertainty and slow down
the process of ﬁnding the best treatment alternative for a patient.
In this chapter, I study the roles of experimentation and risk aversion in the drug choices
of physicians by using data from the Finnish market for cholesterol drugs called statins.
The market is particularly interesting for several reasons. First, an extensive medical
literature has shown that the health beneﬁts and side eﬀects of statins vary between
patients.1 This heterogeneity creates uncertainty about the eﬀectiveness of the statin
therapy for a patient. Second, my data show that physicians are very unwilling to change
the drug treatments of their patients. I explain this ﬁnding with risk aversion and learning
about the average health eﬀects of cholesterol drugs. Third, potential improvements in the
patients' health are substantial, as statins is one of the world's largest selling drug groups.
Still, a third of patients in my data exit the drug therapy after the ﬁrst prescription.
I develop my analysis as follows. A patient (she) comes to a physician (he) to seek a drug
treatment for her medical condition. The physician diagnoses ﬁrst the (ﬁxed) medical
condition of the patient. Conditional on the diagnosis, the physician chooses a cholesterol
drug under uncertainty about the average health eﬀects, or match values, of available
drugs for this particular patient. After the patient has taken the drug, the physician
observes two health eﬀects. The ﬁrst one captures the eﬀect of the drug on the patient's
symptoms (side eﬀects). The second one measures how the drug treatment aﬀects the
exit rate. The therapy may end, for example, because the short-term therapy decreased
the patient's total cholesterol under the desired level (5mmol/L) or lifestyle changes were
more eﬀective than the prescribed drug in reducing the patient's risk for cardiovascular
events.2 If the therapy continues, the physician makes a prescription. The decision takes
into account the initial diagnosis and the physician's beliefs about match values that are
based on the observed health eﬀects. These steps are repeated until the patient's drug
1See for example National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (2006).
2Crawford and Shum (2005) interpreted the exit probability as the probability of recovery.
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therapy ends.
Uncertainty and learning about the eﬀectiveness of medical treatments have two important
implications on prescription behavior. Risk aversion makes the physician reluctant to
try a new treatment compared with a drug that has more certain, but possibly lower,
eﬀectiveness.3 On the other hand, a forward-looking physician may have an incentive to
experiment with a new treatment to get information about its health eﬀects. While the
former causes persistence, or "switching costs", in drug choices, the latter creates diﬀusion
in demand.
This chapter relates to the growing literature on demand for experience goods. A signiﬁ-
cant portion of the existing literature has assumed that agents are myopic, i.e. their dis-
count factor is zero (Coscelli and Shum 2004, Chernew et al., 2008, Ching 2008, Narayanan
and Manchanda 2009). The assumption abstracts away incentives to experiment. A few
papers (e.g. Crawford and Shum, 2005, hereafter CS, Ackerberg, 2003, Ching, 2009, Dick-
stein, 2011, Kim, 2010) study the demand of forward-looking agents under uncertainty.
Finally, this paper is related to the literature that identiﬁes risk preferences from the
observed choices of myopic agents (e.g. Cohen and Einav, 2007, Chetty, 2006).
The ﬁrst objective of this paper is to replicate the dynamic model of CS in the Finnish
market for cholesterol drugs. A diﬀerence between cholesterol drugs and anti-ulcer drugs
analyzed in CS is that cholesterol drugs are used as preventive treatments for cardiovas-
cular diseases whereas anti-ulcer drugs treat ulcers in the stomach and the upper part of
the small intestine. Second, after conﬁrming that the results are qualitatively similar with
CS, I perform counterfactuals that have been ignored in much of the existing literature
on demand for experience goods. First, I evaluate the implications of risk aversion on
demand and eﬃciency. Risk aversion may create habit persistence, slow down the learn-
ing process and decrease incentives to experiment.4 Second, in order to understand the
role of experimentation in demand, I evaluate how treatment outcomes and costs change
when physicians become myopic.5 In this case, physicians do not take into account the
consequences of their treatment choices on the patients' future health.
The parameter estimates indicate that the average health eﬀects of cholesterol drugs
3In practice, the risk aversion parameter captures factors that cause strong persistence in the prescrip-
tion choices of a physician for a patient. Besides risk aversion, these factors may include, for example,
time constraints and marketing eﬀorts directed at the physician.
4See Cohen and Einav (2007) for the implications of risk aversion for individual behavior and pricing
in insurance contracts.
5On the contrary, CS evaluated this issue with a policy experiment where the physician is restricted
to prescribe the ﬁrst drug to his patient in every period until she is healed.
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are heterogeneous across patients, creating uncertainty to medical decision-making by a
physician. The results suggest that market leaders Simvastatin and Atorvastatin perform
reasonably well in the symptomatic dimension. My analysis, however, indicates that
the use of Simvastatin induces higher exit rates than the use of other cholesterol drugs.
Physicians learn fast as much of the uncertainty dissipates after the ﬁrst prescription.
At this stage of the therapy, the physician observes how eﬀectively the ﬁrst prescription
decreased the patient's cholesterol levels and whether it caused any side eﬀects.
The counterfactuals show that the provision of information about the average health
eﬀects of drugs can signiﬁcantly increase the eﬃciency of medical decision-making. Con-
sistent with high persistence in demand for cholesterol drugs, I ﬁnd that risk aversion
makes physicians unwilling to experiment new, less well-known treatment alternatives for
their patients. The results also suggest that if physicians became more willing to take
risks in their treatment choices, the process of learning through experimentation would
improve and the welfare of a patient would increase.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The second section presents the dataset
and descriptive results. Section 2.3 goes through the theoretical model. Section 2.4
presents the likelihood function and discusses identiﬁcation. Section 2.5 presents the
estimation results. Section 2.6 evaluates the ﬁt of the model and shows ﬁndings from the
counterfactual experiments. The ﬁnal section of this chapter concludes.
2.2 Market and data description
2.2.1 The Finnish cholesterol drug market
I study the prescriptions of physicians in the Finnish market for cholesterol drugs. Choles-
terol drugs are used to lower cholesterol levels in the blood by reducing the production
of cholesterol by the liver. Abnormal cholesterol levels, where the concentration of LDL-
cholesterol ("bad" cholesterol) is high and the concentration of HDL-cholesterol ("good"
cholesterol) is low, are one of the risk factors of cardiovascular diseases (CVD), such as
coronary heart disease, heart attack and stroke. High morbidity to cardiovascular diseases
has made cholesterol drugs as one of the world's largest selling drug groups.
I focus on the choices of physicians between diﬀerent active ingredients that are referred to
"drugs". Corresponding to the United States, 6 active ingredients are on the Finnish statin
market: Simvastatin (brand-name Zocor), Lovastatin (Mevacor), Pravastatin (Pravachol
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or Selektine), Fluvastatin (Lescol, Canef or Vastin), Atorvastatin (Lipitor) and Rosuvas-
tatin (Crestor).6 Active ingredients diﬀer to some extent in their eﬀectiveness, side eﬀects
and prices. Patients respond diﬀerently to statins which creates uncertainty about to
the eﬀectiveness of statins for a patient (the Finnish current care for dyslipidemia, 2011,
Jousilahti, 2004).7 Some individuals may also have more side eﬀects with a one statin
than another.8
A physician's statin treatment decision is based on the evaluation of the patient's risk
for CVDs. This evaluation is based on several factors, including the patient's gender,
age, blood pressure and cholesterol levels. In the model, the initial evaluation aﬀects
the prior beliefs of a physician about the quality of the match between the patient and
cholesterol drugs.9 The choice of a cholesterol drug is based on the (expected) beneﬁts and
adverse eﬀects of cholesterol drugs. The main objective of cholesterol drug treatment is to
decrease the total cholesterol level below 5 mmol/L or LDL-cholesterol below 3 mmol/L.
If a cholesterol drug causes side eﬀects for the patient, the physician decreases the dosage,
experiments with an another statin or ends the cholesterol drug therapy (the Finnish
current care for dyslipidemia, 2011). In the model, the physician observes health eﬀects
associated with the use of a cholesterol drug. These eﬀects aﬀect the patient's current
utility from the drug (side eﬀects) and the probability that the statin therapy ends.
The Pharmaceuticals Pricing Board, that is subordinated to the Ministry of Social Aﬀairs
and Health in Finland, regulates drug prices with price ceilings. The regulation decreases
variation in drug prices across years. Price ceilings were likely to be binding for Flu-
vastatin, Atorvastatin and Rosuvastatin that remained under patent protection during
the whole observation period 2003 − 2006 and thus did not face ﬁerce competition from
generics. In the empirical application, I assume that drug prices are constant over time
in order to reduce computational burden.10 Table 2.1 shows that the averages prices of
cholesterol drugs vary still across products. In my sample, that is described below, the
6Within the group of an active ingredient, statins diﬀer also in drug forms, package sizes, strengths
and prices. Besides these active ingredients, combination preparations of a statin and another active
ingredient are also in the market.
7For example, the statin therapy is useful for men, post menopausal women and patients who have
arterial disease or diabetes. The risk of side-eﬀects can increase with genetic susceptibility and certain
drug interactions. Approximately 5% of patients have muscular symptoms (the Finnish current care for
dyslipidemia, 2011).
8See "Controlling Cholesterol with Statins" by U.S. Food and Drug Administration (2010).
9Lifestyle changes, including exercising and changes in diet, are often adequate for a low-risk patient.
However, patients are often unwilling to change their lifestyles (Johnston, 1999).
10This assumption implies that prices are not included in a set of state variables, which simpliﬁes the
computation of a dynamic demand model.
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average price of the oldest active ingredient, Simvastatin, was 85% lower than the average
price of the most expensive statin, Atorvastatin.
Table 2.1: Market and sample description
Active ingredient ATC1 Marketing Average cost3 Market share4
authorization
date2
Simvastatin C10AA01 1992/02 16.15 0.46
Lovastatin C10AA02 1988/06 47.85 0.01
Pravastatin C10AA03 1992/04 95.63 0.04
Fluvastatin C10AA04 1995/11 79.11 0.04
Atorvastatin C10AA05 1997/04 110.12 0.28
Rosuvastatin C10AA07 2003/03 83.23 0.18
Mean Std Min Max
Nbr of prescriptions 2.81 1.72 1.00 10.00
Diﬀerence between
prescriptions (months) 6.79 6.22 0 38
Nbr of diﬀerent drugs 1.26 0.48 1.00 3.00
Censoring indicator (1: yes, 0: no) 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
Non-rational expectations
indicator (1: yes, 0: no) 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
Individuals 1000
Observations 2812
1. The Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) Classiﬁcation of an active ingredient.
2. The date of the ﬁrst marketing authorization. Source: National Agency for Medicines.
3. An average over sample period.
4. Share/total prescriptions.
2.2.2 The dataset
I use a rich dataset of all purchased cholesterol drug prescriptions received by Finnish
patients between January 1 in 2003 and December 31 in 2006.11 The data contains the
date of the prescription and the characteristics of patients, their physicians and products.12
I follow CS to prepare the dataset for the empirical analysis. To simplify the theoretical
model, I remove patients with multiple statin prescriptions within the same day from the
11The data is provided by the Social Insurance Institution of Finland which is responsible for the
provision of public social security beneﬁts to Finnish residents.
12The unit of observation in the data is the prescription of a patient.
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data. To avoid left censoring, I study "new" patients, who had their ﬁrst prescription after
the ﬁrst six month of the observation period, i.e. after June 2003. I deﬁne a patient as
right-censored if his last prescription in the data was received during the last six months
of the observation period, i.e. during 7/2006 − 12/2006.13 For computational reasons, I
draw a random sample of 1000 patients and exclude other cholesterol drug prescriptions
than statins from the sample.14 In my sample, the total number of patients is 1000, the
number of observations is 2812 and the share of censored patients is 48% (Table 2.1).
The lower panel of Table 2.1 describes the drug therapy of patients in the sample. The
average diﬀerence between two prescriptions was 6.8 months.15 On average, patients
had 1.3 diﬀerent active ingredients and 2.8 prescriptions. Figure 2.1 shows that there is
signiﬁcant heterogeneity in the number of prescriptions across patients. The distribution
is very skewed to the left, as 29% of patients had only one prescription, 21% had two
prescriptions, 22% had three prescriptions and 29% had more than 4 prescriptions. The
results are fairly similar for non-censored patients.16
The empirical literature has found that physicians are often unwilling to prescribe new
treatments for their patients (e.g., Hellerstein, 1998, Coscelli, 2000, CS). The literature
has explained this persistence with uncertainty and learning about the health eﬀects of
drugs. Consistent with this explanation, the probability to switch an active ingredient
from the previous prescription is only 0.15 in the sample (Table 2.2).
The switching of a drug may be caused by both experimentation and learning. The
incentive to experiment is the strongest at the beginning of the medical therapy when the
physician has the least information about the average health eﬀects of diﬀerent drugs for
a single patient. Switching at a later stage of the therapy can be induced by learning,
especially if the patient has been using one drug for a long time.
I next investigate whether the data is consistent with learning and experimentation. Table
2.2 presents the probability of switching at diﬀerent phases of the drug therapy, condi-
tional on the total number of the patient's prescriptions. The results show that the
13If the censoring interval is too short, the exit rate is overrated and hence the estimation results may
be biased. This is particularly true for patients whose prescriptions are received at the end of the sample
period and who have more than two prescriptions.
14These excluded cholesterol drugs belong to the group of lipid modifying agents and have a market
share of 2.17% in my sample. In the future, my plan is to increase the sample size by reducing the number
of drugs through aggregation and perform robustness checks for the estimation results.
15Given the time diﬀerence, a 6 month censoring window may not be realistic. In the future, my plan
is increase the window.
16To be more speciﬁc, 36% of non-censored patients had only one prescription, 23% had two prescrip-
tions, 21% had three prescriptions and 20% had more than 4 prescriptions.
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Figure 2.1: Kernel densities for the total number of prescriptions for all patients (the
higher panel) and non-censored patients (the lower panel) in the sample
Table 2.2: The probability of switching from the previous prescription during the drug
therapy in the sample of patients
Prescription nbr/Treatment length1 2 3 4 ≥5 Total
2 0.122 0.119 0.188 0.122 0.133
3 0.179 0.188 0.098 0.155
4 0.234 0.140 0.182
≥5 0.176 0.176
Total 0.122 0.149 0.203 0.141 0.154
1. Total treatment length: the maximum number of the patient's prescriptions in the sample.
2. Patients with multiple prescriptions/physicians at some time point are excluded.
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probability of switching is the highest both at the beginning and at end of the patient's
drug therapy. The high switching probability at the beginning is consistent with experi-
mentation, whereas the high switching probability at the end is consistent with learning.
The results remain still very indicative without a structural model that isolates the roles
of uncertainty and learning in demand.
2.3 The theoretical model
This section describes the dynamic model of demand under uncertainty that I then esti-
mate. Consider a patient (she) who comes to the physician (he) to seek drug treatment
for her medical condition. First, the physician makes an initial diagnosis about his ﬁxed
severity of illness, or type. The severity of illness aﬀects both the symptomatic eﬀects of
drugs and the exit rate from the drug therapy. Conditional on the diagnosis, the physician
evaluates the patient's risk for CVDs and side eﬀects associated with drug treatments.
This evaluation aﬀects the physician's prior beliefs about the eﬀects of drugs on the pa-
tient's symptoms and exit rate. Based on his prior beliefs, the physician selects a drug
treatment that best matches the patient's medical condition.17
After the patient has taken the prescribed drug, she revisits the physician. The physician
observes two health eﬀects. The ﬁrst eﬀect measures the eﬀects of the drug on the patient's
symptoms. The second health eﬀect captures the eﬀect of the drug on the probability
that the therapy ends, such as how eﬀectively the drug and the patient's life style changes
decreased her cholesterol levels. Then, if the patient's therapy does not end, the physician
makes a new treatment decision. This decision is based on the physician's beliefs regarding
the average health eﬀects, or match values, of drugs, conditional on observed health eﬀects.
Again, the patient takes the drug and revisits the physician who observes the health eﬀects
of the drug. Conditional on the health eﬀects that aﬀect the exit rate, the patient's drug
therapy either ends or continues. These steps are repeated until the patient exits from the
therapy. During the course of the patient's therapy, the physician may learn the average
health eﬀects of drugs from the patient's treatment history.
Following CS, I assume the physician maximizes solely the expected discounted utility of
the patient. In the model, all physicians have the same probability of choosing a drug
treatment for the patient. This assumption abstracts away potentially important agency
issues.18 The model also ignores the possibility of physician speciﬁc eﬀects. Such eﬀects
17I follow CS and consider patients who have received at least one drug prescription.
18See for example Iizuka (2007) and (2011) for the empirical analysis of agency issues in the pharma-
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can arise for example if the personal experience of a physician aﬀects prescription behavior
(see Chapter 3). The main focus of this paper is on learning by a physician about the
quality of the match between a particular patient and diﬀerent drugs. As most of the
cholesterol drugs have been on the Finnish market for almost two decades (see Table 2.1),
learning across patients is not likely to have a big role in my application.19
Next, I present the details of the dynamic demand model. I begin by deﬁning the sever-
ity of illness. Then, I present the physician's decision-making problem for a patient.
After that I deﬁne health eﬀects, go through the learning process and present the exit
probability and the set of state variables. Finally, I provide the physician's value function.
The severity of illness
Assume that the patient comes to seek a drug treatment for her medical condition for the
ﬁrst time. First, she is randomly matched to a physician who makes an initial diagnosis
about her ﬁxed severity of illness, or type. The probability that the patient is of type k,
k = 1, ..., K, is given by pk such that
∑K
k=1 pk = 1. Illness types capture heterogeneity
in the medical conditions of patients, such as lifestyle patterns or the amount of LDL
cholesterol in blood, that aﬀects the distributions of health eﬀects. The illness type is
observed by a physician but not by the econometrician. In my empirical application, I
assume that k = 2.20
A drug treatment choice
Conditional on the illness severity type k of patient j, the per-period utility function of
the physician (or the patient) is assumed have a constant absolute risk aversion sub-utility
function for the symptomatic eﬀect of the product n at time t, xjknt.
21 I assume that the
current utility is linear in the price, pn, and the Type I extreme value distributed error
term, ejknt. To be more precise, I consider the following per-period utility function for
the patient22
ceutical market.
19For learning across patients, see Coscelli and Shum (2004) and Kim (2010).
20In CS, the number of types is 4. My plan evaluate the robustness of results to the number of types.
21As all physicians of the patient are alike, the physician-index does not enter the utility function.
22I also make a conditional independence assumption p(z′, e′|z, e, n, θ) = p(z′|z, n, θ2)p(e′|θ3), where z′
are the other random state variables than e. The assumption is commonly made in the dynamic discrete
choice literature (see e.g. Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2010). Note that the transition probability for the
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ujknt = −e−r·xjknt − α · pn + ejknt, (2.1)
where r > 0 is the degree of risk aversion and α is the price coeﬃcient.
The physician makes the drug treatment choice among diﬀerent active ingredients n, n ∈
{1, ..., N}, such that the chosen product maximizes the present discounted utility of the
patient. This implies that the outside option is not in the physician's choice set.23 Instead,
I follow CS and assume that the probability that the patient's therapy ends evolves
endogenously with the physician's prescriptions. The prescription is made conditional
on a set of state variables at time t, Sjkt, that is speciﬁed below. The Markovian decision
problem of the physician is
V (Sjkt) = maxn{E
[
u(xjknt, pn, ejknt) +
β(1− wjkt)E
[
V (Sjk(t+1))|xjknt, yjknt, n
]|Sjkt],∀n}
= maxn{V jknt + ejnkt,∀n}, (2.2)
where wjkt is the indicator variable that takes value 1 if patient j exits from the drug
therapy after period t, β is the discount factor and V jknt = V
k
(Sjnt) is the choice speciﬁc
value function. The expectation in (2)-(3) is taken over two health eﬀects, xjknt and yjknt.
Whereas xjknt captures the eﬀects of the drug on the patient's symptoms, yjknt aﬀects the
probability that the patient exits from drug the drug therapy. Because health eﬀects are
observed after the patient has taken drug n but before period t + 1, the expectation of
the value function at t+ 1 is conditional on xjknt and yjknt.
Health eﬀects
After the patient has taken drug n at the end of period t, the physician observes health
eﬀects that aﬀect her symptoms and exit rate from the drug therapy,
xjknt = µjkn + σexe
x
jknt, where µjkn ∼ N(µkn, σ2) (2.3)
and
yjknt = νjkn + σeye
y
jknt, where νjkn ∼ N(νkn, τ 2) (2.4)
states depends on the previous history via the most recent values of the state variables.
23In Section 2.3, I include the outside option to the physician's choice set.
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where exjknt and e
y
jknt are N(0, 1) distributed independent random variables.
Note that the match value means can vary between patient types and drugs. The variances
of the match values are assumed to be constants.24 For computational reasons, I follow
CS and assume that health eﬀects are uncorrelated, i.e. cov(xjknt, yjknt) = 0.
25 This
assumption implies that experimenting with one cholesterol drug does not change the
physician's view about another, possibly similar cholesterol drug. In my application, the
assumption may not hold for at least two reasons: ﬁrst, side eﬀects can aﬀect both the
patient's symptoms and his exit rate from the drug therapy. Second, cholesterol drugs
do not have signiﬁcant clinical diﬀerences in reducing cardiovascular (National Institute
for Health and Clinical Excellence, 2006). Thereby correlated learning can be relevant.
Assuming zero correlation between health eﬀects may bias results.
Conditional on realized health eﬀects, the physician updates his beliefs about the unob-
served match values, µjkn and νjkn. The posterior beliefs for the mean and variance of
the symptomatic match value, µ
kn
and σ2, are (similarly for νkn and τ
2)
µjknt =

σ2exµjkn(t−1)+σ2jn(t−1)xjknt
σ2ex+σ
2
jn(t−1)
if drug n is taken at time t,
µjkn(t−1) otherwise,
(2.5)
σ2jnt =
{
σ2exσ
2
n
σ2ex+ljn(t−1)σ2n
if drug n is taken at time t,
σ2jn(t−1) otherwise,
(2.6)
where ljnt the number of times patient j has tried the drug n up to (and including) time
t.
When the number of prescriptions ljnt increases and information on the average health
eﬀects accumulates, the variances of the posterior distributions decrease towards zero and
the physician learns the distributions of the match values.
I assume that the physician has rational expectations about other drugs besides Rosuvas-
tatin that have been long on the market. The assumption implies that the physician knows
the prior distributions of drugs, i.e. µjkn1 = µkn, νjkn1 = νkn, σ
2
jn1 = σ
2
n and τ
2
jn1 = τ
2.
The rational expectations assumption may not be true for Rosuvastatin that has been
24I have also experimented with the model where the variance of the symptomatic match value was
allowed to diﬀer across products, i.e. σ2n. The results suggested that the variance estimates were almost
the same for all products. Therefore, I assume in the empirical part of this chapter that σ2 is a constant
across products. In the future, my plan is to decrease the number of products through aggregation and
allow for σ2n to vary across products.
25For correlated learning, see Dickstein (2011).
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marketed since the beginning of the sample period (17.6.2003). For this reason, I assume
that the physician did not know the prior distribution of the symptomatic eﬀects of Ro-
suvastatin26 if his patient had her ﬁrst prescription before 2005 (i.e. 7/2003− 12/2004).27
Thus, physicians may have common, non-correct predictions for the distributions of the
match values for Rosuvastatin during the ﬁrst years. By allowing for non-rational expec-
tations, I control for the possibility that physicians may learn about the average health
eﬀects of Rosuvastatin across patients by reading medical journals and attending confer-
ences.
The exit probability
Assume that the patient has taken drug n and she revisit the physician at the end of
period t. While investigating the patient, the physician observes health eﬀects, yjknt, that
are associated with the use of the drug and aﬀect the patient's exit rate from the drug
therapy. Conditional on these health eﬀects and the patient's exit rate at the previous
prescription, I assume that the exit rate of patient i with type k at the end of period t is
hjkt =
hjk(t−1)
1−hjk(t−1) + djntyjknt
1 +
hjk(t−1)
1−hjk(t−1) + djntyjknt
, (2.7)
where djnt is the indicator variable that takes value 1 if the patient takes drug n at time
t and hjk0 = θk is the initial value of the exit rate. For hjkt ∈ [0, 1), the higher the
health eﬀects, yjknt, are, the more likely the patient exits from the therapy at time t.
28
Correspondingly, the higher the previous exit probability, hjk(t−1), is, the higher the cor-
responding period-t probability is.
A set of state variables
A set of state variables for patient j at time t, Sjkt, consists of the exit rate, hjkt, and the
following drug speciﬁc variables: the number of prescriptions, ljnt, the posterior means,
26In the empirical application, a non-rational expectation about the exit match value was very impre-
cisely estimated. Therefore, I allow non-rational expectations only for symptomatic eﬀects.
27In 2005 − 2006, I assume that the physician has rational expectations about Rosuvastatin. In my
sample, physicians had non-rational expectations for 45% of patients.
28As noted by CS, very large and negative values of yjknt lead to negative values of hjkt. In this case,
hjkt is no longer a valid probability. However, the simulations of the model did not produce any negative
values of hjkt.
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µjknt and νjknt, and the preference shocks, ejknt, for drugs n, n = 1, ..., N .
The value function
By using the law of iterated expectations and the moment generating function of the
normal distribution, the value function of the physician can be expressed as
V (Sjkt) =maxn{−e−rµjknt+ 12 r2(σ2jnt+σ2ex) − αpn + ejknt+ (2.8)
βE
[
(1− hjkt(hjk(t−1), yjknt))E[V (Sjk(t+1))|xjknt, yjknt, n]|Sjkt)
]}. (2.9)
When the risk-averse physician is choosing a new treatment for the patient, he faces a
trade-oﬀ between having a low present utility caused by the "risk-premium" 1
2
r2(σ2jnt+σ
2
ex)
and the option value that contains new information through health eﬀects xjknt and yjknt
that are realized after the patient has taken drug n. The more risk aversive the physician
is, the more the risk-premium decreases the probability of choosing drug n. Moreover,
learning about the average symptomatic eﬀects of the drug for the patient, µjkn, decreases
the variance of the posterior distribution σ2jnt and the risk premium. For this reason,
learning increases the probability of choosing drug n again.
Because the optimization problem has a stationary Markovian structure, only the values
of current state variables in Sjk aﬀect the expectation of the physician about the future.
The value function can thereby be expressed as
V (Sjk) = maxn{E
[
u(xjkn, pn, ejkn) +
β(1− hjk)E
[
V (S ′jk)|xjkn, yjkn, n
]|Sjk],∀n}, (2.10)
where S ′jk is a set of state variables in the next period.
To decrease the dimensionality of the state space, I take the expectation of the value
function in (10) over preference shocks, ejk1, ..., ejkN (see e.g. Aguirregabiria and Mira,
2010, Rust, 1987)
E(V (Sjk)) = γ + log(
N∑
n=1
exp(V
k
(Sjk))), (2.11)
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where γ = 0.5772 is Euler's constant. I follow CS and adapt a method by Keane and
Wolpin (1994) to approximate the expected value function.29
2.4 The econometric model
In this section, I describe the simulated log-likelihood function and discuss identiﬁcation.
I use the following data to compute the simulated likelihood function: the vector of
indicator variables, dj1t, ..., djNt where dj1t equals 1 if the patient takes drug n in period
t, the number of the patient's prescriptions for drug n by time t, ljnt, the average price of
the drug, pn, the indicator for whether the drug therapy of the patient is censored at the
end of the observation period, cj, and the length of the cholesterol drug therapy, Tj.
The likelihood function contribution of (non-censored) patient i includes probabilities
for chosen drugs in each period, 1, ..., Ti, and the probabilities that the drug therapy is
continued up to period Ti and ended at the end of period Ti,
Lncj =
K∑
k
pkE[
Tj−1∏
t
(
(
∏
n
λ
djnt
jknt)(1− hjkt)
)
(
∏
n
λ
djnTj
jnTjk
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Continue the therapy of patient i with type k up to Ti
hjkt], (2.12)
where λjknt =
e
V jknt∑N
n′=1 e
V jn′tk
is the choice probability for drug n at time t. The expectation
in (12) is taken over health eﬀects xjnkt and yjnkt and preference shocks ejknt
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are unobserved to the econometrician. As patient types k are also unobserved to the
econometrician, their eﬀects on the likelihood contribution must be averaged out.
The likelihood contribution of a censored patient is otherwise the same as (12), except
that her exit from the drug therapy is not observed,
Lcj =
K∑
k
pkE
[ Tj−1∏
t
(
(
∏
n
λ
djnt
jknt)(1− hjkt)
)∏
n
λ
djnTj
jnTjk
]
. (2.13)
Because the computation of the likelihood function would require integration over the
distribution with a very high dimension and the choice probabilities do not have a closed
29The basic idea of the method is to solve the dynamic programming problem recursively at a subset
of state space points and approximate in other points by using interpolation. See CS and Keane and
Wolpin (1994) for details.
30These error terms are needed to compute the predicted choices of physicians for their patient.
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form solution, the likelihood function is approximated with Monte Carlo integration. The
simulated likelihood contribution of a non-censored patient is calculated by replacing the
expectation with an average over S simulations,
Lnc,sj =
1
S
S∑
s=1
K∑
k=1
pk
[ Tj−1∏
t
(
(
∏
n
(λsjknt)
djnt)(1− hsjkt)
)]
(
∏
n
(λsjnTjk)
djnTj )hsjkt (2.14)
and similarly for a censored patient.
The simulated log-likelihood function is given by
lnLN,s(θ) =
N∑
j=1
[(1− cj)lnLnc,sj (θ) + cjlnLc,sj (θ)]. (2.15)
To get the simulated version of the likelihood function, I ﬁrst draw the signals and pref-
erence shocks of a patient for all products, conditional on her severity of illness. Next,
I compute choice speciﬁc value functions for each simulation, product and illness type.
Then, I calculate the simulated counterpart of the value function at time t = 1, update the
beliefs by using the simulated signals and the updating formulas presented in equations
(2.7)-(2.8) and compute the simulated exit rate. I repeat these steps for all periods when
the patient received a prescription. I estimate the model using 10 simulations for each
patient31. Because the number of simulation is small, the MSL estimator is inconsistent.32
The results must thus be interpreted with caution.
Identiﬁcation
Variation in drug choices with the number of prescriptions across patients help to iden-
tify the model parameters. Initial prescriptions identify the prior means of symptomatic
match values, µ
kn
, because the physician has not yet observed any symptomatic eﬀects.
Prescriptions in the early vs. the late stages of the treatment, or learning, identify the
variance of symptomatic match values, σ2n. Because risk aversive physicians are more
reluctant to switch a drug treatment, persistence in drug choices identiﬁes the risk aver-
sion coeﬃcient, r. Changes in prescription with the number of times the physician has
31My plan is to increase the number of simulations. CS estimated the model by using 30 simulations.
32This is because the simulated likelihood contribution of individual i lnfˆi is biased for lnfi even if fˆi
is unbiased for fi (see e.g. Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
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prescribed the drug n, ljnt, identiﬁes the variance of symptomatic health eﬀects, σ
2
ex.
33
I normalize the price of the cheapest drug, Simvastatin, to zero to identify the price
coeﬃcient α.
I then consider variation that identiﬁes the parameters of health eﬀects that aﬀect the
exit rate from the drug therapy. The law of iterated expectations implies that the exit
rate conditional on the state variables is
E(hjkt|Sjkt) = EνjknEyjknt|νjkn
[ hjk(t−1)1−hjk(t−1) + djntyjknt
1 +
hjk(t−1)
1−hjk(t−1) + djntyjknt
|Sjkt
]
, (2.16)
where the ﬁrst expectation is taken over the mean of health eﬀects that aﬀect the exit rate,
νjkn, and the second one is taken over health eﬀects conditional on the mean, yjknt|νjkn.
Because the eﬀect of yjknt on the exit rate varies with the number of prescriptions and is
diﬀerent across patients, the mean and variance of the exit match value, νkn and τ
2, and
the variance of yjknt conditional on νjkn, σ
2
ey, are identiﬁed. The parameter of the initial
exit rate, θk, is identiﬁed because it aﬀects the exit rate in the previous period, hjk(t−1).
2.5 Estimation results
Table 2.3 describes the estimation results of the dynamic matching model. The ﬁrst panel
presents the estimates of initial exit and type probabilities, hjk1 and pk for types k = 1
(line 1) and k = 2 (line 2). The second panel contains the means and the variance of the
symptomatic match values for drugs n, n = 1, ..., 6 (rows), and patient types k, k = 1, 2
(columns), i.e. µ
kn
and σ2. Analogously, the third panel includes the means and the
variance of the exit match values for drugs n, n = 1, ..., 6 (rows), and patient types k,
k = 1, 2 (columns), i.e. νkn and τ
2. Recall that due to the non-rational expectations of
the physician, the mean symptomatic match value of Rosuvastatin is allowed to be dif-
ferent from the true match value mean if the ﬁrst prescription was taken before 1.1.2005.
The fourth panel presents the variances of the symptomatic and exit rate health eﬀects
conditional on the match values, i.e. σ2ex and σ
2
ey. The ﬁfth panel contains price and risk
aversion coeﬃcients, α and r. I follow CS and ﬁx the discount rate to 0.95.
33Prescription choices change because the posterior beliefs for the mean and variance of the symptomatic
match value, µ
kn
and σ2, change with the number of prescription for drugs n (see (5)− (6)).
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Table 2.3: Estimates from the dynamic demand model in the sample of patients
Est. Std.err. Est. Std.err Mean,
over types
Exit prob. hj1k Type prob. pk
θ1 (Type 1) 0.493 0.037 0.614 0.039
θ2 (Type 2) 0.494 0.037 0.386
Symptomatic match values, Type 1 Type 2
µjkn
Means:
Simvastatin µ
1k
0.782 0.578 0.011 0.003 0.485
Lovastatin µ
2k
-0.013 0.016 -0.014 0.021 -0.014
Pravastatin µ
3k
-0.012 0.033 0.017 0.032 -0.001
Fluvastatin µ
4k
0.005 0.005 0.009 0.001 0.007
Atorvastatin µ
5k
0.067 0.073 -0.012 0.001 0.037
Rosuvastatin:
rational expect. µ
6k
-0.111 0.187 0.007 0.025 -0.066
non-rational expect. µj61k 0.008 0.001 -0.023 0.000 -0.004
Variance σ2 3.416 1.351
Exit match values, Type 1 Type 2
νjkn
Means:
Simvastatin ν1k 0.046 0.183 0.000 0.001 0.028
Lovastatin ν2k -0.001 0.005 0.001 0.007 0.000
Pravastatin ν3k 0.001 0.011 0.001 0.010 0.001
Fluvastatin ν4k -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.001
Atorvastatin ν5k 0.001 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.001
Rosuvastatin ν6k -0.008 0.059 0.005 0.008 -0.003
Variance τ2 0.999 1.556
Signal variance
Symptomatic signal σ2ex 0.975 0.725
Exit signal σ2ey 1.633 3.568
Price coeﬃcient, α 0.126 0.021
Risk-aversion parameter, r 0.975 0.713
Discount factor, β 0.95
Number of individuals 1000
Draws/individual 10
Log likelihood function 5244
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Discussion
The estimation results for the distribution of patient types provides evidence on hetero-
geneity in the severity of illness across patients with high cholesterol. Recall that the
illness type captures factors observed by the physician but not by the econometrician
that aﬀect the distributions of health eﬀects. The ﬁrst set of parameters in Table 2.3
shows that type 1 and 2 patients have an equal changes of exit at the beginning of the
drug therapy. The exit rate hjkt can still diﬀer across patients, depending on observed
health eﬀects and the physician's drug choices. I also ﬁnd that patients are of type 1 with
probability 0.61 and of type 2 with probability 0.39.
The second set of parameters in Table 2.3 provides evidence on heterogeneity in the
distributions of health eﬀects across patient types. The results suggest that the means
of symptomatic match values, µ
1k
, ..., µ
6k
, diﬀer between patient types but most of the
means are somewhat imprecisely estimated. The rank of drugs based on the mean of
symptomatic match values is (1,5,4,3,2,6)34 for type 1 patients and (3,1,4,6,5,2) for type 2
patients. On average, the cheapest drug Simvastatin (drug 1) performs the best for type
1 patients and Pravastatin (drug 3) for type 2 patients. Patients of type 1 have the worst
match on average with Rosuvastatin (drug 5) and type 2 patients with Lovastatin (drug
2). The estimated prior means of Rosuvastatin under non-rational expectations indicate
that physicians were initially too optimistic about the average symptomatic eﬀects of Ro-
suvastatin for type 1 patients and too pessimistic for type 2 patients. On average, patients
have the best symptomatic match with Simvastatin and the worst with Lovastatin.
In Figure 2.2, I illustrate heterogeneity in the symptomatic match value distributions
further. When a patient is of type 1, the eﬃciency of Rosuvastatin is much worse than
that of other statins. For type 2 patients, the distributions of the match values overlap
much more than for type 1 patients. The standard deviation estimate of symptomatic
health eﬀects is large (3.42) compared with the estimates of the mean symptomatic match
values for both patient types (−0.11−0.78). Heterogeneity in symptomatic health eﬀects
implies that physicians face substantial uncertainty about the symptomatic eﬀects of
cholesterol drugs for their patients. Because the match values values are not known to
physicians at the beginning of therapy, learning may signiﬁcantly help physicians to ﬁnd
the best drug treatments for their patients.
34Active ingredients: 1: Simvastatin, 2: Lovastatin, 3: Pravastatin, 4: Fluvastatin, 5: Atorvastatin, 6:
Rosuvastatin
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Figure 2.2: Symptomatic match value distributions for Types 1 (higher ﬁgure) and 2 (lower
ﬁgure): Simvastatin (-), Lovastatin (), Pravastatin (:), Fluvastatin (-.), Atorvastatin (-
.*), Rosuvastatin (-.x). in the sample of patients
The third set in Table 2.3 presents the estimates for the type-speciﬁc distributions of
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match values that aﬀect exit rates. The results show that the average exit match val-
ues, ν1k, ..., ν6k, are again heterogeneous across patient types. The rank of drugs in this
dimension is (1,5,3,4,2,6) for type 1 patients and (6,2,3,5,1,4) for type 2 patients where
higher ranks indicate higher exit rates. On average, patients using Simvastatin have the
highest and patients using Rosuvastatin have the lowest exit rates from the cholesterol
drug therapy.
The estimates for variances σ2ex and σ
2
ey are large (0.98 and 1.63, respectively) compared
with the estimates of average health eﬀects. This may suggest that the physician faces
signiﬁcant uncertainty about health eﬀects even after learning the patient and drug spe-
ciﬁc match values. Variances σ2ex and σ
2
ey are, however, imprecisely estimated (standard
deviations 0.73 and 3.57) which prevents from making any stronger conclusions.
The ﬁnal set of parameters contains price and risk aversion coeﬃcients. Physicians are
estimated to be insensitive to changes in the prices of cholesterol drugs since the point
estimate of the price coeﬃcient, α, is only 0.13. My ﬁndings also indicate that physicians
are risk averse: the point estimate of the risk aversion coeﬃcient, r, is 0.98 with a standard
deviation of 0.71. In the next section, I will show that risk aversion and uncertainty about
the health eﬀects of cholesterol drugs decrease the incentives of physicians to experiment
with new treatments.
Overall, the estimation results indicate that the market leader Simvastatin has relatively
good symptomatic eﬃciency compared with the other statins. Atorvastatin has the second
market highest share and it performs reasonably well in both the symptomatic and exit
rate dimension. The health eﬀects of Rosuvastatin, that has a market share of 15% in the
sample, diﬀer between patient types. My results also show that the health eﬀects of the
cholesterol drugs are heterogeneous across patients. These ﬁndings are consistent with
the results of CS from the Italian anti-ulcer market.
2.6 Model ﬁt and counterfactual experiments
In this section, I analyze the roles of learning and experimentation in demand for choles-
terol drugs. To do this, I perform several counterfactual policy simulations and evaluate
how they aﬀect the patient's expected discounted utility, the length and costs of the drug
therapy, experimentation incentives and the market shares of the drugs measured.35 First,
I replicate the policy experiments performed by CS. To be more precise, I investigate what
35I measure the market share of a drug by its prescription share of total prescriptions.
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happens if a physician knew the match values of a patient with drug treatments.36 With-
out uncertainty, the physician has higher incentives to prescribe new, less well-known
drug treatments for the patient. Second, I force the physician to prescribe the ﬁrst active
ingredient for the patient every period during the drug therapy. In this experiment, the
physician is not allowed switch to an another drug after learning the match quality of the
ﬁrst drug.
To understand in-depth the consequences of learning and experimentation in the market
for statins, I perform the following new counterfactuals. First, I make the physician myopic
(the discount factor equals zero) in his choices. This experiment removes experimentation
incentives because the physician does not take into account the consequences of his actions
on the patient's future health. Next, I analyze how risk aversion aﬀects incentives to
experiment. To do this, I decrease the risk aversion coeﬃcient from 0.98 to 0.50. This
experiment decreases switching costs caused by uncertainty and increases incentives to
experiment. Finally, I consider the implications of the policy that prevents learning
on pharmaceutical demand. This experiment corresponds to the situation where the
physician does not investigate the patient and decides on a new prescription based on his
prior knowledge. The results are compared to the raw data and the baseline case implied
by the estimated parameters. To perform the counterfactuals, I simulate the sequences
of treatments for 5000 patients and use the prior means of Rosuvastatin under rational
expectations.
I begin by investigating the speed of learning by a physician about the average health
eﬀects of cholesterol drugs for his patient. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 present the evolution of the
posterior means and variances when the number of prescriptions for each drug increases
by one every period. The results suggest that uncertainty regarding to the average health
eﬀects decreases fast. The posterior variance of the symptomatic match value drops 44%
and the posterior variance of the exit match value drops 28% after the ﬁrst health eﬀects
have realized.37 The diminishing of uncertainty slows down after the ﬁrst prescription.
36Speciﬁcally, I set the variances of posteriors, σ2jnt and τ
2
jnt, to zero. Recall that there is still hetero-
geneity among patients in the exit rate and symptomatic eﬀects xjknt and yjknt because the variances of
health eﬀects are non-zero.
37Even though this eﬀect is substantial, CS found that in the anti-ulcer market, the posterior variance
of the symptomatic match value decreased over 70% after a single prescription.
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Figure 2.3: The evolution of posterior variances σ2jnt and τ
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every period, an average over patients, products and types in the sample
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Figure 2.4: Diﬀerences between posterior means and true match values, µjknt − µjkn and
νjknt − νjkn, when ljnt increases by one every period, an average over patients, products
and types in the sample
Before analyzing the consequences of the policy experiments on demand for cholesterol
drugs, I ﬁrst assess how well the structural model ﬁts data. The results in Table 2.4
suggest that the predicted outcomes are somewhat similar with those that are observed
in data (Table 2.4).38 The average length of the statin therapy is 2.8 prescriptions in
the data whereas the one predicted by the model is 2. The predicted number of diﬀerent
drugs taken during the therapy is the same (1.3) as in the data. The predicted costs of
the therapy relative to the average cost of Simvastatin is, however, much smaller than
the observed total costs of the therapy in the sample. The diﬀerence arises because the
market shares of expensive drugs, Atorvastatin and Rosuvastatin are underestimated and
the market share of the cheap drug, Lovastatin is overestimated. The results must thus
be interpreted with this caveat.
38In the future, my plan is to evaluate how the ﬁt of the model could be improved.
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Table 2.4: Counterfactual experiments and model ﬁt in the sample of patients
Model Data Baseline Complete Use the Myopic Risk aversion No learning3
info2 ﬁrst drug r=1/2
Average
discounted utility -1.380 3.195 -4.687 -3.857 2.699 -8.869
Treatment length 2.812 1.972 1.975 1.972 1.972 1.973 1.972
Total costs (eur)4 152.305 49.299 70.482 43.235 49.222 75.582 42.954
Diﬀerent drugs 1.257 1.256 1.597 1.000 1.254 1.600 1.347
Market share5
Simvastatin 0.532 0.600 0.419 0.646 0.600 0.376 0.651
Lovastatin 0.003 0.108 0.174 0.099 0.108 0.188 0.092
Pravastatin 0.026 0.074 0.097 0.066 0.073 0.104 0.065
Fluvastatin 0.051 0.090 0.120 0.077 0.089 0.129 0.077
Atorvastatin 0.243 0.055 0.081 0.045 0.055 0.086 0.043
Rosuvastatin 0.145 0.074 0.109 0.068 0.074 0.118 0.072
1 Number of simulated individuals=5000. The sample of 1000 patients is described in Section 2.2 of this
chapter.
2 Complete information: σ2jnt and τ
2
jnt are set to zero.
3 No learning: physicians do not receive signals about the match values of the patient.
4 Total costs (eur), the price normalized with the price of Simvastatin
5 Market share: the share of prescriptions for a product from the total number of prescriptions.
The results from the counterfactual experiment with complete information suggest that
uncertainty has substantial eﬀects on treatment outcomes and costs (Table 2.4). When
there is no uncertainty about the patient's average health eﬀects, the expected discounted
utility is higher than in the baseline case. The average treatment length (2 prescriptions)
does not change from the baseline. The physician is more willing to prescribe diﬀerent
drugs when there is no uncertainty. To be more speciﬁc, the average number of diﬀerent
drugs is 1.6 under complete information and 1.3 in the baseline. The market share of
the cheapest drugs, Simvastatin and Lovastatin, decreases 16% from the baseline.39 As a
result, the total costs of the statin therapy (relative to the average cost of Simvastatin)
are 43% higher under the complete information scenario than in the estimated baseline.
In the second counterfactual experiment, the physician is forced to prescribe the ﬁrst
drug to the patient every period during the drug therapy. This policy rules out exper-
imentation but lets the physician to learn from realized health eﬀects. Unsurprisingly,
the expected discounted utility decreases because the physician cannot switch to a bet-
39This happens because removing uncertainty decreases the risk-premium and increases the role of
idiosyncratic preference shocks ejknt in the utility function, making market shares more evenly distributed.
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ter treatment alternative after getting more information about the quality of the ﬁrst
drug. Still, market shares, total costs and treatment length do not change much from the
estimated benchmark.
In the next experiment, I investigate the signiﬁcance of experimentation by making the
physician myopic. The results are similar with the previous experiment. Even though
the expected per-period utility of the patient is smaller than in the baseline, treatment
outcomes, costs and market shares remain almost the same as in the estimated benchmark
case. These results suggest that the disutility caused by uncertainty aﬀects the medication
choices of the physician more than the information gains of experimentation. This indi-
cates that experimentation incentives do not matter much in the market for cholesterol
drugs.
Then, I decrease the risk aversion parameter from 0.98 to 0.50. When the physician be-
comes less risk averse, the number of diﬀerent drugs increases 27%, the process of learning
improves and the patient's expected welfare increases from the estimated baseline scenario.
Even though the drug therapy length does not change, the total costs of the statin therapy
increase by 53%. To explain this, the lower risk aversion coeﬃcient decreases the relative
diﬀerences in sub-utilities −e−rµnk+ r
2
2
(σ2n+σ
2
ex) between drugs and thus preference shocks
ejknt aﬀect prescriptions more.
In the last simulation experiment, the physician does not observe health eﬀects and thus
he cannot learn. The expected discounted utility decreases because the variance of the
symptomatic match value does not decrease over time. The market share of Simvastatin
increases slightly because it has relatively good performance for both patient types. The
total costs of the statin therapy and the average therapy length remain almost the same
as in the benchmark case.
Then, I study in detail how incentives to experiment vary across policy experiments. Fig-
ure 2.5 presents the simulated probability of switching a drug treatment from the previous
prescription, conditional on the number of prescriptions.40 As suggested by Table 2.3, the
probability of switching is higher in the experiment without learning than in the bench-
mark case. This is because uncertainty and learning make risk-averse buyers reluctant
to try new, less well-known products. When the physician is myopic, the probability of
switching is almost the same than in the baseline scenario.
40Note that the sample of patients varies with the prescription number.
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Figure 2.5: The probability of switching an active ingredient from the previous prescrip-
tion, an average over patients, products and types in the sample
Finally, Figure 2.6 presents the market share of the market leader and the cheapest drug,
Simvastatin, in diﬀerent policy experiments. The results suggest that the average market
share decreases over the course of the therapy. This may happen since those patients
who are on the statin therapy long have the worst symptomatic match with Simvastatin.
When the number of prescriptions is high, the estimated market share does not diﬀer
much from the market share of the policy with complete information since physicians have
probably learned the average health eﬀects of Simvastatin. The probability of prescribing
Simvastatin is the highest, around 60%, in the experiment without learning.
49
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Prescription number
M
ar
ke
t s
ha
re
 o
f s
im
va
st
at
in
 
 
Baseline
Complete info
Use the first drug
Myopic
r=0.5
No learning
Figure 2.6: The market share of Simvastatin in each period, an average over patients,
products and types in the sample
Overall, my results suggest that promoting in the process of learning can signiﬁcantly
improve medical decision-making. This ﬁnding implies that policy makers should provide
information about the health eﬀects of drugs. Consistent with high persistence in demand
for cholesterol drugs, I ﬁnd that physicians are not willing to experiment with new, less
well-known treatment alternatives. If physicians became less risk averse, their learning
would improve and the welfare of a patient would increase. To achieve these goals, one
might imagine that treatment recommendations could encourage doctors to more risks in
their treatment choices.
2.7 Conclusions
I analyzed the role of experimentation in demand for pharmaceuticals. I estimated a
dynamic matching model of medical decision-making that incorporates uncertainty and
learning about the average health eﬀects of pharmaceuticals. After the patient has used a
drug, the physician observes how the drug treatment aﬀected both the patient's symptoms
and the probability of ending the drug therapy. The structural model was estimated using
rich data from the Finnish market for cholesterol drugs.
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The parameter estimates implied that patients respond diﬀerently to cholesterol drug
treatments. I also found that physicians are risk averse and face substantial uncertainty
about the health eﬀects of statins. These ﬁndings suggested that information and learning
may have signiﬁcant value in this market. The counterfactuals showed that the provision
of information on the average health eﬀects of drug treatments increases the patient's
welfare from the estimated benchmark case. I also found that uncertainty aﬀects medical
decision-making more than the information gains of experimentation. If doctors became
willing to take more risks in their treatment choices, the process of learning would improve.
A key assumptions of the model is that physicians are identical. In the next chapter, I
analyze how physician's own experience of a patient and learning from past choices of
other doctors aﬀect her behavior.
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Chapter 3
Private Experience and Observational
Learning in Pharmaceutical Demand
I quantify the roles of the physician's own experience and the past choices of other doctors
in pharmaceutical demand. I develop a model of medical decision-making under uncer-
tainty about the quality of the match between the patient and the drug treatment. Unlike
previous demand models, I take into account both private and social learning, and allow
heterogeneity in quality across patients. I test whether information on the past choices of
other physicians improves drug choices. Using rich data from the market for cholesterol
drugs, I show that treatment patterns relying heavily on the past choices of other doctors
can lead to demand beyond the eﬃcient level. My results suggest that continuity of care,
where a patient repeatedly consulting the same doctor, is an eﬃcient policy to limit such
behavior.
Keywords: social and private learning, structural modeling, unobserved quality, asym-
metric information, demand, information diﬀusion, physician behavior
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3.1 Introduction
Agents may use their own experiences and the past choices of their peers to learn about
the quality of a product. Yet there is very little previous work quantifying whether
private learning and observing the behavior of other agents help to reduce uncertainty
around choices. In this chapter, I explore these issues in pharmaceutical demand under
uncertainty about the eﬀects of the drug treatment on patient health. I will show that
that treatment patterns relying heavily on the past choices of other doctors can lead to
over-prescribing in terms of welfare. I analyze whether continuity of care - in the sense
of a patient repeatedly consulting the same doctor - is an eﬃcient policy to limit such
behavior. The policy is commonly used in primary care to promote the process of learning
and improve medical decision-making:
However, there are other aspects to the doctor-patient relationship that have im-
portant implications on eﬃciency. The distinctive feature of general practice agency
is that the doctor-patient relationship is usually long-term and more likely to be
characterized by repeated transactions [...] In general practice repeated transactions
are also potentially beneﬁcial because the GP becomes more aware of the context of
the patients' health problems, and has more information about the patients' medical
history, social circumstances, values and preferences.
Anthony Scott (2000), Handbook of Health Economics
I develop a model of medical decision-making under uncertainty about the quality of the
match between the patient and the drug treatment. I modify the standard theoretical
models with social learning (Chamley, 2004, Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992),
by allowing agents to learn product quality from their own experiences. I ask whether
continuity of care is preferable to providing information on the past behavior of other
doctors through patient records. I focus on the Finnish market for cholesterol drugs that
are used to decrease the risk for cardiovascular diseases. Beneﬁts from improvements in
the drug treatment of hyper-cholesterolemia (high cholesterol) can be substantial, as heart
disease and stroke alone are among the most widespread and costly diseases. Still, many
doctors claim that cholesterol drugs are prescribed to low-risk patients beyond the level
of clinical eﬀectiveness.1
Empirical evidence shows that private experience and peer eﬀects have important roles
in demand for pharmaceuticals. First, the extensive literature in medicine and economics
1See e.g. Franklin (2011), Adams (2011), Joelving (2011), BBC (2011).
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(see e.g. Weiss and Blustein, 1996, Scott, 2000, King et al., 2008) has documented the pos-
itive relationship between continuity of care and treatment outcomes. My data conﬁrms
that prescriptions are highly responsive to changes in the length of the doctor-patient
relationship.2 Second, prescription behavior by inexperienced physicians is signiﬁcantly
aﬀected by the choices of prominent physicians, or "opinion leaders" (Nair et al., 2010). In
my data, the previous choices of peers aﬀect prescribing behavior especially if a physician
does not have much own experience of the patient.
To model these ﬁndings, I develop my analysis as follows. I consider a physician's (she)
decision to continue the patient's (he) drug therapy in primary care where physicians may
change.3 The physician does not know ex-ante the eﬃcacy and side eﬀects of cholesterol
drugs (referred as the "drug") for a patient. I analyze the physician's attempt to learn
the quality match between the patient and the drug from her own experience and the past
choices of other doctors. At the beginning, the physician evaluates the patient's risk for
cardiovascular diseases based on his observed characteristics, such as gender and age. This
evaluation forms the prior belief of physicians on the average health eﬀects, or quality,
of the cholesterol drug for the patient. In the follow-up, a physician performs diagnostic
procedures and medical tests to evaluate whether the drug aﬀected the patient's abnormal
cholesterol levels and caused side eﬀects. While interpreting her ﬁndings, the physician
privately observes the health eﬀects of cholesterol drugs that aﬀect her personal opinion
(private belief) on quality. Simultaneously, she looks at patient records to see the past
choices of other doctors. With this information, the physician forms the public belief
on quality. The physician takes into account her own opinion, the patient's prescription
history and the prior belief when she decides on the continuation of the patient's therapy.
The model helps to understand whether continuity of care can improve the eﬃciency of
drug choices. When only one physician is treating a patient, the physician becomes over
time more familiar with the patient's disease and her perceptions on the distribution of
health eﬀects become more precise. She may thus learn whether the drug is on average
good or bad for the patient which improves her medical decision-making. If physicians
change frequently, the process of learning slows down and becomes heavily dependent on
the past choices of other doctors. An inexperienced physician may belief that the drug
treatment must perform well for the patient who has used the drug for many years. This
2Speciﬁcally, I consider the choices of physicians working in the Finnish public primary care. In this
market, the physicians of a patient change frequently for exogenous reasons, such as due to the shortage
of physician labor. See section 3.2.1 for details.
3The model can be extended to allow multiple inside goods. This is very straightforward if the health
eﬀects of only one drug group, say patented products, are uncertain.
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optimism on quality leads to over-prescribing when the drug is of low quality.
A vast majority of the literature on demand for experience goods assumes that agents can
only learn the quality of a product from their own experience (e.g. Crawford and Shum,
2005, Kim, 2010, Dickstein, 2011, Chan and Hamilton, 2006, Chernew et al. 2008) or that
all information is public (e.g. Ackerberg, 2003, Ching, 2009). A few recent papers also
look at the social learning of an agent who makes a once-in-a-lifetime decision (Cipriani
and Guarino, 2012, Knight and Schiﬀ, 2010, Zhang, 2010). My main contribution is that
I take into account both private and social learning in demand, allowing agents to receive
multiple experience signals. With my framework, I can analyze how the own consumption
experiences of an agent interact with information received from the past choices of peers
in her learning process.4 Furthermore, because private and social learning may induce
divergent beliefs about quality, a demand model should capture them both in order to
produce reliable estimates on product quality and on the eﬀects of policy experiments
on choices.5 Finally, unlike the previous work on social learning, I allow heterogeneity
(among patients) in quality.
I ﬁnd that the average health eﬀects of the cholesterol drug treatment are heterogeneous
across patients. Particularly, the quality of the match is on average high for 72% of pa-
tients and low for the remainder. The estimates also imply that most of the uncertainty
associated with quality vanishes when the patient has used the cholesterol drug treat-
ment once. Even if quality was known, uncertainty regarding to health eﬀects remains
signiﬁcant. These results have implications on eﬃciency.
The counterfactual experiments suggest that information on the patient's prescription
history does not compensate for the lack of the long-term treatment relationship. If the
patient had only one physician, the physician learns fast and better health outcomes
realize. If quality is high (low), the long-term doctor-patient relationship increases (de-
creases) demand for cholesterol drugs. Information on the past choices of other doctors
for a patient promotes learning about high quality, but not as eﬃciently as continuity of
care. If quality is low, observing the patient's prescription history increases demand over
the level of eﬃcient prescribing.
4Traditional private and social learning models are special cases of my framework.
5If there is private information unobserved by the econometrician, but all information is assumed to
be public, quality estimates become biased. Speciﬁcally, when quality is in reality high, quality estimate
is downwards biased because private information slows down learning and decreases the probability of
choosing the product. Low quality estimate is, on the other hand, upwards biased because social learning
makes agents too optimistic about quality which increases the probability of choosing the product.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the dataset and
provides descriptive evidence on the eﬀects of physician's own experience and the past
choices of other doctors on medical decision-making. Section 3.3 goes through the struc-
tural model and Section 3.4 discusses estimation and identiﬁcation. Section 3.5 presents
estimation results, the ﬁt of the model and the results from the counterfactual experi-
ments. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Market and data description
3.2.1 Cholesterol drug markets
Cardiovascular diseases (CVD), such as heart attacks, stroke and high blood pressure,
aﬀect millions of people globally. Heart disease and stroke alone are among the most
common and costly health problems in Europe and the United States.6 Patients who
have experienced CVDs have to deal with high medical expenditures, lost wages and
lower productivity.
I analyze the Finnish market for cholesterol drugs that are used to decrease the risk for
cardiovascular events. I focus on statins (HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors) that is the most
popular group of cholesterol drugs globally.7 Statins decrease high serum LDL-cholesterol
("bad" cholesterol) and increase HDL-cholesterol ("good" cholesterol) by inhibiting an
enzyme in the liver that has an important role in the production of cholesterol.8 High
morbidity to CVDs and a large volume of diagnoses of dyslipidemia, i.e. an abnormal
amount of lipids, such as cholesterol and fat, in the blood, have made cholesterol drugs
one of the world's largest selling drug groups.
Corresponding to the United States, the following active ingredients are on the Finnish
statin market: Atorvastatin (Lipitor and Torvast), Fluvastatin (Lescol), Lovastatin (Meva-
cor, Altocor, Altoprev), Pravastatin (Pravachol, Selektine, Lipostat), Rosuvastatin (Crestor)
6Around 12% of adults suﬀered from heart disease in 2009 − 2010 in the United States (National
Center for Health Statistics, 2011). Every year, there are around 152 000 strokes in the UK (British
Heart Foundation, 2013).
7See e.g. Herper, M. (2010) "Why You May Need Cholesterol Drugs", Forbes, and U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), 2010.
8When cholesterol levels are too high, cholesterol can grow on the walls of blood vessels transporting
blood from the heart to other body parts. Over time, these blood vessels can be blocked, preventing the
heart from getting enough blood.See e.g. "What is cholesterol?" by the National Heart, Lung and Blood
Institute that is a division of the National Institutes of Health in the USA.
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and Simvastatin (Zocor, Lipex).9 I focus on a physician's decision to continue the pa-
tient's statin therapy for several reasons. First, uncertainty is probably the highest in the
health eﬀects of statins in general. Second, clinical diﬀerences between statins in reducing
cardiovascular events have been claimed to be small (National Institute for Health and
Clinical Excellence, 2006) and thus it is quite natural to consider statins as a one group. I
thereby ignore important questions regarding to a physician's or patient's choice between
branded and generic products (see e.g. Scott-Morton, 1999, Ching, 2010a and 2010b) and
between diﬀerent active ingredients (see Crawford and Shum, 2005).10
A treatment decision by a physician is based on the beneﬁts and adverse eﬀects of statins.
The statin therapy is initiated if the patient has a high risk for CVDs. The evaluation
of the risk is based on several factors, including the patient's gender, age, blood pressure
and cholesterol levels. In my model, the initial evaluation is captured by the physician's
prior belief on the average health eﬀect of cholesterol drugs for a particular patient. In
the follow-up of the drug therapy, a physician evaluates the realization of the treatment
goals and sustains the patient's treatment motivation. The main goal of cholesterol drug
treatment is to decrease the total cholesterol level below 5 mmol/L (LDL-cholesterol below
3 mmol/L). If the patient experiences side eﬀects, the physician decreases the dosage,
experiments with an another statin or suspends the cholesterol drug therapy (the Finnish
current care for dyslipidemia, 2011).11 As patients respond diﬀerently to statins (the
Finnish current care for dyslipidemia, 2011, Jousilahti, 2004), a physician may not know
the eﬃcacy and side eﬀects for a single patient.12 I take the uncertainty into account and
9Within the group of an active ingredient, statins diﬀer also in the form of drugs, package sizes,
strengths and prices. I do not consider a combination preparations of a statin and an another active
ingredient.
10I also assume that the physician decides to end the patient's medical treatment. In practice, the ﬁnal
decision to end the therapy can be done either by the physician or the patient or both.
11Lifestyle changes, including exercising and changes in diet, are often adequate for a low-risk patient.
However, patients are often unwilling to change their lifestyles, even after having a signiﬁcant shock
in their life. Perhaps 45% of smokers stop smoking after a myocardial infarction which is between 2
or 4 times of the success rate of antismoking clinics. Results are not as good for other cardiovascular
risk factors related lifestyle, such as physical exercise or diet. Patients can become even less active after
infarction. There is also some evidence that changes in self-reported fat intake in one year after infarction
can be small. (Johnston, 1999)
12For example, statins are reported being useful for men, post menopausal women and patients who
have arterial disease or diabetes. It has also been shown that statins decrease by 15% the mortality rate
of patients who were 60 years and older and initially clinically asymptomatic. Genetic susceptibility and
certain drug interactions can increase the risk of side eﬀects. For example, approximately 5% of patients
have been reported suﬀering muscular symptoms and an increase in the activity of serum muscular
enzymes appears for 0.5 − 2.0% of statin users, even though its clinical signiﬁcance is often uncertain.
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let the physician to learn the average health eﬀects of statins by observing realized health
eﬀects and the patient's past statin prescriptions.
Cholesterol drugs are also particularly interesting as there is no consensus on an appropri-
ate level of cholesterol drug prescribing. Some doctors have claimed that there is a little
evidence that statins reduce the CVDs of low-risk individuals. Doctors supporting the
use of statins have said that they have prevented heart attacks and other CVDs.13 In my
model, physicians disagree on the health eﬀects of statins, depending on their personal
experience of the patient.
Two features of the Finnish market simplify my empirical analysis. The ﬁrst is that a
choice of a physician by a patient was very restricted in public primary care. During
the observation period, the patient was not allowed to choose the health center. Within
the health center, the patient's family physician was (exogenously) determined based on
the patient's residential area (Finnish Medical Association, FMA, 2007).14 However, due
to the shortage of physician labor, patients were not often treated by their own family
physicians.15 I assume that a physician is exogenously determined for the patient in
primary care.16
The second feature is that two characteristics of the Finnish statin market decrease vari-
ation in drug prices over time. First, drugs are subject to price cap regulation by the
Pharmaceuticals Pricing Board that is subordinated to the Ministry of Social Aﬀairs and
Health in Finland. Second, the patents of Fluvastatin, Atorvastatin and Rosuvastatin
remained eﬀective during the whole observation period 2003 − 2006. As patent protec-
tion limits competition, it is likely that the prices ceilings of the patented products were
binding. In the empirical analysis, I follow much of the previous learning literature (e.g.
Crawford and Shum, 2005) and assume that the drug prices are exogenous. The assump-
tion simpliﬁes the construction of the structural model as prices do not adjust with the
(The Finnish current care for dyslipidemia, 2011)
13See e.g. Adams (2011), Joelving (2011), BBC (2011).
14Family physician practices are widely adopted in many countries. For example in the USA, The
American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP) is one of the largest national medical organizations.
See AAFP, http://www.aafp.org.
15For example in 2006, 9% of the appointments in health centers had a shortfall of physicians and
almost the same share of working-age physicians were absent from their permanent jobs. In 46% of
these cases, this was caused by staying abroad (FMA, 2006c). It has been estimated that 90% of family
physicians treat other than their own patients every week (see FMA, 2005, 2006a, 2006c, 2007).
16To be more speciﬁc, I assume that the probability of getting a certain physician does not depend
on the statin treatment or the health of the patient. This probability is needed to recover the choice
probability for the outside good.
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observed behavior of physicians.17
3.2.2 Information transmission between physicians
In the model, I assume that a physician has personal experience about the patient-speciﬁc
quality of the drug treatment. As MD Epstein (1999) illustrates in the Journal of the
American Medical Association: "Clinical judgment is based on both explicit and tacit
knowledge. Medical decision-making, however, is often presented only as a conscious
application to the patient's problem of explicitly deﬁned rules and objectively veriﬁable
data. [...] Seasoned practitioners also apply to their practice a large body of knowledge,
skills, values, and experiences that are not explicitly stated by or known to them. [...]
While explicit elements of practice are taught formally, tacit elements are usually learned
during observation and practice." In this section, I evaluate the validity of the assumption
on private information further by discussing the information content of patient records
and communication between physicians.
Patient records
A patient record documents and transfers information on a single patient's medication
between physician. If all relevant information for medical decision-making is available
in the record, a physician does not have any private information of the patient. To see
whether this is the case, I next consider the information content of patient records.
The focus of patient records is on the patient's medical condition and medication.18 To
see what type of information is stored in patient records, consider an example of a patient
record for a dispensary admission in Appendix B. The patient record provides a compact
description of the patient's health status and the plan, the goal and the follow-up of the
treatment. It also includes the name of the physician, the list of current medication and
a brief justiﬁcation for starting a medical treatment. In general, patient records may also
17In the ﬁnancial market application of Cipriani and Guarino (2012), bid and ask prices (prices at
which a trader can buy and sell) are endogenous because they reﬂect public information containing the
history of trades and prices.
18Patient records regarding to medication include entries about the need of pharmacotherapy and
medical foundations, a prescription and given medical treatment, including the name, quantity, form,
dosage, dosage form, the date and time of issue of a drug and the name of the physician who has given
or prescribed the drug (The Ministry of Social Aﬀairs and Health, 2005).
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contain information on whether medication is permanent and reasons for a physician's
decision to end the patient's drug therapy.19
Patient records do not perfectly transfer all relevant information for medical decision-
making between physicians. The case example demonstrates that the continuation of drug
therapy is not justiﬁed (Appendix B). According to an interviewed specialist, this is a very
common practice, at least in routine cases. Records do not include physician-speciﬁc fac-
tors, such as the physician's own preferences for medication and information on whether
her medical decision-making is based on medical literature, advertising and treatment
recommendations. The physician's accumulated knowledge of the patient's preferences,
values and circumstances is rarely recorded (see Guthrie et al., 2008). The specialist also
claimed that a narrative text format complicates the interpretation of records that may
impede information transmission. The registering of information takes the physician's
time that may decrease her incentives to record all relevant information.
Communication
I evaluate next whether all relevant information for medical decision-making is transfered
through communication. A physician who cares about her patient may want to consult her
colleagues before deciding on the continuation of the treatment. Because communication
is time-consuming, consultation does not probably happen in routine cases. On the other
hand, the patient, who wants to get as good medical treatment as possible, may want
to communicate all relevant information to her physicians. It is, however, unlikely that
medical decision-making by physicians is exclusively based on information received from
the patient (see e.g. Epstein, 1999).
The theoretical cheap-talk20 literature (see for example Crawford and Sobel, 1982, Ol-
szewski, 2004) has shown that the truthful information revelation of a consultant (a
sender, here: other physicians or a patient) to a decision maker (a receiver, here: a physi-
cian) is only one of many possible outcomes, even if there is no disagreement between
participants. If the preferences of the consultant are even slightly misalligned with the
preferences of the decision maker, there is some information loss in all equilibria (Craw-
19Essential information in electronic patient documents are reported in the following guidebook and
its updated versions (in Finnish): "Opas Ydintietojen, otsikoiden ja näkymien toteuttaminen sähköisessä
potilaskertomuksessa", version 1.1, 28.2.2006.
20In a typical cheap-talk game, the sender may, often costlessly, convey her private information through
messages to the receiver. The receiver then takes an action that together with sender's signal aﬀects the
payoﬀs of both players.
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ford and Sobel, 1982). If the consultation eﬀort of the physician is unobserved to the
patient, incentives for consultation may not be high.
Finally, if all physicians of a patient share the same information, they should have the
same probability of choosing the medical treatment. As it turns out in the next section,
this is not the case.
3.2.3 Data
Sample selection
I use a rich dataset of all purchased cholesterol drug prescriptions in Finland from January
1 in 2003 to December 31 in 2006. The data is provided by the Social Insurance Institution
of Finland which is responsible for the provision of public social security beneﬁts to Finnish
residents. The data identiﬁes patients, their physicians and cholesterol drugs.21
I prepare my data for the empirical analysis in the following steps. First, to follow
patients from the beginning of cholesterol drug therapy and to avoid left-censoring, I
focus on "new" patients who did not have any prescriptions during the ﬁrst 6 months of
the observation period i.e., before July 2003.22 Second, I ignore patients with multiple
prescriptions or physicians within a day to simplify the analysis further. Third, I consider
patients whose physicians are primarily working in public health centers. Ideally, I would
like to concentrate on patients who have only used the services of public health centers but
unfortunately the data does not include this information. As a proportion of physicians
work for both the public and the private sectors23, some patients in the sample may have
used private health care services. Fourth, I concentrate on patients who belong to the
working-age (15-64 years) population because the data does not allow me to distinguish
the death of a patient from the ending of the statin treatment. Finally, for computational
reasons, I draw a random sample of 10000 patients from the sample of new working-age
patients whose physicians are working in primary care.
21Other characteristics than the primary job of a physician (public health center/public hospital/other)
received from the survey conducted by the Finnish Medical Association (FMA) are from the registers of
the Social Insurance Institution of Finland. The response rate of the yearly survey has been very high.
For example, in 2006, the response rate of physicians who received the survey was 80% (FMA, 2006c).
22This six months' time window has been also used by Crawford and Shum (2005).
23In 2006, 19.6% of physicians, who were primarily working in health centers, had a sideline job (FMA,
2006c).
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Descriptive evidence
In this section, I provide the descriptive analysis of the sample. The results in Table
3.1 demonstrate that the sample consists of very heterogeneous patients. Most of the
patients in my sample were relatively old at the time of the last prescription (an average
51 years) and almost half of the patients were men. The number of diagnosis varies24
in substantially around its mean (0.7).25 A signiﬁcant portion of patients (55%) were
censored in the sample i.e., they had their last prescription within the last six months of
the observation period.
24The number of diagnosis is observed if the patient was on sick-leave.
25Information on the number of diagnosis is observed if a patient received sickness beneﬁts from the
Social Insurance Institution of Finland.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for the sample of patients1
Mean Std.Dev. Only non-censored At the time
patients of the last
prescription
Patient characteristics
Age 55.03 7.20 No Yes
Gender (1: male, 0: female) 0.49 0.50 No Yes
Nbr of diagnosis 0.73 1.31 No Yes
Censoring indicator (1: yes, 0: no) 0.52 0.50 No Yes
Patient's medical treatment
Treatment ending (1: yes, 0: no) 0.34 0.47 Yes No
Nbr of prescriptions 1.93 1.17 Yes Yes
Nbr of physicians 1.28 0.58 Yes Yes
Prescriptions of a current physician 1.676 1.072 No No
Visit a physician specialized in
internal diseases 0.01 0.09 No No
Visit a non-specialized physician 0.69 0.46 No No
Total number of
physician's prescriptions 1.65 1.07 No No
Physician change (1: yes, 0: no)2 0.33 0.47 No No
Active ingredient change
(1: yes, 0: no)2 0.17 0.38 No No
Price, eur 46.32 49.16 No No
Number of observations 22 021
1 The relevant population consists of new working-age patients who have used statins and
the services of public health centers. The size of the random sample is 10 000 patients.
2 Note that here the number of prescriptions is at least 2 because the change in the value of
the variable from the previous prescription is computed by using the diﬀerence between its
current and lagged value.
Following Crawford and Shum (2005), I assume that the drug therapy of a non-censored
patient ends after the last prescription in the data. If the patient is censored, the end of
the therapy is not observed. If the censoring interval is too short, the estimation results
may be biased. This is particularly true if the patient's drug treatment is prescribed at
the end of the observation period and he has more than two prescriptions.26 Dickstein
26As a robustness check, I used a one-year censoring interval and deﬁned a patient to be "new" if
he did not have prescriptions during the ﬁrst year. Then, the probability that the patient is censored
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(2011) used an alternative approach where the treatment episode of a patient ends at the
last prescription if there was a gap of 90 days within the treatment history. A patient
appearing in the data again after the gap is then treated as a new patient.
The cholesterol drug therapies of non-censored patients in the sample were on average
relatively short, approximately 2 prescriptions (Table 3.1). The probability that the pa-
tient's therapy ends at any stage of therapy is 0.34. The average number of physicians per
patient was 1.3 and the total number of prescriptions received from a particular physician
was 1.65. Most of the patients (70%) were treated by a non-specialized physician. The
average price of a prescription was 41 eur.
Table 3.2 presents the distribution of the total number of prescriptions and physicians
at the time of the (non-censored) patient's last prescription. Most of the non-censored
patients (52%) had only one prescription and 80% of the patients were in a permanent
physician-patient relationship. Even though the distributions of the total number of
prescriptions and physicians are skewed to the right, 48% of non-censored patients had
more than one prescription and 20% were treated by more than one physician.
Table 3.2: The percentage share of non-censored patients in the sample conditional on
the total number of prescriptions and physicians at the last prescription
Physicians
Prescriptions 1 2 3- Total
1 51.91 . . 51.91
2 18.55 8.37 . 26.93
3 6.77 4.80 1.45 13.02
4- 3.13 2.95 2.07 8.15
Total 80.36 16.12 3.52 100.00
I consider next the incidence of a physician change in the sample of patients. Table 3.1
illustrated that the breakdown of the physician-patient relationship was very common.
The probability that the patient's physician changes from the previous prescription was
33%. A high standard deviation also indicates signiﬁcant diversity among patients in the
incidence of a physician change.
Then, I analyze how the number of interactions between a physician and a patient aﬀects
prescriptions. I consider ﬁrst how the probability of continuing the (non-censored) pa-
tient's statin therapy depends on the lagged number of physicians (Figure 3.1). I ﬁnd that
was somewhat higher (0.73) than with the original censoring interval. The probability that the patient's
treatment ends was 0.40 which is fairly close to the corresponding probability with other deﬁnition (0.34).
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the continuation probability is 50% for patients who have only one physician, i.e. who
do not have any physician switches. The choice probability decreases to 42% for patients
having two physicians and further to 33% for patient with three physicians.
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Figure 3.1: The probability of treatment continuation and its 95% conﬁdence intervals by
the number of physicians for non-censored patients, sample averages
I investigate next whether the decreasing pattern between the choice probability and the
number of physicians is driven by the phase of the patient's therapy. To see if this is
the case, I estimate the following linear probability model for the continuation of the
(non-censored) patient's statin therapy,
ait = α +Xi(t−1)β + eit, t > 1,
where ait is an indicator variable that gets value 1 if the statin therapy of patient i
is continued at time, or prescription, t and 0 otherwise27, Xi(t−1) is a vector of lagged
explanatory variables and eit is the error term.
The results presented in Table 3.3 suggest that the continuation probability increases by
13% when the number of previous physicians increases by one. The lagged length of the
27To be more precise, ait = 0 only once when the patient's statin therapy ends.
70
doctor-patient relationship has an opposite eﬀect on the continuation probability. These
ﬁndings may suggest that physicians do not share the same information about the health
eﬀects of the cholesterol drug treatment for a patient.
Table 3.3: Descriptive regressions for the probability of therapy continuation in the sample
of non-censored patients
Variable1 Model (1) Model (2)
Constant 0.672*** 0.704***
(0.167) (0.169)
Own experience:
prescriptions/current physician -0.126***
(0.013)
Nbr of physicians 0.129***
(0.017)
Prescription nbr -0.156*** -0.046***
(0.008) (0.010)
Gender 0.0288** 0.0277*
(0.0109) (0.0109)
Age 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Nbr of diagnosis 0.006 0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
Cost, eur 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Reimbursement -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Fixed eﬀects:
physician, ATC-code, hospital district yes yes
N 10031 10031
adj. R2 0.093 0.100
1 Explanatory variables are lagged by a one prescription.
2 Variables are for cholesterol drug prescriptions.
2 Standard errors in parentheses.
3 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
To get further evidence on peer eﬀects and the role of private experience in demand, Table
3.4 illustrates how medical spending in the sample depends on the length of the physician-
patient relationship, after controlling for observed characteristics. When the number of
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physicians increases by one, the total costs of the therapy at any stage decreases by 7
euros which is 15% of the average costs of statins in the sample. Table 3.4 also shows that
the more the physician has experience of the patient, the less the previous choices of peers
- measured by the number of cholesterol drug prescriptions provided by other doctors to
a single patient - aﬀect an average medical spending at any phase of the therapy.28 When
the physicians of a patient change frequently relative to the stage of the drug therapy,
the eﬀect of physician's own experience on the total costs becomes small. These results
are consistent with "asymmetric peer eﬀects" where inexperienced physicians rely on
experienced doctors to decrease uncertainty around their prescription decisions (see e.g.
Nair et al., 2010). Still, the ﬁndings remain very indicative without putting any structure
in the model that helps to isolate the eﬀects of personal experience and social learning on
medical decision-making.
28I measure the physician's own experience with the number of interactions with the patient.
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Table 3.4: Descriptive regressions for treatment costs in the sample of patients
Explained variable Total cost, Total cost, Cost, Total cost,
eur1 eur eur1
Constant -92.48*** -102.5*** 12.52*** -168.2***
(17.54) (18.04) (2.173) (23.10)
Nbr of physicians -7.106*
(3.312)
Own experience:
prescriptions/current physician 60.63*** 0.549*** 23.25***
(2.952) (0.119) (5.537)
Other physicians' experience:
prescriptions/previous physicians 60.20*** 0.572***
(4.542) (0.152)
Own experience*others' experience -3.718 -0.126**
(3.499) (0.044)
Physicians/prescriptions 86.71***
(13.73)
Own experience*
physicians/prescriptions -31.65*
(12.88)
Nbr of prescriptions 57.93*** 55.60***
(3.014) (4.182)
Reimbursement 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.019*** 0.029***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Prescription date 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.000*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Min prescription date -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.000 -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age, years 0.020 0.018 -0.015 0.035
(0.092) (0.092) (0.009) (0.091)
Gender 1.722 1.775 0.165 1.499
(1.531) (1.513) (0.149) (1.486)
Nbr of diagnosis -0.0260 -0.0343 -0.151** -0.0927
(0.479) (0.489) (0.059) (0.463)
Fixed eﬀects:
physician, ATC-code, hospital district yes yes yes yes
N 22183 22183 22183 22183
adj. R2 0.715 0.716 0.974 0.723
1 Total (cumulative) costs at a given stage of the therapy.
2 Variables are for cholesterol drug prescriptions.
2 Standard errors in parentheses.
3 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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3.3 A theoretical model of pharmaceutical demand
3.3.1 Overview
In this section, I present a structural model of medical decision-making with private
experience and observational learning. In each period during the drug therapy, the patient
(he) is randomly matched to a physician (she). After an initial treatment choice, the
physician investigates the patient and gets private information about the quality of the
match between the patient and the drug treatment. During the course of the patient's
therapy, the physician may learn quality from from her own experience and the previous
choices of other doctors for this particular patient.29
Consider patient i who comes for the ﬁrst time to a public health center to seek drug
treatment for her medical condition. After entrance, a physician is randomly assigned
to the patient. As the sensitivity of patients to cholesterol drugs diﬀer, the physician
does not know ex-ante the average health eﬀects, or quality, of the drug treatment for
this particular patient. To form the prior belief on quality, the physician evaluates the
patient's risk for CVDs based on the patient's observed characteristics. The physician
takes the prior belief and her privately observed idiosyncratic preferences into account
when she decides whether to initiate the cholesterol drug therapy.
In the follow-up of the drug therapy at time (or prescription number) t, patient i comes
again to the health center where he is randomly matched physician l. First, the physi-
cian performs a diagnostic procedure, physical examination and tests for the patient to
privately evaluate the eﬃcacy and side eﬀects of the drug treatment. This evaluation
is modeled by an experience signal xilt. Simultaneously, she looks at patient records to
see how long the patient has been using the drug. Conditional on the prior, the past
choices of other doctors indexed by l1, ..., lt−1, hit = {ail11, ..., ailt−1(t−1)}, and all private
experience signals that the physician has received during the course of the patient's drug
therapy up to and including time t, she updates her belief about its quality.
Recall that in previous social learning models (Cipriani and Guarino, 2012, Knight and
Schiﬀ, 2010, Zhang, 2010) agents can receive only one experience signal. Based on this
posterior belief and her private preference shocks for the drug treatment and the outside
good, vil1t and vil0t respectively, the physician makes a decision on the continuation of the
29A relatively easy extension of the model is to enrich the choice set of physicians that could include
other medical treatment alternatives, such as non-patented products, with the known (to physicians) but
possibly random quality. An extension that allows several inside goods with uncertain qualities comes at
the cost of computation.
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patient's therapy. Further decisions follow until any physician decides to end the drug
therapy. The timing of events is summarized by Figure 3.2.
t           t+1
Match to a physician l Observe xilt,hit,vilt A treatment choice
Time
Figure 3.2: The timing of events in period t during the follow-up of the therapy: 1.) a
patient is ﬁrst matched to a physician, 2.) the physician observes a new signal xilt and
the past choices of other doctors hit and private idiosyncratic preference shocks, vil1t and
vil0t, 3.) the physician makes a treatment choice on all her private signals received up to
and including time t, public information hit and private preference shocks.
In the long-term treatment relationship, the physician learns about the average health
eﬀects of the drug treatment from her own experience. If the relationship breaks down,
a physician attempts to infer quality from the past choices of other doctors. The less the
physician has own experience of the patient, the more the past choices of peers aﬀect her
prescription behavior. If the patient has used the drug treatment long, an inexperienced
physician may perceive that the drug must be eﬀective. When the drug is of high quality,
observing the past choices of other doctors improves learning. On contrary, the optimism
on quality leads to over-prescribing when the drug is of low quality.
To keep the model tractable and to avoid the salient computational burden, I assume
that a physician maximizes her expected per-period utility. The assumption of myopic
behavior is often made in the structural learning literature (e.g. Coscelli and Shum, 2004,
Ching, 2009, Chernew et al., 2008) and it abstracts away incentives to experiment with
the drug treatment to get new information about quality in the next period (see e.g.
Crawford and Shum, 2005).30
Following e.g. Crawford and Shum (2005) and Dickstein (2011), the model does not take
into account learning across patients.31 This type of learning could be incorporated to the
30My future plan is to estimate a dynamic version of the model.
31For learning across patients, see Kim (2010) and Coscelli and Shum (2004). Note also that Crawford
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model by using the entry of a new active ingredient, Rosuvastatin. This extension comes
again with the cost of computation and tractability because physicians and the econome-
trician have to keep track on the posteriors of all doctors. Because many cholesterol drugs
have been on the market since the end of the 1980s or the early 1990s, learning about the
distribution of health eﬀects across patients does not probably have a signiﬁcant role in
my application.
In the following sections, I present the model in detail. I ﬁrst formulate a deterministic
process governing the assignment of a physician for a patient.32 Because the physician is
not forward-looking in her treatment continuation choices, the assignment, or matching,
probability does not aﬀect her behavior. Then, I describe a therapy continuation choice
under uncertainty and the information structure, including the distribution of signals
(health eﬀects) and the patient-speciﬁc quality. Finally, I derive the posterior belief
of the physician about quality, conditional on her private experience and the patient's
prescription history.
3.3.2 The theoretical model
Physician and patient matching
In each period until the therapy ends, patient i is assigned to a physician. The physician is
either "new" i.e., she does not have the previous treatment relationship with the patient,
or is any of the previously drawn "old" physicians 1, ..., Nit. The number of old physicians
at time t + 1 increases by one, Ni(t+1) = Nit + 1, if the new physician treats the patient
at time t, and otherwise it remains unchanged, Ni(t+1) = Nit.
I assume that the patient is assigned to the new physician with probability κi and to
the old physician with probability (1 − κit) × 1Nit . This speciﬁcation implies that each
old physician is randomly selected for the patient from the pool of the previously drawn
physicians with the same probability 1
Nit
.33
I assume the following functional form for the matching probability of patient i:
and Shum (2005) allow the possibility of non-rational expectations, because in their model physicians'
prior beliefs for one particular drug, Omeprazole, can evolve over time, which captures common changes
in priors, for example, due to advertising. However, posteriors may also vary through a diﬀerent type of
mechanism, namely based on the previous medication decisions of a particular physician or other doctors.
32The assignment probability is used to recover the probability of the outside good (see Section 4.1).
33Note that only 3.5% of patients had more than 2 physicians in my data (see Table 3.2).
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κi = Pi(dit = 1) =
eyi
1 + eyi
. (3.1)
In the above expression, yi is N(θ
y, σ2y)- distributed patient level random coeﬃcient. The
variance of the random coeﬃcient, σ2y, measures the magnitude of heterogeneity in match-
ing probabilities across patients. The heterogeneity is potentially important because the
probability of a physician change can diﬀer between patients, for example, by residential
area.
A therapy continuation choice under uncertainty
Assume that physician l is drawn for patient i at time t. The physician decides whether
to continue the drug therapy of patient i, ailt = 1, or end the therapy for good, ailt = 0,
conditional on her information at that time, Iilt. In the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the
physician chooses to continue the medical therapy if the expected utility from the medical
treatment exceeds the utility from the outside option (the non-purchase option),
ailt = 1⇔ E(uil1t|Iilt) ≥ uil0t. (3.2)
I assume that the per-period utility received from the medical treatment, uil1t, depends
on the quality signal, or health eﬀects, xilt, and a vector of control variables, Zil1t. The
controls include, for example, the (average) price of statins, observed patient level char-
acteristics and the time trend capturing general market level changes over time due to
advertising. These controls are observed by both physicians and the econometrician. Be-
cause patient records do not contain information on preference shocks, I assume that the
physician's idiosyncratic, Type 1 extreme value distributed tastes for the drug treatment
and the outside option, vil1t and vil0t, are her private information. Following the previous
literature (e.g. Crawford and Shum, 2005), I assume a Constant Absolute Risk Aversion
(CARA) sub-utility speciﬁcation for the health eﬀects. To be more speciﬁc, I consider
the following utility function,
u(xilt,Zil1t, vil1t) = −e−r·xilt + Zil1tα+ vil1t, (3.3)
where r > 0 is the risk aversion coeﬃcient.
I assume that the utility of the outside good for the physician l of patient i at time t,
uil0t, is a function of a vector of observed characteristics, Zil0t, and the physician's private
preference shock, vil0t,
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u(Zil0t, vil0t) = Zil0tβ + vil0t. (3.4)
To ensure identiﬁcation in the discrete choice model, I make a typical restriction that the
constant of the outside option is zero. Recall that the utility of the outside good varies
with the patient's observed characteristics (see Chan and Hamilton, 2006, for a similar
approach). For example, cholesterol drugs prevent coronary events in the long-run after
the patient's drug therapy has ended.34 I control this with the number of prescriptions.
Health eﬀects
The quality of the match between the patient and the drug treatment (referred as "qual-
ity"), θi, is without loss of generality either high θ1 or low θ0 with prior probabili-
ties pi(θ1) and 1 − pi(θ1), respectively. 35 The variance of random quality, Var(θi) =
E(θ2i ) − (E(θi))2 = pi(1 − pi)(θ21 + θ20 − 2θ1θ0), measures prior uncertainty regarding to
quality. The prior is uninformative when it equals 1/2.
The prior probability is common knowledge for physicians but it may vary across patients,
depending on the patient's observed characteristics. I assume that each physician has the
following prior belief that the treatment has high quality for patient i:
pi(θ1) =
eγ0+Z
p
i γ1
1 + eγ0+Z
p
i γ1
, (3.5)
where Zpi is a vector of patient level characteristics at the time of the ﬁrst prescription.
In the follow-up of the patient's drug therapy at time t > 1, the physician observes
an experience signal, or health eﬀects associated with the use of cholesterol drugs. I
assume that health eﬀects are independent and normally distributed conditional on the
true quality,
xilt|θi ∼ N(θi, σ2), (3.6)
34The literature has explained this with the stabilization of existing plaque and the slowing of the
progression of coronary artery disease (Ford et al., 2007).
35The model could be generalized to allow a continuous quality level but the computation of the
posterior probability for quality θ conditional on information at time t It, f(θ|It), becomes more diﬃcult
than in the binary case as it would involve integration over quality levels θ.
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where σ2 measures uncertainty regarding to health eﬀects. The distributions of signals and
priors are common knowledge and θ1, θ0, σ
2, γ0 and γ1 are parameters to be estimated.
36
Because prior beliefs are heterogeneous across patients, the unconditional (mixture) den-
sity of health eﬀects, f(xilt), depends on the observed characteristics of the patient. This
means that the sensitivity of patients on the eﬃcacy and side eﬀects of statins may diﬀer
for example by their gender and age, as the medical literature suggests (see Section 3.1).
A physician's information set
Because signals are private information to physicians, a physician's information set for the
patient at time t, Iθilt, includes her own private experience of the patient and the previous
therapy continuation choices of other physicians. Formally, Iθilt = xilt ∪ hit \ {ailt′ , t′ < t}
where xilt is the set of signals that physician l has received up to (and including) time t and
hit \ {ailt′ , t′ < t} is the patient's prescription history, hit = {ail11, ..., ailt−1(t−1)}, without
the physician l's actions, {ailt′ , t′ < t}. Because the preference shocks of physician l are
her private information, the ﬁnal information set of physician l at time t for patient i is
given by Iilt = I
θ
ilt ∪ vilt where vilt is the set of preference shocks that physician l has
received up to (and including) time t.
The expected utility
The expected utility of physician l associated with the continuation of the drug therapy
for patient i conditional on her information at time t, Iilt, can be written as:
E(uil1t|Iilt) = Eθi|IEx|θi,I(−e−rxilt) + Zil1tα+ vil1t
= Eθi|I(−e−rθi+
1
2
r2σ2) + Zil1tα+ vil1t
= −λilte−rθ1+ 12 r2σ2 − (1− λilt)e−rθ0+ 12 r2σ2 + Zil1tα+ vil1t. (3.7)
λilt = Pr(θ1|Iilt) is the posterior probability that quality is high. The ﬁrst equality follows
from the law of iterated expectations and the second one from the moment generating
function of the normal distribution.
The expected utility of the risk averse physician decreases with uncertainty about the eﬀect
of the drug therapy on the patient's health, σ2. The risk aversion parameter increases the
36The model could be extended to allow unobserved heterogeneity. In this case, the mean and variance
of a signal can diﬀer depending on the type of the patient that is observed by his physicians.
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expected utility through quality parameters θ1 and θ0 and decreases it through the risk
premium 1
2
r2σ2. Clearly, the latter eﬀect starts to dominate when either σ2 or the risk
aversion parameter r is large enough, namely r > 2θk
σ2
, k ∈ {0, 1}.
Public and private beliefs
In this section, I describe how the physician updates her beliefs about the quality of the
drug treatment. I ﬁnd that the posterior belief about quality, λilt, is a function of the
prior and the physician's private and public beliefs. The private belief is the probability
of quality, conditional on physician's accumulated private experience of the patient, xilt.
The public belief is the probability of quality, conditional on the past choices of other
doctors. I show that the private experience aﬀects the private belief through a sum of
signals. It turns out that this property decreases the computational burden of the model
substantially. Even though the physician does not observe the private information of
other doctors, she tries to infer quality from their past therapy continuation choices.
The posterior belief
Let Pi(θ1|xilt) denote the private belief of physician l that quality is high for patient
i at time t conditional on her private experience xilt. I denote by qilt = P (θ1|l, hit)
the corresponding public belief that is conditional on the previous therapy continuation
decisions of other physicians l′ 6= l.
Conditional on health eﬀects xilt and the past choices of other doctors for patient i,
physician l updates her beliefs about the quality of the treatment for patient i using
Bayes' rule and the iid nature of the health eﬀects,
λilt = Pi(θ1|l, hit,xilt)
=
P (hit|l, θ1)f(xilt|θ1)pi(θ1)
P (hit|l, θ1)f(xilt|θ1)pi(θ1) + P (hit|l, θ0)f(xilt|θ0)pi(θ0) . (3.8)
In the above expression, P (hit|l, θ) is the probability of other doctors' treatment continu-
ation choices for the patient and f(xilt|θ) is the probability of health eﬀects, conditional
on the true quality of the drug, θ ∈ {θ0, θ1}.
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The posterior can be linked to the prior, private and public beliefs as follows:
λilt =
qiltf(xilt|θ1)
qiltf(xilt|θ1) + (1− qilt)f(xilt|θ0)
=
qiltPi(θ1|xilt)/pi(θ1)
qiltPi(θ1|xilt)/pi(θ1) + (1− qilt)Pi(θ0|xilt)/pi(θ0) , (3.9)
where the ﬁrst equality follows from (8). To see this, multiply and divide (8) by 1/P (l, hit)
and note that qilt =
Pi(hit|l,θ1)pi(θ1)
P (l,hit)
where P (l, hit) is the probability of the public medication
history of the patient without the physician l's actions. The second equality in (9) follows
from the ﬁrst one by dividing and multiplying the ﬁrst equality by 1/f(xilt) and by
observing that f(xilt|θ)
f(xilt)
= P (θ|xilt)
p(θ)
for θ ∈ {θ0, θ1}.
The posterior belief is determined by the prior, pi(θ1), and private and public beliefs,
Pi(θ1|xilt) and qilt. When the public (private) belief is uninformative (equals 1/2), the
posterior belief depends only on the private (public) and prior beliefs. When the physician
puts weight only on her prior and private experience, the model corresponds to a tradi-
tional structural learning model where agents learn only from their private experience
(see e.g. Coscelli and Shum, 2004, Crawford and Shum, 2005, Ackerberg, 2003). Recall
also that the posterior is an increasing function of private and public beliefs. Hence the
higher these beliefs are, the more conﬁdent the physician becomes that the quality of the
medical treatment is high.
The last step is to derive the evolution of private and public beliefs.
The private belief
First, I describe how the physician learns from her private experience. Assume that
the physician has seen the patient S times in the follow-up of the therapy and has ob-
served health xil1, ..., xilS. Denote by f(xil1, ..., xilS|θ) the joint probability of health eﬀects
xil1, ..., xilS conditional on θ for θ ∈ {θ0, θ1}. By using the normality and independence of
health eﬀects, the physician updates her private belief about θ1 for patient i according to
Bayes' rule:
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Pi(θ1|xil1, ..., xilS) = f(xil1, ..., xilS|θ1)pi(θ1)
f(xil1, ..., xilS|θ1)pi(θ1) + f(xil1, ..., xilS|θ0)pi(θ0)
=
∏S
s=1
1
σ
√
2pi
e−
(xils−θ1)2
2σ2 pi(θ1)∏S
s=1
1
σ
√
2pi
e−
(xils−θ1)2
2σ2 pi(θ1) +
∏S
s=1
1
σ
√
2pi
e−
(xils−θ0)2
2σ2 pi(θ0)
=
1
1 + e
∑S
s=1
−(xils−θ0)2+(xils−θ1)2
2σ2
pi(θ0)
pi(θ1)
=
1
1 + e
1
2σ2
(−2(θ1−θ0)XilS+S(θ21−θ20)) pi(θ0)
pi(θ1)
. (3.10)
The posterior37 depends on signals xil1, ..., xilS only through their sum XilS =
∑S
s=1 xils,
which is also normally distributed given the true quality,
XilS|θi ∼ N(Sθi, Sσ2). (3.11)
The result generalizes to continuous, normally distributed quality, θi ∼ N(θ, σ2).
A physician learns the true quality through her own experience when the number of signals
is large enough. Assume that quality is high.38 In this case, the joint probability for signals
converges to zero more slowly than the corresponding probability for low quality. To see
this, examine the denominator in (10) that can be rewritten as
1 + e
1
2σ2
(−S(θ1−θ0)2−2(θ1−θ0)σ
∑S
s=1 eils)
pi(θ0)
pi(θ1)
(3.12)
when xils = θ1 + σeils for eils ∼ N(0, 1). Because the expected value of eils is zero, the
denominator approaches one when the number of signals S increases.
At the patient population level, the weights of the exponential terms increase when the
priors of patients, pi(θ1), ∀i, decrease. This delays private learning about high quality and
increases variation in private posteriors across patients. Note also that for high enough
signal realizations i.e., XilS >
S((θ1)2−(θ0)2
2(θ1−θ0) , the private posterior decreases with the uncer-
tainty parameter σ2, making physicians less likely to continue the drug therapy.
37Note that this is a valid probability distribution as the posterior of signals given the true state is
restricted between zero and one.
38Private learning on low quality is analogous.
82
The public belief
Next, I consider the social learning of the physician from the past choices of other doctors.
After observing the action of physician −l, ai−lt, the physician l (and all other physicians
except physician −l) updates her posterior belief about high quality by using the following
Bayes formula:
qil(t+1) =
P (ai−lt|hit, θ1)qilt
P (ai−lt|hit, θ1)qilt + P (ai−lt|hit, θ0)(1− qilt) . (3.13)
The public posterior belief at time t + 1 is determined by the (conditional) choice prob-
abilities for high and low qualities and the public belief of physician l at time t. Given
that the public beliefs correspond to priors at the beginning of the therapy, qil1 = pi(θ1),
the ﬁnal step is to compute the probability of a physician −l's choice, conditional on the
patient's prescription history and true quality, Pr(ai−lt|hit, θ) for θ ∈ {θ0, θ1}. This is
done in two steps.
First assume that physician l observes the physician −l's signals, but not her preference
shocks. Let's deﬁne a threshold for the diﬀerence of private valuations vi−l0t − vi−l1t for
which physician −l is indiﬀerent between the continuation and ending of the drug therapy,
Wi−l1t −Wi−l0t = vi−l0t − vi−l1t,
where Wi−l1t = E(ui−l1t|Ii−lt) − vi−l1t is the expected mean utility of the treatment and
Wi−l0t = ui−l0t − vi−l0t is the corresponding mean utility from the outside good.
Conditional on her signals, the public belief and control variables, a physician's optimal
action is to continue the drug therapy if and only if the diﬀerence in private valuations
is less or equal to the threshold, vil0t − vil1t ≤ vil0t − vil1t. If physician l observes that
physician −l continued the therapy, she infers that the realization of the diﬀerence in
private valuations must have been less or equal to this threshold. The larger the threshold,
the larger the probability that the drug therapy is chosen.39
With the assumption on the distribution of vi−l0t−vi−l1t, the conditional choice probability
P (ai−lt|Xi−lt, hit) can be recovered from the thresholds vil0t − vil1t for all Xi−lt. Equiv-
alently, when private valuations are Type 1 extreme value distributed, the conditional
probability that physician −l chooses the drug therapy is
39See Goeree et al., 2005 for theoretical work with one private signal.
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P (ai−lt = 1|Xi−lt, hit) = P (E(ui−l1t|Iilt) ≥ ui−l0t|Xi−lt, hit)
=
eWi−l1t
eWi−l0t + eWi−l1t
. (3.14)
As physician l does not observe the physician −l's private experience, the second step is
to compute the choice probability, conditional on the patient's prescription history and
quality. The conditional choice probabilities for θ0 and θ1 are calculated by using the law
of iterated expectations,
P (ai−lt = 1|hit, θ) =
∫
eWi−l1t
eWi−l0t + eWi−l1t
dF (Xi−lt|θ) for θ ∈ {θ0, θ1}. (3.15)
where I average out the eﬀect of the sum of signals on the physician's behavior. Without
the property that the private belief depends on signals through their sum, the computation
of the conditional choice probability would involve S integrals, instead of one. I compute
the choice probability numerically by using Simpson's method with 100 uniform grid
points.
When physician −l decides to continue the drug therapy of patient i, the public belief of
physician l at time t + 1, qil(t+1), increases from qilt and hence she becomes more opti-
mistic about quality. To see this, note ﬁrst that the sum of signals Xi−lt is higher under
θ1 than θ0. The expected utility associated with the continuation of the drug therapy for
physician −l, E(ui−l1t|Ii−lt), is increasing with the posterior belief λi−lt. The higher the
sum of signals Xi−lt is, the more conﬁdent the physician becomes that quality is high i.e.,
∂λi−lt
∂Xi−lt
≥ 0. Therefore, P (ai−lt = 1|Xi−lt, hit) in (19)-(20) is at least as high when quality
is θ1 than θ0. Because F (Xi−lt|θ1) has ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance over F (Xi−lt|θ0)
for θ1 > θ0, P (ai−lt = 1|hit, θ1) ≥ P (ai−lt = 1|hit, θ0). As a result, the public posterior of
physician l increases from the previous period i.e., qil(t+1) ≥ qilt.
3.4 The econometric model and identiﬁcation
In this section, I present the simulated likelihood function of the structural learning model
and discuss identiﬁcation. I use the following data to compute the simulated likelihood
function: 1.) the total number of physician visits for patient i, Ti, where the statin therapy
of patient i was continued in periods 1, ..., Ti − 1 and the outside option was chosen in
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period Ti if the patient is non-censored, 2.) the number of patient i's "old" physicians at
time t, Nit, 3.) an indicator variable if a previously chosen physician l is drawn for patient
i again among Nit old physicians, d
old
ilt , 4.) a vector of control variables aﬀecting utilities
received from the statin therapy and the outside good, Zilt, 5.) the censoring indicator,
ci, and 6.) the characteristics of patient i at the beginning of the therapy, Z
p
i , that aﬀect
the prior probability.
3.4.1 The likelihood function
The likelihood contribution of censored patient i contains the following probabilities for
each period t ∈ {1, ..., Ti−1} and physician l ∈ {1, ..., Nit+1} who is drawn for the patient
at the beginning of period t: 1.) the probability that physician l is matched to patient i
and 2.) the probability that physician l chooses the statin therapy for patient i conditional
on the sum of signals and the patient's prescription history, pilt = Pr(ailt = 1|Xilt, hit).
Because health eﬀects xilt, preference shocks vilkt, k ∈ {0, 1}, and random coeﬃcients
yi are unobserved by the econometrician, their eﬀects to the likelihood contribution of
patient i must be integrated out.
The likelihood contribution of censored patient i is
Lci ≡ E(L˜ci) = E
Ti−1∏
t=1
Nit∏
l=1
[
1− κi
Nit
pil1t]
doldilt︸ ︷︷ ︸
a previously drawn doctor
[κipi(Nit+1)1t]
1−doldilt︸ ︷︷ ︸
a new doctor
, (3.16)
which consists of the likelihood contributions of the patient's previously drawn and new
doctors. For example, 1−κi
Nit
is the probability that old physician l is drawn for the patient
at the beginning of period t and pil1t is the probability that the treatment of patient i is
continued at time t by this physician l.
The data does not contain any information on the identity of the physician who decided
to end the therapy. To tackle this problem, I ﬁrst form the joint probability that a
certain physician is drawn for the patient and the same physician chooses to end the drug
therapy. Then I sum these joint probabilities over the physicians of the patient to recover
the probability that any physician ends the therapy at time Ti.
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Formally, the likelihood contribution for the observed data of non-censored patient i is
Lnci = E(L˜
c
i · [
1− κi
NiTi
NiTi∑
l=1
pil0Ti + κipi(NiTi+1)0Ti ]), (3.17)
where 1−κi
NiTi
pil0Ti is the joint probability that an old physician l is drawn and she decides
to end the treatment and κipi(NiTi+1)0Ti is the corresponding joint probability for new
physician NiTi + 1.
Because expectations over signals in the likelihood function contributions are diﬃcult to
compute numerically, I use their simulated counterparts Lc,si and L
nc,s
i . For example, for
non-censored patients,
Lnc,si =
1
S
S∑
s=1
(L˜c,si · [
1− κsi
NiTi
NiTi∑
l=1
psil0Ti + κ
s
ip
s
i(NiTi+1)0Ti
]), (3.18)
where S is the number of simulations. To compute the simulated likelihood function
contribution for each patient, I draw S realization of random coeﬃcients ysi governing
physicians switching probabilities and Ti×S realizations of signals and preference shocks
to get choice probabilities for each period and patient.40
Finally, the simulated log-likelihood function is
logLs(θ) =
N∑
i=1
[cilogL
c,s
i (θ) + (1− ci)logLnc,si (θ)]. (3.19)
In general, simulation error increases the variance of the he maximum simulated likeli-
hood (MSL) θˆMSL estimator compared to the maximum likelihood (ML) estimator. This
simulation error disappears asymptotically when the number of simulations increases at
a rate higher than
√
N . As the estimation of the model is computationally intensive, I
set the number of simulations per patients to ten.41 Obviously, simulation error may be
an issue when the number of simulations is small and therefore estimation results must
be interpreted with this caveat. To get appropriate standard errors, I use the standard
formula for the simulated estimate of the asymptotic variance which relies on the BHHH
estimate for the information matrix. I estimate the model by using the derivative free
simplex method (see e.g. Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
40Note that only one physician makes a treatment choice each period and therefore in total Ti × S
simulations of signals and preference shocks are needed for each patient.
41For example, Crawford and Shum, 2006, had 30 simulations per patient. I plan to experiment with
the number of simulations to see how the results would change.
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3.4.2 Identiﬁcation
In this section, I brieﬂy consider the structural assumptions of the demand model and the
variation in the data that help identify the parameter vector Θ = (θ0, θ1, σ
2, γ0,γ1,α, θy, σ
2
y, η).
To a large extent, identiﬁcation relies on similar arguments that have been presented in
the previous literature on demand for experience goods (see e.g. Crawford and Shum,
2005).
Market shares at the beginning of the therapy identify the parameters of the prior dis-
tribution, γ0 and γ1, because the treatment choice of the physician is then governed by
her prior belief. Because the private learning of the physician decreases uncertainty as-
sociated with the quality of the medical treatment, choice probabilities at the end of the
long-term drug therapy identify parameters for unobserved quality, θ0 and θ1. This is
particularly true if the patient is in a long-term treatment relationship with his physician.
The identiﬁcation of quality parameters can be also seen from the expected utility of the
drug treatment (equation (3.7)). After ﬁxing the parameters of the prior distribution,
γ0 and γ1, and the variance of signals, σ
2, changes in the posterior belief λilt with the
number of prescriptions identify the quality parameters. Heterogeneity in the choices of
physicians both across patients and over time identify the standard deviation of signals.
Because quality has two possible values θ0 and θ1, it is not possible to separately identify
the quality parameters and the risk aversion coeﬃcient, r. I normalize the risk aversion
parameter to one which is close to the parameter estimate of Crawford and Shum (2005).42
3.5 Results
In this section, I present results from the estimation of the structural learning model and
describe the ﬁt of the model. Because the risk of cardiovascular diseases increases with
age and is higher for men than for pre-menopausal women, I allow the prior probability to
depend the log of age at t = 1 and gender. The prior depends also on an indicator variable
for whether the patient was treated by an internal disease specialist at the time of the
ﬁrst physician visit. It is likely that the patient, who used the services of the specialist,
is more severely ill and gains more from cholesterol drugs.
I allow the utilities associated with the statin treatment and the outside good to depend
on several observed variables. First, I let the utility from therapy continuation to depend
42An alternative is to interpret parameters θ and σ2 relative to risk aversion coeﬃcient r, e.g. θˆ1 = rθ1,
where θˆ1 is the estimated parameter.
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on for the average price of statins at time t. I also control for a time trend in months
since January 2003 because market level changes, such as advertising, might as well aﬀect
the utility from statins. Because the patient's health might deteriorate when he becomes
older, I let the utility without cholesterol drugs to depend on age at time t. As cholesterol
drugs prevent coronary events in the long-run after the patient's drug therapy has ended,
I allow the outside good utility to vary with the number of prescriptions.43
Discussion of the results and the ﬁt of the model
Table 3.5 presents the parameter estimates and their standard errors. The ﬁrst set con-
tains the key parameters of the model: quality levels θ0 and θ1 and the standard deviation
of health eﬀects, σ (see 3.6). Figure 3.3 presents the conditional and unconditional distri-
butions of signals, f(xilt|θ0), f(xilt|θ1) and f(xilt), for the estimated parameters and the
average of priors pi(θ1).
43Alternatively, the controls of the outside good could be included in a vector of inside good controls.
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Table 3.5: Parameter estimates for the learning model in the sample of patients
Parameter Estimate Std.Err.
Signal (xilt) parameters
Low quality (θ0) -0.220 0.001
High quality (θ1) 1.338 0.002
Std. Dev. (σ) 1.049 0.003
Prior parameters
Constant (γ0) -0.003 0.001
log(Age in years at t=1) 0.120 0.000
Gender 0.093 0.001
Visit an internal disease
specialist at t=1 (1: yes, 0: no) 0.067 0.443
Prior mean and std 0.717 0.012
Physician matching probability
Random coeﬃcient
Constant (θy) -0.049 0.001
Std. Dev. (σy) 1.057 0.004
Physician switching probability,
mean and average std 0.491 0.217
Control variables
Patient's deductible, eur -0.021 0.000
Time trend in months/10 -0.028 0.000
Outside good controls
Patient's age/10 years -0.089 0.000
Number of prescriptions/10 0.107 0.000
Number of observations 22 021
Number of patients 10 000
Number of simulations1 10
Simulated log-likelihood function 30 555
1 The number of simulations per patient and physician
visit.
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Figure 3.3: The conditional and mixture probability densities of signals, f(xilt|θ0),
f(xilt|θ1) and f(xilt), for estimated parameters and the average prior in the sample of
patients
The results demonstrate substantial uncertainty and heterogeneity among patients in
the quality and health eﬀects of the statin treatment. The parameter estimate for high
quality θ1 (1.34) is in absolute terms over 6 times higher than the estimate of low quality,
θ0 (−0.22). The variance estimate of signals, σ2, implies that physicians face signiﬁcant
uncertainty about the health eﬀects of statins even if quality was known. To be more
precise, the variance of signals is 5 times higher than the low quality estimate θˆ0 and 82%
of the value of the high quality estimate θˆ1.
Heterogeneity in health eﬀects implies that information and learning may signiﬁcantly
improve medical decision-making by a physician. Without uncertainty about quality, the
incentives of the physician to continue the patient's therapy may be much higher when
quality is high rather than low. A high uncertainty in health eﬀects decreases the expected
utility of a risk-averse physician, slows down her learning44 and diminishes her incentives
to continue the patient's statin therapy.
The second set of parameters in Table 3.5 includes estimates for the physician's prior
44This can be seen from the denominator of equation (3.15) in which iid physician l's shocks eils,
s ∈ {1, ..., S}, for patient i get more weight when standard deviation σ increases.
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belief that the quality of the statin treatment is high, pi(θ1). As expected, the physician
has a higher prior probability if her patient is older and male and thus has a higher risk
of CVDs compared with other patients. Quite intuitively, the prior belief is higher if the
patient has visited an internal disease specialist at the time of the ﬁrst prescription.
Depending on the characteristics of patients, the prior probability varies across patients
from 65% to 75% and has a mean of 72% with a small standard deviation. At the
beginning of the therapy, the physician beliefs that quality is more likely to be high than
low. Because the average prior belief is fairly uninformative, the posterior belief of the
physician λilt is mostly determined by her private and public beliefs. This, coupled with
a relatively large variance of signals, σ2, implies that the learning of the physician from
her private experience may take some time.
Third, I report the parameters of the random coeﬃcient yi that aﬀects the probability
that the patient is assigned for a new physician, κi. The set of parameters for the random
coeﬃcient includes the constant, θy, and the standard deviation, σy. The results suggest
that the estimated standard deviation σˆy (1.06) is much higher than the estimated mean
θˆy (−0.05). These ﬁndings imply that the probability of getting a new physician varies
substantially (0-99%) around its mean (49%). The (average) standard deviation of κi is
0.19 that is 32% of the estimated mean of κi. Heterogeneity in assignment probabilities
across patients can arise for several reasons, including diﬀerences between municipalities
in their ability to recruit permanent physician labour.
The ﬁnal set of variables includes control variables aﬀecting utilities associated with the
statin therapy and the outside option. The price of statins has a very small, negative
eﬀect on the expected utility from the statin treatment. A physician can be insensitive
to changes in average prices because a signiﬁcant part of expenses is covered by the
national health insurance. Over time, the expected utility of the physician from the statin
treatment decreases. This may reﬂect changes in advertising by pharmaceutical ﬁrms over
a product's life cycle and other market level changes. Physicians whose patients are older,
and hence have a higher risk of having more severe diseases, are less likely to end the statin
therapy as their patients gain less from the outside alternative. The utility associated the
outside good increases with the number of prescriptions. This may happen because the
statin therapy is likely to have long-term eﬀects on the patient's health even after the
statin therapy has ended.
Finally, I consider the model ﬁt by comparing average predicted and observed choice prob-
abilities. For each physician-patient pair, I compute the predicted probability of choosing
the statin treatment, conditional on the sum of signals and the patient's prescription his-
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tory, P (ailt = 1|Xilt, hit). I then compare the corresponding observed choice probabilities
to these predicted probabilities, as presented in Figure 3.4. The model ﬁts the data rel-
atively well even though it slightly over-predicts the observed average choice probability
at the beginning of the treatment and under-predicts after that. At the aggregate level,
the model ﬁts the data reasonably well: the average observed probability of choosing
the statin therapy is 79% which is close to the predicted probability, 81%. The average
predicted probability of getting a new physician is lower (49%) than the corresponding
observed probability (60%).
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Figure 3.4: Diﬀerence between observed and predicted choice probabilities by the number
of prescriptions in the sample, an average over patients, physician visits and simulations
3.6 Counterfactual experiments
After estimating the parameters, I quantify the roles of private and observational learning
in medical decision-making. The main objective is to evaluate to the length of the doctor-
patient relationship aﬀects the process of learning and the eﬃciency of medical decision-
making. To be more speciﬁc, I evaluate whether the policy promoting continuity of care
is preferable to providing information on the past choices of other doctors.
I ﬁrst investigate what happens if the patient had only one physician. In this case, the
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physician learns only from her private experience. Next, I investigate whether information
on the past choices of other doctors compensates for the lack of continuity of care. To
do this, I compare treatment outcomes and costs in the long-term treatment relationship
with the policy where the patient has a diﬀerent physician every period. A physician has
then a one-shot opportunity to investigate the patient to get information on the health
eﬀects of cholesterol drugs but she observes the patient's treatment history. To understand
the role of peer eﬀects in demand, I study how the behavior of the physician changes if
information on the past choices of other doctors was not available. In this experiment,
the physician has to rely only on her private experience and the prior belief. Finally, I
evaluate the consequences of the policy where the physician does not learn. In this case,
the physician decides about the continuation of the patient's therapy without investigating
him. I compare the results with the baseline scenario predicted by the estimated model.
To perform the policy experiments, I simulate 10 prescription paths for each patient in
the observed sample of 10 000 patients used in the estimation of the model.45
I begin by describing the development of posterior beliefs over time and dispersion among
patients under diﬀerent policy experiments. I then investigate how treatment adherence,
expected utilities and costs change when the length of the treatment relationship and
the amount of available information were changed. I measure adherence by the predicted
length of the drug therapy and the probability of choosing the statin therapy conditional
on the information of the physician, P (ailt = 1|Iθilt) (see Dickstein, 2011, for the similar
approach).
The speed of learning
Figure 3.5 describes the development of the average posterior belief over patients, physi-
cians and simulations, conditional on high quality. At the beginning of the therapy, a
physician is fairly pessimistic about the eﬀect of the drug treatment on patient health
since the average prior for low quality is 28%. Most of the uncertainty regarding to qual-
ity vanishes after the ﬁrst physician visit. At this stage of the therapy, the physician
has observed how well the ﬁrst prescription decreased the patient's cholesterol levels and
whether any side eﬀects realized. In the long-term treatment relationship, the physician
45When the number of predicted prescriptions is less than the observed one, I use the observed char-
acteristics of patients. Otherwise, I assume that patients come to seek treatment for high cholesterol
once a year. The time trend increases by 12 months, the patient's age by a one year and the number
of prescriptions by one in period t + 1 from the previous period t. An exception is the average price of
statins at time t which I replace with the average over time, products and patients.
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learns quality fast, by the eighth physician visit. In short-term relationships, physicians
become more optimistic on quality during the course of the patient's therapy, but learning
is slower than in the long-term relationship. The bottom half of Figure 3.5 presents the
standard deviation of posterior beliefs. At the ﬁrst prescription, variation in posteriors
arises because prior beliefs are heterogeneous across patients. Reﬂecting high variation
in health eﬀects, the standard deviation increases to 0.2 at the second prescription. As
expected, learning diminishes the variances of the posteriors gradually.
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Figure 3.5: The mean (higher ﬁgure) and variance (lower ﬁgure) of the posterior belief
λilt = Pr(θ1|Iilt) given that true quality is high (θi = θ1) in the sample of patients
The top of Figure 3.6 illustrates the development of the average posterior when the patient-
speciﬁc quality is low. In this case, large diﬀerences in average posteriors between diﬀerent
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scenarios arise. In the long-term treatment relationship, the physician learns again fast. If
physicians change frequently, the average posterior starts to increase after a few prescrip-
tions. Again, the physician becomes more optimistic about quality when other doctors
have chosen the drug treatment for the patient previously. The bottom part of Figure
3.6 shows that heterogeneity in posteriors at the aggregate level is higher among patients
when quality is low rather than high. The standard deviation of posteriors are fairly
similar in the counterfactual experiments. In particular, a high variation in the posteriors
remains also in the permanent treatment relationship, even though the posterior belief is
decreasing over time.46
46Note that the exponential term in equation (3.10) is eS(θ0−θ1)
2−2(θ1−θ0)σ
∑S
s=1 eils if θi = θ0. When
2(θ1 − θ0)σ
∑S
s=1 eils is high relative to constant term S(θ0 − θ1)2, there can be much variation in the
posterior beliefs of physicians among patients.
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Figure 3.6: The mean (higher ﬁgure) and variance (lower ﬁgure) of the posterior belief
λilt = Pr(θ1|Iilt) given that true quality is low (θi = θ0) in the sample of patients
Overall, the results suggest that the long-term doctor-patient relationship promotes the
process of learning about quality. The physician becomes optimistic about quality when
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she observes the past choices of other doctors. When quality is high, information on the
prescription history improves learning, but not as eﬃciently as the long-term relationship.
When quality is low, such information slows down learning. These results have implica-
tions on prescriptions, costs and eﬃciency.
The length of the doctor-patient relationship
I ﬁrst examine how the long-term doctor-patient relationship aﬀects outcomes and costs.
Table 3.6 presents averages for the expected utility, the adherence of the treatment and
the total costs, conditional on quality. The results suggest that continuity of care pro-
motes learning and improves medical decision-making by a physician. Consider ﬁrst the
patient with high quality of the match with cholesterol drugs. In this case, the long-term
physician-patient relationship leads to the highest expected utility and the treatment ad-
herence among evaluated experiments. Still, the treatment adherence and the total costs
increase only slightly from the estimated benchmark. When quality is low, I ﬁnd that
continuity of care decreases treatment length by 5% and the total costs of the drug ther-
apy by 5% compared with the estimated benchmark. This is so, since the physician learns
fast that the treatment does not suit well for the patient.
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Table 3.6: Counterfactual simulations in the sample of patients
Outcome variable Baseline2 One Physician No public info, No public No learning5
physician3 change every info4 physician change
period
True quality: θ1:
Expected utility -2.612 -2.594 -2.624 -2.618 -2.632 -2.704
Expected utility,
≥ 5 prescriptions -2.791 -2.765 -2.808 -2.802 -2.824 -2.873
Treatment length 4.327 4.420 4.420 4.272 4.199 4.013
Probability of
statin therapy 0.770 0.774 0.766 0.766 0.763 0.751
Total cost/100 eur 2.883 2.945 2.844 2.846 2.797 2.674
True quality: θ0:
Expected utility -2.815 -2.844 -2.798 -2.823 -2.808 -2.692
Expected utility,
≥ 5 prescriptions -3.034 -3.104 -3.006 -3.056 -3.031 -2.865
Treatment length 3.406 3.243 3.503 3.361 3.439 3.967
Probability of
of statin therapy 0.706 0.692 0.715 0.703 0.710 0.748
Total cost/100 eur 2.270 2.160 2.335 2.240 2.292 2.644
1 These values are calculated by using the observed sample of 10 000 patients and 10 simulated prescription
sequences per patient.
2 The baseline scenario is predicted by the model estimates.
3 In this experiment, the physician-patient relationship is permanent.
4 Public information on the previous treatment continuation choices of other physicians is not available.
5 Learning is prevented and hence the posterior of physician l for patient i at time t, λilt, equals to the prior
belief pi(θ1).
I next investigate the consequences of the policy where a new physician treats the patient
in every period (Table 3.6). When the physician does not have much own experience
of the patient, she relies more on the past choices of other doctors. Consider ﬁrst the
patient with high quality of the match with statins. In this case, continuity of care does
not much improve drug choices or change treatment outcomes compared to the policy
where treatment relationships are short-term but the prescription history is observed.
Consider then the patient with the low quality of the match in Table 3.6. In this case, the
length of the treatment relationship has more pronounced eﬀect on treatment outcomes
and costs. This happens because social learning increases the optimism of the physician
about the quality and can lead to over-prescribing. The results show that the policy with
the short-term relationship increases the adherence by 3% and the total costs by 8% from
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the experiment with continuity of care. Table 3.6 demonstrates that the physician would
be slightly better-oﬀ, in terms of eﬃciency, without information on the prescription history
when physicians change frequently. Speciﬁcally, when treatment relationships are short-
term, providing information on the past choices of other doctors increases the adherence
by 1% and the total costs by 2% from the policy without such information. Again in
terms of eﬃciency, even worse outcomes arise if learning is not possible.
The results have several policy implications. Continuity of care helps the physician to ﬁnd
out sooner the health eﬀects of the drug treatment. This reduces the costs of uncertainty
and improves her medical decision-making, as suggested by the existing reduced-form lit-
erature (Weiss and Blustein, 1996, Scott, 2000, King et al., 2008). The second conclusion
is that information on the patient's prescription history does not compensate for the lack
of the long-term treatment relationship. When the treatment suits well for the patient,
prescription records promote learning, but not as eﬃciently as continuity of care. If a
physician does not have much own experience, treatment patterns based on the observed
medication history of the patient may hinder learning and lead to over-prescribing for a
fraction of patients.
3.7 Conclusions
I quantiﬁed the roles of private experience and the past choices of other doctors in pharma-
ceutical demand. I constructed a structural model of demand for pharmaceuticals under
uncertainty about the quality of the match between the patient and the drug treatment. I
analyzed whether continuity of care is more eﬃcient than the policy where information on
the past choices of other doctors is observed but treatment relationships are short-term.
Using rich data from the market for cholesterol drugs, I found that prescriptions are highly
responsive to the length of the doctor-patient relationship. I illustrated that the number
of interactions between the physician and the patient have important implications on
pharmaceutical demand. My analysis suggested that treatment patterns relying heavily
on the past choices of other doctors may lead to over-prescribing for a fraction of patients,
in terms of eﬃciency. I also showed that the long-term treatment relationship can limit
over-prescribing and improve medical decision-making.
The structural model can be extended to allow the other important features of the phar-
maceutical market. The ﬁrst extension is to make physicians forward-looking in their
decision-making, creating incentives for experimentation to get more information. Sec-
ond, the model can be broadened to incorporate several inside goods. The framework
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can be also applied in other experience good markets, such as ﬁnancial markets, where
traders are investing in assets with uncertain returns.
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A typical example of a patient story for one dispensary visit:
The reason of entry
A patient comes with the referral of physician X due to atrial ﬁbrillation
At issue a 65 years old retired gymnastics teacher. In an anamnesis 2003 acute coronary
thrombosis, angioplasty RCA. Discovered then also a decreasing diverticulum of an aorta
ad 50mm, controls in fall. In the Doppler-ultrasound-research of neck veins in 2005 was
discovered in left arteria carotis interna stenosis less 50%. Discovered year 2007 COPD.
The patient smoked over 30 years, quit 6 years ago. In a tolerance test 8/07, no coronary
ischaemia.
The patient has visited in the health center of X due to dizziness. Discovered elevated
blood pressure, irregular beat. Hear enzymes and other laboratory values normal, pro-
BNP over 500. Patient's medication at this moment Pravachol 20mg x 1, Linatil 20mg
x 1, Carvedilol 12.5mg x 2. Started Marevan due to atrial ﬁbrillation, aiming to do
cardioversion.
Today taken INR, only 1.3. Hence cardioversion cannot be done now. Pulse also fairly fast
80-90/min, RR-level 180-170/110-100. Carvedilol ad raised 25mg + 12.5mg. INR-controls
will continue in the side of outpatient treatment. Phone contact after a month.
Physician X
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Chapter 4
Do Stronger Patents Protect Against
Competition? Evidence from the
Pharmaceutical Industry
Policy makers have been strengthening intellectual property rights in several countries dur-
ing the past decades. The rationale behind these reforms is that stronger patents increase
the proﬁts of an innovator and promote R&D. Economic theory predicts that longer patents
may hinder rather than stimulate innovation by increasing competition during the patent
period. Broad patents, on the other hand, increase the costs of imitation and decrease
competition. I test the theory on the relationship between patent strength and compe-
tition during patent protection. I consider the Finnish markets for pharmaceuticals that
provide rich variation in both patent length and breadth across innovations. The results
suggest that patent breadth, rather than length, prevents imitation. Patent rights have no
eﬀect on the risk of parallel trade.
Keywords: intellectual property rights, imitation, parallel trade, pharmaceuticals, inno-
vation
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4.1 Introduction
Several countries, including the United States, have been strengthening their intellectual
property rights during the past few decades (see e.g. Gallini, 2002). The economic
rationale for stronger patents is to provide inventors larger rewards from R&D and to
increase innovation incentives. The theoretical literature has challenged this view by
showing that longer patents can increase competition during the patent period and thus
decrease the proﬁts of an innovator (Gallini, 1992, Takalo, 1998). On the other hand,
an increase in patent breadth raises the costs of developing non-infringing duplicates and
thus decreases the entry incentives of competitors.1 In this chapter, I test empirically the
theory on the relationship between patent strength and competition during the patent
period.
I investigate markets for pharmaceuticals where competition during patent protection
can arise for at least two reasons. First, competitors (so called parallel traders) may
resale patented products between countries without the authorization of the owner of the
intellectual property (Kyle, 2007). Second, rivals may invent around patented innovations.
I consider the imitation of an analogy process patent where the competitor has invented
new manufacturing processes to produce the patented innovation.2
The pharmaceutical industry provides a good setup to analyze the economics eﬀects of
stronger intellectual property rights, as patents have been viewed to have an essential role
in promoting pharmaceutical innovation (Grabowski, 2002, Gallini 2002). The process
of bringing a single new drug to the market - from its discovery to marketing approval
- involves substantial risks, is time-consuming and costs from around 500 million to 2
billion US dollars (DiMasi, 2003, Adams and Brantner, 2006 and 2010).3 Because generic
compounds are developed with substantially lower costs and risks than new drugs (see
Grabowski, 2002), it is not surprising that much of the pharmaceutical innovation does
not provide signiﬁcant increments on existing innovations.4
1It can be asked why a patent holder does not grant licenses to its competitors. Licensing may,
however, fail for several reasons, such as due to informational asymmetries between the patent holder
and the rival about the rival's current and potential future proﬁts (see Bessen and Manskin, 2009).
2Analogy process patents have been used often in countries where product patents for drugs are not
available (Domeij, 2000). Process patents are also used in other industries. For example, the share of
process patents on all patents in the manufacturing industry was around 24 − 30 in 1970s% (see e.g.
Cohen and Klepper, 1996).
3It has been estimated that less than 1% of compounds survive from pre-clinical period to human
testing and only 20% of the compounds entering clinical trials gain the US Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) approval (DiMasi, 1995).
4For example, the National Institute of Health Care Management reported that only 35% of new
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I speciﬁcally focus on the Finnish markets for pharmaceuticals. In these markets, the Sup-
plementary Protection Certiﬁcate (SPC) system provides rich variation in patent length
that is usually ﬁxed to 20 years from the ﬁling date of the patent application. An SPC is
an intellectual property right that extends the period of exclusivity from zero to ﬁve years,
depending on the time needed to obtain marketing authorization.5 Using heterogeneity
in both patent length and breadth across innovations and data on the entry decisions
of ﬁrms, I analyze how intellectual property rights aﬀect the risks of parallel trade and
generic entry, or imitation.
A large theoretical literature has analyzed how intellectual property rights change the na-
ture of competition (Gallini, 1992 and 2002, Choi, 1998, Bessen and Maskin, 2009, Takalo,
1998). Still, this question has received surprisingly little attention in the empirical patent
literature. The previous work has estimated the eﬀects of patent strength on innova-
tion (e.g. Hall and Ziedonis, 2001, Kortum and Lerner, 1999, Noel and Schankerman,
2006, Sakakibara and Branstetter, 2001, Bessen and Hunt, 2007, Baldwin et al., 2000,
Moser, 2005) and patenting (Lerner, 2002, Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). The literature has
also studied the importance of patent characteristics in the risk of it to be involved in in-
fringements and invalidity suits (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001, Lerner, 2010, Cremers,
2004). Even though there is a large empirical literature on the determinants of entry in
pharmaceutical markets (e.g. Morton, 2000, Kyle, 2006, Danzon et al., 2005), the eﬀect
of patent rights on competition during the patent period has not been previously studied,
despite of its importance. If broader or longer patents do not prevent competition, welfare
gains from policies that improve patent strength may be very limited.
My results suggest that patent breadth - measured by the number of claims - prevents
imitation. To be more precise, the hazard rate of imitation decreases by 11− 13% when
the patent breadth of an incumbent innovation increases by one claim. I ﬁnd no evidence
that patent length would increase the risk of imitation during patent protection. Patent
length and breadth have no eﬀect on the rate of parallel trade.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 describes the institutional
environment and the dataset. Section 4.3 presents the econometric model and discusses
the identiﬁcation assumptions. Section 4.5 goes through the estimation results. Section
products had new active ingredients and only 23% of those had suﬃcient clinical improvements over
existing products to get a priority rating from the agency. Only part of this non-drastic innovation is
imitation during the patent protection of an original innovation.
5In the US, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, commonly known
as the "Hatch-Waxman" Act, permits extensions similar with SPCs to compensate for market lost during
the drug approval process by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
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4.6 concludes.
4.2 The institutional environment and the dataset
This section presents the institutional environment and the data. In the empirical analysis,
I measure (maximum) patent length in two ways: number of years either from the patent
application date or from the date of grant of the patent. To understand how the patent
length from the applicate date is determined, I ﬁrst discuss the patenting process in
Finland. The granting process at the Finnish patent oﬃce (National Board of Patents and
Registration in Finland) is broadly speaking similar with the processes at the European
Patent Oﬃce (EPO) and the United States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce.6 Then, I present
the characteristics of patents and discuss brieﬂy entry regulation for pharmaceuticals.
Finally, I describe a sample of markets. A market is deﬁned as an active ingredient (or
their combination) of a medical product that is protected by a patent.
4.2.1 The Finnish patent system
A patent owner has the right to exclude others from the commercial utilization of the in-
vention. To get the patent, ﬁrms and individuals must prepare and submit an application
to the Finnish patent oﬃce.
The patent application is published 18 months after the date of ﬁling or in the priority
date that is the date of ﬁling of the ﬁrst application. Contrary to the practices of EPO,
certain identiﬁcation details, such as the name of the applicant, the application number
and the ﬁling date, are published in Finland immediately. Then, the applicant has 6
months to decide whether or not to pursue the application by requesting a substantive
examination. Alternatively, the applicant who has requested the examination previously
has to conﬁrm whether the application should proceed.
After requesting the examination, the patent oﬃce examines whether the innovation meets
certain requirements and whether the patent can be granted. The most important re-
quirements are novelty and non-obviousness. Exclusive rights are not accorded to an old,
6For further information, see "How to apply for a European patent" by European Patent Oﬃce (2013)
and "Patents" by National Board of Patents and Registration in Finland (2013). Van Zeebroeck et al.
(2009), however, show that there are major diﬀerences across countries in patent drafting styles. Allison
and Lemley (2002) also argue that heterogeneity in patent system across countries has increased over
time.
112
previously known technique. Besides being novel, the innovation has to diﬀer from known
innovations and this diﬀerence has to be so big that the idea is not obvious.
Patent length
In Europe, the maximum length of a general patent is 20 years from the actual date of
ﬁling an application.7 In order to keep the patent in force, renewal payments must be
paid (see National Board of Patents and Registration for details).
In European Union member countries, the supplementary protection certiﬁcate (SPC)
system provides an extension for a general patent. The SPC system was introduced
to compensate for the long time needed to obtain a marketing authorization. SPCs
are available for various pharmaceutical and plant protection products. A certiﬁcate
application can be made for any medical product which is protected by a basic patent in
a European Union member state and has received a marketing authorization in the same
member state. Minor changes to a medicinal product, such as use of a diﬀerent salt, an
excipient and a presentation, do not justify a new SPC.8
The maximum length of the SPC for the general patent depends on the time needed to
get the marketing authorization,
Max length SPCi = max{0,min{(MAEEAi − APi)− 5 years, 5 years}} (4.1)
where MAEEAi is the date of the 1st marketing authorization in the European Economic
Area for the active ingredient associated with patent i and APi is the application date of
the patent. SPC duration varies across innovations from zero to ﬁve years and hence the
maximum length of a patent varies from 20 to 25 years from the application date.9
In the empirical part, I measure patent length in two ways: with number of years either
starting from the ﬁling date of the patent application or from the date of grant of the
7In the United States, for utility patents ﬁled since June 8, 1995, the maximum length of a general
patent is 20 years from the earliest ﬁling date of the application on which the patent was granted. For
patents ﬁled prior to June 8, 1995, he maximum length is either 20 years from the earliest ﬁling date
or 17 years from the issue date, depending on which is longer (the United States Patent and Trademark
Oﬃce, 2012).
8See Case C-431/04, Proceedings initiated by Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
9The duration of the SPC can be extended to 5.5 years when the SPC relates to a human medicinal
product for which data from clinical trials conducted in accordance with an agreed Paediatric Investigation
Plan have been submitted.
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patent. The reason is that patent length since grant, rather than application, is likely to
have more signiﬁcant impact on competition during patent protection since uncertainty
about the scope and timing of patent rights is narrowed after the patent has been granted.
Incumbents may also create patent clusters containing several patents (e.g. for a process
or a reformulation) in order to extend patent protection. Then the patent associated with
the SPC, that is observed in the data, provides a lower bound for the patent length of
the medical product, including all its extensions.10
Claims
Patent claims are a part of the patent that deﬁne the breadth of patent protection and
legal basis in technical terms. Innovators determine claims together with patent examin-
ers. The breadth of the claims may be broad or narrow. Narrow claims are typically more
speciﬁc about a particular element or a product than broad claims.11 Broad claims are
often more valuable than the narrow ones but they may be more diﬃcult to obtain and
to enforce because there can be other patents invalidating them. I follow Lerner (1994)
and use the number of claims as a proxy for patent breadth.12
Other patent characteristics
A patent has several other characteristics, besides its length and breadth. First, an
innovation can be patented in several countries. A set of patents in various countries for
a single invention is called a patent family. Because a patent is costly to obtain and to
keep in force, it is likely that the size of the patent family is higher for more valuable
10The anecdotal evidence from the quote of an originator company suggests that "Before end 80s:
Products mainly NCEs which where [were?] protected by the one patent- [...] Late 80s early 90s[...]
Expansion of the portfolio to cover lifecycle initiatives, to extend protection time for product and the
brea[d?]th of the protection trying to keep competition further away". (The preliminary report of Phar-
maceutical Sector Inquiry by European Commission.) Because the most of the innovations in the data
are relatively old (the average application year is 1991), this may not be a big concern.
11See e.g. Soonwoo Hong: "Claiming what counts in business: drafting patent claims with a clear
business purpose", the World Intellectual Property Organization.
12For example, Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) suggested that the number of claims is an indicator
of the complexity and value of an innovation. The number of claims can, however, reﬂect other factors
besides breadth, such as resource constraints, patent application drafting style and eﬀort and uncertainty
about the value of an innovation (Allison and Lemley, 2002).
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innovations (Harhoﬀ et al., 2003, and Putnam, 1996). In the empirical part, I consider
the number of patent family members for an innovation.
Second, the International Patent Classiﬁcation (IPC) is a hierarchical patent classiﬁcation
system that is widely used to classify the technology of a patent. The highest hierarchical
level of the IPC correspond to very broad technical ﬁelds (e.g. C denotes "Chemistry and
Metallurgy"). Sections are divided into classes (e.g. class C21 denotes the "Metallurgy of
iron"). Classes are again divided into more than 640 subclasses (e.g. class A21B denotes
"Bakers' ovens; Machines or equipment for baking") and further into main groups and
subgroups (the World Intellectual Property Organization). I follow Lerner (1994), Harhoﬀ
et al. (2003) and Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) and use the number of the lowest
level IPC classiﬁcations as a proxy for patent scope.
Third, a priority country is the country of the ﬁrst application. The priority right allows
the claimant to ﬁle a subsequent application in another country for the same invention
with the date of ﬁling the ﬁrst application. Because the priority country is most often
the country of an innovator, it can reﬂect regional variation in the costs of innovation.13
I classify priority countries to Europe and non-Europe.
Fourth, a patent can cite previous patent documents. I consider the number of cited
documents that help to evaluate how much the patent relies on past innovations. The
number of backward citations may also correlate with the value of the patent (Hall et al.
2005, Harhoﬀ et al., 2003).14
Pharmaceutical analogy process patents
I consider analogy process patents that have been commonly used for pharmaceuticals in
many countries, where product patents have not been available.15 Claims for an analogy
process patent deﬁne manufacturing processes for a chemical substance. For a patent to
be eﬀective, the claims should include all feasible manufacturing processes. This may
be very costly and time consuming, and often competitors have been found new ways
to produce the drug. For example, competitors may have developed the new ways of
synthesis. More often, they have made only small modiﬁcations, such as another pH, to
existing innovations (Domeij, 2000).
13PutFME (1996) showed that priority country was the country of an innovator for 98% of US, 88%
of German and 84% of French inventors.
14In the future, my plan is to use forward citations that indicates how much an innovation has con-
tributed to the development of subsequent inventions (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001).
15In Finland, analogy process patents were granted for pharmaceuticals until the mid of 1990s.
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For example, in the Danish court case on an analogy process patent for the anti-ulcer
drug rantidine, the defendant's innovation had the same synthesis steps as in the original
claims. The defendant had used somewhat diﬀerent starting materials to create a process
that was not deﬁned in the claims. Then it added an additional reaction step to create
the same ﬁnal product, raniditine. Because the reaction step was new and unpredictable,
the Danish Supreme Court decided the case for the favor of the defendant (Domeij, 2000).
Data exclusivity and entry regulation
In European pharmaceutical markets, data exclusivity has been supplementing intellectual
property rights since 1994. During the data exclusivity period, an incumbent has exclusive
rights to utilize research results associated with its marketing authorization. A competitor
can still receive a marketing authorization on the basis of its own research results. Since
the end of 2005, the length of the data exclusivity in the EU has been 8 years, and
during the 10 years of marketing exclusivity, a generic product cannot be placed on
the market.16 For marketing authorizations submitted before the end of 2005, the data
exclusivity granted to the original marketing authorization holder was either 6 or 10 years
(6 in Finland) (European Commission, 2008). I control for changes in the data exclusivity
regulation with the time trend.
The entry of pharmaceuticals is strictly regulated all over the world and procedures pre-
ceding it are fairly similar in Finland as in the USA. In order to enter the market, a ﬁrm
must receive a marketing authorization for its product from the Finnish National Agency
for Medicines (NAM) which corresponds to the FDA in the USA. To get a license for
parallel importation, an original product must have authorizations in both the source and
destination country. Parallel imported products must have the same chemical composi-
tions, dosage forms and strengths as the original product in both countries.
16Time for the protection starts when the ﬁrst authorization is granted in the EU area.
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4.2.2 The dataset and patent characteristics
The dataset
The dataset is collected from several sources. I use the register data for pharmaceuticals
that is provided by the Finnish Medicine Agency (FMA). The data contains information
on the characteristics of a medical product such as its entry, exit and marketing autho-
rization approval dates, the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classiﬁcation code
of the World Health Organization,17 and the indicator for whether the product is parallel
imported. The data include all active ingredients that had valid marketing authorizations
at some time point during 2003− 2006 and 2008. The data does not include information
on products that both entered and exited markets during 2007.18 I also use the dataset
of FME on drugs that are substitutable in the generic substitution system in 28.1.2009.19
The data contains information on the documentation type of a product, i.e. whether it
the product is an incumbent or a generic.
The data for the SPCs of pharmaceutical process patents applied before January 2009
was obtained from the National Board of Patents and Registration in Finland.20 The
dataset includes the patent's identiﬁcation number, application, granting and expiration
dates and the name of the patent holder. With the identiﬁcation number, I gathered
information on the patent family, the number of claims and cited patent documents from
Espacenet which is an international network of patent databases. I merged the patent
data to the FME data by the name of the active ingredient. A ﬁrm who entered a market
during patent protection with a generic product was interpreted as an imitator.
If a ﬁrm entered and exited a market before the FME data on substitutable drugs was
compiled or a product was not substitutable, information on the documentation type was
not available. I supplemented data on the documentation type by comparing the name
17The ATC Classiﬁcation System is used for the classiﬁcation of drugs. Diﬀerent levels of the code
indicate the following groups: 1.) 1st level: the anatomical main group, 2.) 2nd level: the therapeu-
tic main group, 3.) 3rd level: the therapeutic/pharmacological subgroup, 4.) 4th level: the chemi-
cal/therapeutic/pharmacological subgroup, 5.) 5th level: the chemical substance.
18Data for year 2007 was not available in the web page of FMA at the time of data collection in 2008.
The robustness analysis suggests that the results do not change if year 2007 is excluded from the sample.
19The generic substitution system was introduced in Finland on 1 April 2003. In the system, the
prescribed medicinal product is substituted in a pharmacy by the cheapest, or close to the cheapest,
generic alternative. Substitutable medicinal products contain the same quantity of the same active agent
and are biologically equivalent.
20Pharmaceutical patents without SPCs are not included in the dataset. Excluded patents include the
least valuable innovations which patents were not renewed.
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of the SPC holder with the name of the marketing authorization holder. If it was the
same, the marketing authorization holder was interpreted as the incumbent. If it was not,
I tried to ﬁnd information on a possible license agreement between SPC and marketing
authorization holders from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)21 ﬁles,
the web pages of pharmaceutical ﬁrms and Thomson Reuters Current Patent Gazettes.22
If a ﬁrm entered a market before the expiration of a patent and information on an alter-
native patent was found, then the documentation type was denoted as an imitator. In
6% of markets, information on whether an entrant was an original innovator, a licensee
or an imitator was not available.23 In the empirical part, I analyze how long the incum-
bent's period of exclusivity is before either imitation or parallel importation or both occur.
Therefore, I had to exclude from the data those markets where a ﬁrm with an unknown
identity entered a market before an imitator.
Before presenting evidence on the role of patent rights in early competition, I provide de-
scriptive statistics for the characteristics of innovations in Table 4.1. The average patent
length from its application was 23 years and from its grant only 16 years, indicating
long approval times. Importantly, patent length, measured either from the patent ap-
plication or grant date, varied between innovations. For example, the variance of the
average length from the application date was 13% of its mean. The number of claims
was on average 19, with a high standard deviation across markets. The average number
of patent family countries for a single innovation was 38, and the priority country of an
innovation was most often in Europe. On average, a patent cited on average 16 patent
documents and the mean number of inventors was 5. A second set of variables describe
the other characteristics of active ingredients. The results show that 33% of products
had restrictions in prescribing24 and the share of "drastic" innovations (the ﬁrst innova-
tions in the chemical/therapeutic/pharmacological market)25 was 25% in the sample of
markets. Overall, the descriptive evidence illustrates that pharmaceutical innovations are
very heterogeneous.
21SEC is responsible for enforcing the federal securities laws and regulating the securities industry, the
nation's stock and options exchanges, and other electronic securities markets in the United States.
22Thomson Reuters is the world's leading source of intelligent information for businesses and profes-
sionals.
23Parallel importation is always observed in the data.
24For example, a specialized physician can prescribe certain drugs. See FMA for further details.
25This corresponds to the 4th level of the ATC code. Example: C10AA for HMG CoA reductase
inhibitors (statins).
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for the sample of markets1
Variable Mean Std
Patent variables
2
Years from
- patent application to SPC expiration 22.710 2.891
- patent grant to SPC expiration 15.589 3.561
Claims 19.045 14.611
Patent family size 37.639 39.056
Priority area:
Europe (1: yes, 0: no) 0.529 0.501
International patent classiﬁcations 3.574 1.173
Cited documents 16.116 18.631
Inventors 5.465 4.023
Other characteristics
Restrictions in prescribing right 0.329 0.471
The ﬁrst active ingredient in ATC4 (1: yes, 0: no) 0.252 0.435
The share of markets with
imitation:
- All markets 0.056 0.231
- Years from the grant of a patent:
shorter than the average 0.022 0.147
longer than the average 0.082 0.277
- Claims:
less than the average 0.077 0.268
more than the average 0.000 0.000
The share of markets with
parallel importation:
- All markets: 0.224 0.419
- Years from the grant of a patent:
shorter than the average 0.196 0.401
longer than the average 0.246 0.434
- Claims:
less than the average 0.256 0.439
more than the average 0.138 0.351
The share of markets with competition3 0.271 0.447
Nbr of markets 107
1 Summary statistics are measured in 2008 for those markets where
information on the number of claims is available.
2 The maximum within a patent family for the following variables:
international patent classiﬁcations, cited documents and the number
of inventors.
3 Competition: parallel importation or imitation.
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Table 4.1 demonstrates that early competition in the Finnish markets for pharmaceuticals
was very common. On average, the probability of imitation at any time point before patent
expiration was 0.06 and the probability of parallel trade was 0.22.26 The probability of
early competition, i.e. either imitation or parallel trade, was 0.27. This means that either
parallel trade or imitation but not both occurs in some markets.
Figure 4.1 illustrates how competition during the patent period shortens the eﬀective
patent life, i.e. the incumbent's monopoly period during the patent period. In markets
with early competition, the eﬀective patent life was on average very short (6.7 years), with
substantial variation around the mean. Without competition, the average number of years
since the entry of an incumbent to the expiration of a patent was 12 years. When only
non-censored markets were examined, the average of the eﬀective patent life in markets
with competition was 8 years and without competition 11 years. The results suggest that
early competition shortens the period of exclusivity substantially.
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Figure 4.1: Eﬀective patent life in years for markets with and without competition (entry
of an imitator or a parallel importer) in the sample of markets
I then investigate how the prevalence of early competition depends on the length of a
patent. The results of Table 4.1 suggest that the probability of early competition increases
with patent length, measured from the application date. When a patent was longer than
the average (referred as a "long patent"), 8% of markets had imitation and 25% parallel
26When also those markets that do not have information on the number of claims are included to the
sample, 9% of markets had imitation and 20% parallel importation.
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importation during the patent period. When the patent was shorter than the average, the
probability of imitation was only 0.02 and the probability of parallel importation 0.20.
When interpreting the results, it should be noted that the majority of markets (75%) were
censored, i.e. the patent protection of an original innovation was still eﬀective at the end
of the observation period in 2008. When all 25 non-censored markets are analyzed, the
risk of parallel trade was 0.33 and does not depend on the length of a patent since its
grant. The probability of imitation remains to be much higher (0.13) in markets with a
long patent than in other markets (0.08). Overall, these descriptive results indicate that
an increase in patent length induces imitation during patent protection.
Finally, I examine how the number of claims aﬀect the risks of imitation and parallel trade.
When the number of claims was more than the average ("broad" patent), the results of
Table 4.1 show that the rates of imitation and parallel trade during patent protection were
both much lower than for innovations with narrow patents. These results may suggest
that broad patents prevent competition during patent protection. The risk of parallel
trade was higher than than risk of imitation in markets with narrow patents. This might
indicate that parallel importers want to enter markets where the costs of imitation are
high. When non-censored markets were investigated, the risk of parallel trade is lower in
markets a high number of claims (0.29) than in markets where the number of claims is
less than the average (0.35). The risk of imitation in non-censored markets is relatively
similar between markets where the number of claims is less (0.10) or more (0.14) than the
average.
To conclude, the descriptive results demonstrate that imitation and parallel trade are
present in many pharmaceutical markets that are still under patent protection. The
eﬀective patent life of an incumbent remains often very short. The results suggest that
the strengthening of patent rights decreases the risk of early competition and thus may
help the incumbent to appropriate rents from its innovation eﬀorts. Next, I use regression
analysis that controls for the observed heterogeneity between innovations.
4.3 The econometric model and its identiﬁcation
4.3.1 The econometric model
The setup of the econometric analysis is as follows. Each market i is at risk of experiencing
imitation (j = 1) and parallel trade (j = 2). Let tij be the number of years from
the entry of an incumbent to the jth event type (parallel importation or imitation) in
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market i. Denote by Tij the corresponding random variable that has the cumulative
distribution function P (tij) = P (Tij ≤ tij). If patent protection is eﬀective at the end of
the observation period and competition has not yet occurred, the time of censoring tic is
observed instead.
The hazard function for the occurrence of an event of type j (imitation or parallel impor-
tation) in market i is
λj(tji|xjit) = lim∆tij→0
P [(tji ≤ Tji < tji + ∆tij)|Tij ≥ tji,xjit]
∆tij
, (4.2)
where xjit is a vector of covariates that can vary over markets and time and can be
diﬀerent for imitators and parallel importers. The numerator of the hazard function is
the conditional probability that the event occurs in the time interval [t, t + dt), given
that it has not occurred before, i.e. Tij ≥ tji. Dividing the denominator by the width
of the interval gives a rate of event occurrence per unit of time. When the width of the
interval goes to zero, the conditional probability becomes an hazard (instantaneous) rate
of occurrence for the event.
The hazard rate λj(tji|xjit) of the event type j (imitation or parallel importation) is
speciﬁed as follows,
λj(tji|xjit) = λj0(t)eαjLengthi+γjClaimsi+x˜jitβj , (4.3)
where λj0(t) is the baseline hazard function, Lengthi is the patent length (either from the
application or grant date), Claimsi is the number of claims and x˜jit is a vector of control
variables for market i at time tij.
I ﬁrst investigate imitation and parallel importation as independent events. This means
that I estimate separate Cox Proportional Hazard (CPH) models (3) for both event types.
The parameters of the CPH model for a given event are estimated by maximizing the
event-type speciﬁc partial likelihood function. The model is semi-parametric because the
estimation of the coeﬃcients of the explanatory variables does not require the simultane-
ous estimation of the baseline hazard function (see e.g. Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
I then treat imitation and parallel trade as competing events and study how patent rights
aﬀect the combined risk of early competition. In this case, time Tij is the eﬀective patent
life. The occurrence of imitation eliminates the market from the risk of facing parallel
importation and the other way round. At most one complete duration for each market is
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thus observed and the other event type censored.27 As a market can face either imitation
or parallel importation, there are two records of the data for the market at any time during
the observation period until the entry of a competitor occurs. I estimate the stratiﬁed,
or the grouped, CPH model (2) where I allow for the eﬀects of patent length and claims
to diﬀer between event types. I estimate the parameters of the model by maximizing the
partial likelihood that is a product of event type-speciﬁc partial likelihoods.
The model explains how the intellectual property rights of an incumbent innovation aﬀect
the risks of imitation and parallel trade during patent protection.28 I am only interested
in whether there is competition during the patent period, not in the identities or the
number of competitors. Thus, the descriptive model is used instead of the structural
approach (see e.g. Berry, 1992). The non-structural approach has often been used in the
literature on pharmaceutical entry (e.g. Kyle, 2006, 2007, and Danzon et al., 2005) and
in the studies of patent litigation (e.g. Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001).
4.3.2 Identiﬁcation
The empirical model has some strong assumptions. First, survival times are independent
across markets, event types and time periods. The independence assumption is analogous
with the assumption on the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) of the multi-
nomial logit model. As in that case, the violation of the independence assumption in the
data may bias the estimation of parameters.29 To correct for the market level correlation
and multiple events, I use the robust (sandwich) variance estimate (Cameron and Trivedi,
2005). The results must still be interpreted with caution.
I also make a common, but criticized, assumption that the transition time tij and the
censoring variable are independent (Putter et al., 2007). This means that the hazard of
censored markets can be represented by the hazard of markets that remain without com-
petition, after controlling for observed characteristics. The independence assumption may
be realistic when the end of the study period causes the censoring of observations. In the
competing risks framework, censoring can also be caused by the appearance of an event
(say, imitation), which prevents occurrence of the another event (parallel importation).
27In the data, there is one market where the entries of a parallel importer and an imitator occurs in
the same year. The Efron approximation is used to deal with the tie (Efron, 1977).
28This also means that imitation does not occur if an incumbent introduces a generic alternative during
patent protection through its subsidiary.
29As discussed by McFadden, Train and Tye (1981), the IIA property implies that error terms are
independent random variables.
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Even though the main event of interest is the ﬁrst event, the other event is still competing.
To put it diﬀerently, for the time to imitation (parallel importation), all markets where
parallel importation (imitation) appeared ﬁrst are censored. Under the independence as-
sumption, the entry of an imitator does not change the risk of parallel trade. Importantly,
the assumption implies that the eﬀects of patent characteristics on the risk of imitation
are the same for markets that are still without competition as for markets where parallel
importation has occurred ﬁrst. In practice, the independence assumption does not hold
if the entry of a parallel importer intensiﬁes competition and thus decreases the entry
incentives of an imitator.
I assume that the patent rights of the incumbent innovation do not correlate with the
decisions of early rivals to enter the Finnish market. The exogeneity assumption is not
realistic if patent rights are strongly correlated with the (unobserved) value of the innova-
tion across countries, ﬁrms and years. The positive correlation can arise if the incumbent
negotiates a broader patent for the innovation that will produce higher expected proﬁts in
Finland. This proﬁtability may increase the rival's incentives to enter the market during
patent protection which biases the eﬀect of the patent breadth on early competition up-
wards. If the litigation risk increases with patent breadth, the value of the innovation can
be negatively correlated with the patent breadth. The eﬀect of the patent breadth may
thus be downwards biased. Respectively, the eﬀect of the patent length on competition
during the patent period can be either upwards or downwards biased. The negative cor-
relation between proﬁtability and the patent length arises if the marketing authorization
process takes longer for the drug that produces serious adverse eﬀects for patients. The
bias upwards arises if regulators and a drug ﬁrm speed up the marketing authorization
procedure when the value of the innovation is high.
There are several reasons to believe that the endogeneity of the patent rights may not be
a serious issue. First, the incumbent may not be able to anticipate the proﬁtability of its
innovation at the time when decisions about the patent's length and breadth are made.
This may happen if the value of the innovation is very uncertain.30 Second, the patent
breadth is likely to be determined by the technological and human capital (innovators)
advances of the innovative ﬁrm. In the empirical model, the general level of technology
and human capital are controlled by the ﬁrst publication year of the patent and the
time trend. Due to technological development and the long time diﬀerence between the
development of the original innovation and early competition, these advances may not
30There is the large literature on the role of uncertainty in the demand for pharmaceuticals. See e.g.
Crawford and Shum, 2005.
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aﬀect the entry incentives of imitators and parallel importers.31 Third, the patent length
is also determined by several other factors that are not probably highly correlated with the
entry decisions of imitators and parallel importers to Finland, including 1.) legal deadlines
which account for roughly one month, 2.) the monitoring and control of regulators, 3.)
competition between regulatory agencies and 4.) the overall number of applications.
4.4 Estimation
This section presents the estimation results of the survival analysis in Table 4.2. The table
contains CPH models for imitation and parallel trade (models 1-4) and Cox competing
hazard (CCH) models for the hazard rate of early competition (models 5-6). The patent
length is measured in two ways: number of years either from the patent application date
(models 1,3,5) or from the date of grant (models 2,4,6) to the date of SPC expiration. In
the CPH models, I explain the number of years from the entry of an incumbent either to
patent expiration or to the speciﬁc event (imitation or parallel trade). In the CCH models,
I consider the incumbent's exclusivity period during patent protection, i.e. number of
years from the entry of an incumbent either to patent expiration or to early competition.
In the second subsection, I evaluate the robustness of the results.
31For this particular reason, Morton (2000) used years on patent as an instrument for brand advertising
before patent expiration in the analysis of its eﬀect on generic entry.
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Table 4.2: Estimation results for Cox hazard models in the sample of markets
Imitation Imitation Parallel Parallel Competing Competing
importation importation risks risks
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Patent length (years),
from grant 0.156 0.059 0.211
(0.179) (0.063) (0.126)
from application 0.028 0.007 0.155
(0.190) (0.073) (0.183)
Claims -0.104∗ -0.106 -0.010 -0.005 -0.072∗ -0.086∗
(0.048) (0.065) (0.034) (0.036) (0.032) (0.034)
Interaction with
a parallel trade indicator
Patent length (years),
from application -0.109
(0.195)
from grant -0.133
(0.134)
Claims 0.047 0.055
(0.035) (0.035)
Year -0.206∗∗ -0.195∗∗ 0.069 0.059 -0.021 -0.015
(0.074) (0.075) (0.064) (0.066) (0.063) (0.063)
Publication year6 0.200∗ 0.206 0.027 0.026 0.011 0.012
(0.100) (0.135) (0.046) (0.044) (0.036) (0.036)
Patent family size 0.050 0.054 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
(0.028) (0.044) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010)
Priority country in Europe (1: yes, 0: no) -2.459 -2.330 0.223 0.315 -0.242 -0.355
(2.011) (2.294) (0.478) (0.490) (0.397) (0.393)
Cited documents -0.009 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.004 0.002
(0.028) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
Nbr of inventors 0.166 0.170 0.009 0.009 0.060 0.056
(0.092) (0.113) (0.082) (0.077) (0.045) (0.045)
Nbr of international
patent classiﬁcations 0.282 0.359 0.184 0.163 0.229 0.230
(0.444) (0.635) (0.183) (0.185) (0.168) (0.166)
First in ATC4-group
(1: yes, 0: no) -0.542 -0.574 0.518 0.457 0.171 0.181
(1.730) (1.517) (0.467) (0.458) (0.424) (0.437)
Prescribing restriction (1: yes, 0: no) -1.029 -0.850 -1.446 -1.443 -1.314∗ -1.345∗
(1.360) (1.273) (0.809) (0.791) (0.640) (0.655)
AIC 48.041 47.619 208.937 208.209 245.846 248.184
R2 0.015 0.015 0.009 0.010 0.007 0.006
Max. R2 0.044 0.044 0.182 0.182 0.115 0.115
Num. events 5 5 24 24 29 29
Num. obs. 860 860 979 979 1912 1912
1 The eﬀective patent life starts from the entry of an incumbent.
2 The value of the variable is its maximum number within the family of a patent.
3 In the competing risks model, separate baseline hazard functions are allowed for imitators and parallel importers.
4 Signiﬁcance starts for the P-value: P ≤ 0.10 (.), P≤ 0.05 (*), P ≤ 0.01 (**), P ≤ 0.001 (***).
5 Standard errors are clustered at an active ingredient level (ATC5).
6 Minimum within a patent family.
7 The number of international patent classiﬁcations.
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4.4.1 Discussion
The patent length
I ﬁrst discuss the eﬀects of the patent length on the risk of imitation. The results indi-
cate that both variables for patent length have economically signiﬁcant but statistically
imprecise eﬀects on the hazard rate of imitation (models 1-2 in Table 4.2). I ﬁnd that one
year increase in the patent length starting from the application increases the imitation
rate by 100× (e0.243− 1) = 28%. When the patent length from the grant increases by one
year, the rate of imitation increases by 35%.
There are several reasons why the patent length from its grant has a higher eﬀect on
imitation than the length from the application date. First, the patent application is
not published immediately after the application. Thus it can take time until imitators
or parallel traders receive information about the innovation. Second, the length and
breadth of a patent are likely to be uncertain at the beginning of the patent grant process
(see e.g. Gans et al., 2008). Third, less valuable or novel innovations may have longer
application times. The eﬀect of the patent length from the application date may thereby
be downwards biased.
The results of models 3-4 suggest that the eﬀects of patent length variables on the rate of
parallel trade are both economically and statistically insigniﬁcant. For example, one year
increase in the patent length from the application increases the hazard rate of parallel
importation by 0.7%. The standard error of the patent length coeﬃcient is 10 times larger
than the estimated coeﬃcient. Corresponding to the previous results for imitation, the
point estimate for the eﬀect of the patent length from the grant is somewhat higher, 6%,
but it is also statistically insigniﬁcant.
Coeﬃcient estimates of the CCR models (columns 5-6) show that one year increase in
the length of a patent from its application (grant) increases the hazard rate that the ﬁrst
competitor is an imitator by 17% (23%), but the eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant.
The explanation for why these eﬀects are smaller than those from the CPH models for
imitation (columns 2-3) is that in many cases the ﬁrst entrant is a parallel importer.
The eﬀects of both patent length variables on the hazard rate of parallel trade are again
economically and statistically insigniﬁcant. Overall, these results suggest that a longer
patent may induce imitation but it does not aﬀect the risk of parallel trade.
127
The patent breadth
The parameter estimates for the number of claims provide important evidence on the
entry deterrence eﬀect of the patent breadth on imitation. To be more precise, the yearly
hazard rate of imitation decreases by 11 − 13% when the number of claims increases by
one (models 1 and 2). This eﬀect is also statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% signiﬁcance
level.
As expected, the number of claims does not seem to aﬀect the rate of parallel importation
as its coeﬃcient estimates for models 3-4 are close to zero and imprecise. The results from
the competing risks models (models 5-6) suggest that the eﬀects of the number of claims
on the risk that the ﬁrst competitor in an imitator is smaller than the corresponding
eﬀects in the models 1-2. Again, these results are driven by the observation that the ﬁrst
entrant is more often a parallel importer than an imitator.
Other characteristics
The results for the year -variable suggest that the rate of imitation has decreased and
the rate of parallel trade has not change over years.32 The other characteristics of the
innovation do not change the risk of early competition. To be more speciﬁc, the coeﬃcient
estimates the patent family size are close to zero and do not diﬀer statistically signiﬁcantly
from zero.33 Correspondingly, the priority area does not aﬀect the rates of imitation and
parallel importation. The point estimates of the number of cited documents suggest that
the number of cited documents and the number of inventors do not aﬀect the rate of paral-
lel trade and are almost zero. Finally, the number of IPCs has a statistically insigniﬁcant
but positive eﬀect on the rates of parallel trade and competition. For example, when the
number of IPCs increases by one, the hazard rate of imitation increases by 19− 25%.
The ﬁnal set of variables measures the market size and cost factors that can aﬀect proﬁts.
The results show that "drastic" innovations (the ﬁrst product in an ATC4-group) are
less likely to be imitated but face more parallel trade. Even though the coeﬃcients
of the drastic innovation indicator have economically signiﬁcant magnitudes, they are
32To be more speciﬁc, the longer the time in years from the entry of an incumbent to the end of the
observation period is, the higher the rate of imitation is.
33The results should not be interpreted as causal eﬀects because the patent family size over time is likely
to be endogenous. For example, competition during patent protection can decrease the expected proﬁts
of the incumbent and thereby decrease incentives to patent the original innovation in other countries.
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imprecisely estimated. The rate of early competition is lower for products that can not
be prescribed by all physicians than other products without such restrictions.
4.4.2 Robustness
In this subsection, I evaluate the robustness of the results concerning the eﬀects of the
length and claims on the rates of imitation and parallel trade. First, in 34% of markets,
information on the number of claims is missing. If this sample selection to non-missing
and missing observations is not random, the estimation results can be biased. This is
particularly true if the information is missing for, say, less proﬁtable innovations. To
evaluate the importance of this, I study how the point estimates of both patent length
variables change when the number of claims is not controlled. The results in Table 4.3
suggest that one year increase in the length of a patent from grant (application) increases
the rate of imitation by 12% (10%) which is less than when claims are controlled. The
corresponding coeﬃcient estimate for the rate of parallel importation is 0.058 (0.041). The
point estimates of both patent length variables are statistically insigniﬁcant. Overall, the
results regarding to the eﬀects of the patent length variables do not change much when
the number of claims is not controlled. This suggests that the missing observations of
claims do not bias the results.
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Table 4.3: Estimation results for Cox hazard models without claims in the sample of
markets
Imitation Imitation Parallel Parallel Competing Competing
importation importation risks risks
Patent length (years),
from grant 0.114 0.058 0.053
(0.069) (0.050) (0.080)
from application 0.094 0.041 -0.013
(0.077) (0.068) (0.069)
Interaction with
a parallel trade indicator
from grant 0.029
(0.086)
from application 0.095
(0.094)
Year -0.234∗ -0.239∗ 0.081 0.078 -0.035 -0.026
(0.104) (0.096) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.056)
Publication year6 0.044 0.036 0.000 -0.003 0.006 0.013
(0.061) (0.059) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022)
Patent family size 0.007 0.006 -0.003 -0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.020) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Priority country in Europe (1: yes, 0: no) -0.564 -0.594 0.035 0.015 -0.285 -0.243
(0.498) (0.492) (0.383) (0.383) (0.304) (0.304)
Cited documents -0.005 0.002 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 -0.008
(0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016)
Nbr of inventors 0.065 0.072 -0.035 -0.026 0.034 0.023
(0.069) (0.063) (0.084) (0.080) (0.048) (0.053)
Nbr of international
patent classiﬁcations -0.172 -0.173 0.253 0.273 0.077 0.061
(0.237) (0.253) (0.154) (0.153) (0.148) (0.138)
First in ATC4-group (1: yes, 0: no) -0.234 -0.250 0.300 0.298 0.079 0.082
(0.506) (0.510) (0.383) (0.372) (0.314) (0.317)
Prescribing restriction
(1: yes, 0: no) 0.174 0.099 -1.727∗ -1.734∗ -0.891 -0.860
(0.708) (0.709) (0.768) (0.757) (0.505) (0.513)
AIC 160.502 159.255 339.694 338.851 464.519 466.066
R2 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.002
Max. R2 0.084 0.084 0.180 0.180 0.130 0.130
Num. events 17 17 36 36 50 50
Num. obs. 1721 1721 1679 1679 3240 3240
1 The eﬀective patent life starts from the entry of an incumbent.
2 The value of the variable is its maximum number within the family of a patent.
3 In the competing risks model, separate baseline hazard functions are allowed for imitators and parallel importers.
4 Signiﬁcance starts for the P-value: P ≤ 0.10 (.), P≤ 0.05 (*), P ≤ 0.01 (**), P ≤ 0.001 (***).
5 Standard errors are clustered at an active ingredient level (ATC5).
6 Minimum within a patent family.
7 The number of international patent classiﬁcations.
In 5% of analyzed market, a patent owner did not renew its SPC before the expiration
date. In these markets, the values of innovations are likely to be lower than in markets
where the maximum duration of SPCs were reached. Because the value of an innovation
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may be correlated with the entry incentives of imitators and parallel importers, both
patent length variables may be endogenous. When markets, where patent owners did not
renew their SPCs, were removed from the sample, the results did not change much (Table
4.4). These ﬁndings indicate that the bias caused by non-renewed SPCs may not be a
serious issue.
131
Table 4.4: Estimation results for Cox hazard models, a SPC was not renewed in the
sample of markets
Imitation Imitation Parallel Parallel Competing Competing
importation importation risks risks
Patent length (years),
from grant 0.297 0.039 0.201
(0.249) (0.070) (0.133)
from application 0.222 -0.065 0.122
(0.342) (0.102) (0.218)
Claims -0.120∗ -0.134∗ -0.007 -0.013 -0.086∗∗ -0.072∗
(0.047) (0.054) (0.036) (0.034) (0.033) (0.031)
Interaction with
a parallel trade indicator
Patent length (years),
from application -0.147
(0.242)
from grant -0.144
(0.144)
Claims 0.053 0.045
(0.034) (0.034)
Year -0.199∗∗∗ -0.216∗ 0.055 0.067 -0.012 -0.022
(0.059) (0.088) (0.066) (0.062) (0.061) (0.063)
Publication year6 0.047 0.038 0.023 0.021 0.007 0.009
(0.063) (0.066) (0.044) (0.047) (0.037) (0.035)
Patent family size 0.008 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.017) (0.021) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011)
Priority country in Europe (1: yes, 0: no) -1.253 -1.394 0.292 0.214 -0.366 -0.263
(0.931) (0.855) (0.492) (0.486) (0.399) (0.398)
Cited documents 0.034 0.026 -0.003 -0.004 0.001 0.003
(0.026) (0.027) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020)
Nbr of inventors 0.084 0.067 0.008 0.011 0.055 0.058
(0.068) (0.062) (0.077) (0.084) (0.045) (0.045)
Nbr of international
patent classiﬁcations 0.223 0.172 0.137 0.144 0.195 0.203
(0.418) (0.350) (0.188) (0.187) (0.167) (0.170)
First in ATC4-group
(1: yes, 0: no) -0.994 -0.970 0.427 0.485 0.147 0.139
(1.254) (1.361) (0.457) (0.460) (0.433) (0.424)
Prescribing restriction (1: yes, 0: no) -0.630 -0.730 -1.441 -1.402 -1.342∗ -1.327∗
(1.329) (1.396) (0.791) (0.816) (0.658) (0.642)
AIC 59.689 60.971 207.272 207.224 246.542 244.766
R2 0.013 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.007
Max. R2 0.050 0.050 0.187 0.187 0.119 0.119
Num. events 6 6 24 24 29 29
Num. obs. 977 977 936 936 1826 1826
1 The eﬀective patent life starts from the entry of an incumbent.
2 The value of the variable is its maximum number within the family of a patent.
3 In the competing risks model, separate baseline hazard functions are allowed for imitators and parallel importers.
4 Signiﬁcance starts for the P-value: P ≤ 0.10 (.), P≤ 0.05 (*), P ≤ 0.01 (**), P ≤ 0.001 (***).
5 Standard errors are clustered at an active ingredient level (ATC5).
6 Minimum within a patent family.
7 The number of international patent classiﬁcations.
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As a ﬁrm enters and exits the market in 2007 or before 2003, information regarding to it
is missing as the data combines entry information from the registers of years 2003− 2006
and 2008. For this reason, I ﬁrst restrict the sample to contain years before 2007. Table
4.5 suggests that the results are again fairly similar with those presented in Table 4.2.34 I
next focus on markets where the incumbent's entry was from year 1990 onwards and take
into account observation before year 2007. The eﬀects of the both patent length variables
on the rate of imitation become negative but remain statistically insigniﬁcant (Table 4.6).
To explain this, an entry of a competitor must have happened at the early stage of patent
protection because innovations in the subsample are fairly new. These ﬁndings suggest
that the results are fairly robust to the missing data due to sample selection.
34Small variation in the data does not allow for a further restriction that takes into account only those
markets where an incumbent entered a market from year 2003 onwards.
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Table 4.5: Estimation results for Cox hazard models, year≤ 2006 in the sample of markets
Imitation Imitation Parallel Parallel Competing Competing
importation importation
Patent length (years), risks risks
from grant 0.156 0.125 0.169
(0.179) (0.085) (0.133)
from application 0.028 0.128 0.122
(0.190) (0.120) (0.203)
Claims -0.104∗ -0.106 -0.028 -0.018 -0.071∗ -0.078∗∗
(0.048) (0.065) (0.031) (0.033) (0.028) (0.029)
Interaction with
a parallel trade indicator
Patent length (years),
from grant 0.016
(0.146)
from application 0.107
(0.242)
Claims 0.027 0.018
(0.031) (0.030)
Year -0.206∗∗ -0.195∗∗ 0.044 0.051 -0.067 -0.078
(0.074) (0.075) (0.080) (0.076) (0.066) (0.069)
Publication year6 0.200∗ 0.206 0.008 0.006 -0.007 0.000
(0.100) (0.135) (0.054) (0.052) (0.044) (0.045)
Patent family size 0.050 0.054 -0.026 -0.025 -0.014 -0.018
(0.028) (0.044) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.015)
Priority country in Europe (1: yes, 0: no) -2.459 -2.330 0.068 0.227 -0.592 -0.764
(2.011) (2.294) (0.506) (0.540) (0.449) (0.443)
Cited documents -0.009 0.002 0.016 0.018 0.021 0.017
(0.028) (0.025) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.022)
Nbr of inventors 0.166 0.170 0.017 0.022 0.093∗ 0.079∗
(0.092) (0.113) (0.097) (0.092) (0.037) (0.035)
Nbr of international
patent classiﬁcations 0.282 0.359 0.368 0.364 0.473∗ 0.448∗
(0.444) (0.635) (0.210) (0.222) (0.201) (0.192)
First in ATC4-group
(1: yes, 0: no) -0.542 -0.574 0.974 0.975∗ 0.572 0.537
(1.730) (1.517) (0.518) (0.494) (0.498) (0.506)
Prescribing restriction (1: yes, 0: no) -1.029 -0.850 -2.061∗ -2.021∗ -1.511∗ -1.572∗
(1.360) (1.273) (1.045) (1.020) (0.728) (0.738)
AIC 48.041 47.619 146.875 145.864 171.707 173.503
R2 0.015 0.015 0.018 0.019 0.013 0.012
Max. R2 0.044 0.044 0.154 0.154 0.097 0.097
Num. events 5 5 18 18 22 22
Num. obs. 860 860 838 838 1636 1636
1 The eﬀective patent life starts from the entry of an incumbent.
2 The value of the variable is its maximum number within the family of a patent.
3 In the competing risks model, separate baseline hazard functions are allowed for imitators and parallel importers.
4 Signiﬁcance starts for the P-value: P ≤ 0.10 (.), P≤ 0.05 (*), P ≤ 0.01 (**), P ≤ 0.001 (***).
5 Standard errors are clustered at an active ingredient level (ATC5).
6 Minimum within a patent family.
7 The number of international patent classiﬁcations.
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Table 4.6: Estimation results for Cox hazard models, year≤ 2006, an incumbent's entry
in year≥ 1990 in the sample of markets
Imitation Imitation Parallel Parallel Competing Competing
importation importation
Patent length (years), risks risks
from grant -0.012 0.149 0.123
(0.125) (0.096) (0.137)
from application -0.286 0.198 0.055
(0.203) (0.152) (0.243)
Claims -0.237∗ -0.240 -0.049 -0.039 -0.080∗ -0.087∗
(0.112) (0.137) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.035)
Interaction with
a parallel trade indicator
Patent length (years),
from grant 0.049
(0.156)
from application 0.209
(0.297)
Claims 0.030 0.023
(0.033) (0.033)
Year -0.830∗ -0.872 0.019 0.012 -0.023 -0.020
(0.404) (0.501) (0.098) (0.109) (0.091) (0.080)
Publication year6 0.204∗ 0.186∗ 0.014 0.008 0.008 0.014
(0.101) (0.089) (0.054) (0.055) (0.044) (0.045)
Patent family size 0.015 0.000 -0.026 -0.027 -0.007 -0.010
(0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.012) (0.012)
Priority country in Europe
(1: yes, 0: no) -3.505 -3.191 -0.314 -0.147 -0.767 -0.933
(2.492) (2.535) (0.503) (0.551) (0.517) (0.484)
Cited documents 0.066 0.078 0.017 0.019 0.020 0.018
(0.048) (0.058) (0.019) (0.016) (0.021) (0.025)
Nbr of inventors 0.163 0.142 0.060 0.071 0.066 0.052
(0.095) (0.090) (0.065) (0.067) (0.051) (0.048)
Nbr of international
patent classiﬁcations -0.866 -0.887 0.490∗ 0.479∗ 0.360 0.354
(0.475) (0.507) (0.224) (0.226) (0.203) (0.201)
First in ATC4-group
(1: yes, 0: no) -2.058∗∗ -2.073∗∗ 0.623 0.682 0.333 0.246
(0.768) (0.778) (0.557) (0.549) (0.532) (0.534)
Prescribing restriction (1: yes, 0: no) 2.232 2.258 -2.149 -2.061 -1.231 -1.311
(1.177) (1.319) (1.112) (1.085) (0.722) (0.760)
AIC 38.739 39.229 133.308 132.599 155.141 155.607
R2 0.015 0.015 0.018 0.019 0.009 0.009
Max. R2 0.036 0.036 0.151 0.151 0.091 0.091
Num. events 4 4 16 16 19 19
Num. obs. 791 791 764 764 1510 1510
1 The eﬀective patent life starts from the entry of an incumbent.
2 The value of the variable is its maximum number within the family of a patent.
3 In the competing risks model, separate baseline hazard functions are allowed for imitators and parallel importers.
4 Signiﬁcance starts for the P-value: P ≤ 0.10 (.), P≤ 0.05 (*), P ≤ 0.01 (**), P ≤ 0.001 (***).
5 Standard errors are clustered at an active ingredient level (ATC5).
6 Minimum within a patent family.
7 The number of international patent classiﬁcations.
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4.5 Conclusions
I studied empirically whether the strengthening of the incumbent innovation's patent
rights prevents competition during patent protection. I considered two competing events
- imitation and parallel trade - that may decrease the proﬁts of the innovator on R&D
investments. I used data from the Finnish markets for pharmaceuticals that provides rich
variation in both patent breadth and length across innovations.
The results indicated that patent breadth prevents imitation but does not aﬀect the rate
of parallel trade. The ﬁrst conclusion is that patent policy makers should acknowledge
that rivals respond to changes in patent rights. The second implication of the results is
that patent breadth, rather than length, could be used to strengthen intellectual property
rights.
Further empirical work is required to understand the role of patent rights in competition
and ultimately in incentives to innovate. The next step could be estimate the welfare con-
sequences of increasing patent strength. It would be also interesting to study empirically
whether stronger patents delay follow-on innovation in general.
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